07-30-2007, 11:45 AM
Time to get tough on Pakistan
According to a recently released National Intelligence Estimate, the United States faces a "persistent and evolving terrorist threat" and al-Qaida is as strong today as before Sept. 11. The most important and urgent action that we can take to keep America safer is to root out al-Qaida's sanctuary in Pakistan.
Al Qaida has rebuilt the base of operations it lost in Afghanistan across the border in tribal areas of western Pakistan. Key leaders, including Osama bin Laden and top lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, are probably hiding in this rugged terrain. Training camps are used by the Taliban to support its insurgency in Afghanistan, and by al-Qaida to develop its capabilities. Plots in London have been traced back to Pakistan, demonstrating al-Qaida's operational control over a global network. We must remember that it was largely the sanctuary in Afghanistan that enabled bin Laden and al-Qaida to sponsor and carry out the 9/11 attacks.
Despite this direct threat, the United States has an agreement with Pakistan that prevents us from going after this safe haven. Our forces in Afghanistan are not permitted to pursue Taliban fighters once they cross the Pakistani border. Instead, we rely on the Pakistani government, led by President Pervez Musharraf, to target al-Qaida and the Taliban. Musharraf has resisted, relying on an agreement with tribes to do the job. Last week the Bush administration declared that Musharraf's strategy has failed.
The time has come to bear down on Musharraf. For years, he has captivated the United States by presenting himself as a secular moderate in a region beset by religious extremists. But his actions have not matched his rhetoric. He has promised to cease Pakistan's support for the Taliban and round up al-Qaida, but failed to deliver. He has promised to transition Pakistan toward open democracy, but continues to govern like a military dictator. Meanwhile, he has received $10 billions in U.S. aid since Sept. 11.
It is not acceptable for al-Qaida to retain a safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas. We cannot permit another attack on the United States. Further U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be conditional on Pakistani action. And we must be clear with Musharraf that if Pakistan won't take out al-Qaida, the United States will. Here, we have many tactical options that do not involve a substantial ground force: covert actions, special operations and air strikes, including unmanned aircrafts. Before acting, we would have to be certain that our action was the only remaining option to eliminate the sanctuary.
Musharraf's argument against this kind of direct action -- by his government, or the United States -- is that it would cause his government to fall and enable Islamic extremists to come to power. The reality is that his rule is endangered because of his own heavy-handed tactics, and his current behavior has facilitated the growth of Islamic extremism. Furthermore, Islamic extremists are not strong enough to take over the country; it is far more likely that another Pakistani general or a political bloc led by a former prime minister would take over were Musharaff's government to fall.
The United States must make clear that our interests in Pakistan go beyond the rule of its president. Musharraf has insisted on keeping his position as the head of Pakistan's military despite promises to transfer to civilian leadership, refused to permit former civilian prime ministers to enter the country, cracked down on independent media, and rigged elections. His recent attempt to fire the chief justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court sparked intense protests and was eventually overturned.
There have been some improvements in Pakistani life, including economic growth. But most ordinary Pakistanis see the United States backing an autocratic leader. As we take a tougher line on counter-terrorism, we should broaden our engagement with the Pakistani people. We should increase aid for secular education and civil society, so that we help create alternatives to radical Islam, and show the Pakistani people that we want to help them achieve a better future.
We need to proceed with care in Pakistan, a country beset by radical Islam. But we must also have red lines. In the rugged tribal areas of Pakistan, those red lines are being crossed as al-Qaida has reconstituted a base. For the security of the American people -- and for the future of Pakistan -- we must send President Musharraf a clear message: Enough is enough.
Musharraf promised much, delivered little (Sydney Morning Herald)
<b>The Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, is now not only a widely opposed leader but also a humiliated leader.</b> He is at his weakest point since seizing power in a military coup nearly eight years ago. Neither Pakistanis nor the United States and its allies, which have backed him as a critical player in the war on terrorism, can easily view him as a credible and sustainable leader any longer. What has brought this about and what is Washington's best option in the event of his downfall?
Musharraf is largely responsible for his predicament, but the US role should not be ignored. The virtually unqualified support he received from the Bush Administration following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US was instrumental in enabling him to renege on promises to put Pakistan on a path of genuine democratisation. The US too easily bought the line that Musharraf was the key to a stable Pakistan, just as it once consented to Pakistan's backing of the Taliban and a Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in the naive belief it would stabilise Afghanistan.
Musharraf publicly emphasised the importance of democracy and what he called "enlightened Islam". But he never failed to suppress and humiliate the main opposition parties - the Pakistan People's Party, led by the former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, and the Pakistan Muslim League, headed by another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, whom he overthrew. He did everything possible to keep the leaders of these parties in exile, expanded the role of the military in politics and allowed Pakistan's military intelligence to continue its role as a government within a government.
He talked about reforming Pakistan's system of religious education to stem Muslim extremism, fighting al-Qaeda and preventing the Taliban from receiving help for cross-border operations in Afghanistan. Yet he did not address any of these issues effectively. He made little headway in exercising control over Pakistan's tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan, where many al-Qaeda's operatives are believed to be hiding. In 2005 Musharraf deployed 80,000 troops to bring those areas under his authority but the subsequent truce agreement left the Taliban and al-Qaeda uncontrolled.
<b>Musharraf seems to have acted on an expectation that when foreign forces left Afghanistan Pakistan would reclaim the influence it enjoyed while the Taliban were in power.</b>
Publicly, Musharraf has sought to assuage the nationalist demands of two smaller groups, the Pathans and the Baluch, in the provinces of North-West Frontier and Baluchistan on the border with Afghanistan. In reality, he did little to address the poverty and social and economic disparities in these provinces. Instead, <b>he allowed many of his generals to buy large tracts of land at cheap prices and ruthlessly suppressed the Baluchi nationalist movement.
Musharraf initially allowed a degree of freedom in the media and the judiciary. But early last year he turned against them and recently moved to dismiss Pakistan's respected Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, for corruption. The real reason is Chaudhry's refusal to kowtow.</b>
Indeed, Chaudhry's refusal to step down has turned him into a credible opposition figure. His reinstatement by the Supreme Court this month humiliated Musharraf. The military's storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad to end a stand-off between Musharraf and a group of Islamic militants two weeks ago - and the subsequent spate of suicide bombings across Pakistan - has only compounded Musharraf's problems.
<b>The weekend announcement that the US and India have reached agreement on peaceful nuclear co-operation - allowing trade in nuclear reactors, technology and fuel, permitting India to reprocess nuclear fuel and opening the way for the US to become a "reliable" supplier for India's energy program - is another embarrassment to Musharraf.</b>
His position is now dire. If he is overthrown or assassinated, it leaves the US and its allies with difficult choices. One certainly would be to institute civilian-military rule, but this could only work if it led to democratic transformation. The US may not find this the most palatable option, but it is the best it can hope for under the circumstances.
<b>Pakistan cannot be left to its own devices; it is a nuclear-armed state, whose instability could have grievous consequences for the world.</b>
According to a recently released National Intelligence Estimate, the United States faces a "persistent and evolving terrorist threat" and al-Qaida is as strong today as before Sept. 11. The most important and urgent action that we can take to keep America safer is to root out al-Qaida's sanctuary in Pakistan.
Al Qaida has rebuilt the base of operations it lost in Afghanistan across the border in tribal areas of western Pakistan. Key leaders, including Osama bin Laden and top lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, are probably hiding in this rugged terrain. Training camps are used by the Taliban to support its insurgency in Afghanistan, and by al-Qaida to develop its capabilities. Plots in London have been traced back to Pakistan, demonstrating al-Qaida's operational control over a global network. We must remember that it was largely the sanctuary in Afghanistan that enabled bin Laden and al-Qaida to sponsor and carry out the 9/11 attacks.
Despite this direct threat, the United States has an agreement with Pakistan that prevents us from going after this safe haven. Our forces in Afghanistan are not permitted to pursue Taliban fighters once they cross the Pakistani border. Instead, we rely on the Pakistani government, led by President Pervez Musharraf, to target al-Qaida and the Taliban. Musharraf has resisted, relying on an agreement with tribes to do the job. Last week the Bush administration declared that Musharraf's strategy has failed.
The time has come to bear down on Musharraf. For years, he has captivated the United States by presenting himself as a secular moderate in a region beset by religious extremists. But his actions have not matched his rhetoric. He has promised to cease Pakistan's support for the Taliban and round up al-Qaida, but failed to deliver. He has promised to transition Pakistan toward open democracy, but continues to govern like a military dictator. Meanwhile, he has received $10 billions in U.S. aid since Sept. 11.
It is not acceptable for al-Qaida to retain a safe haven in Pakistan's tribal areas. We cannot permit another attack on the United States. Further U.S. military aid to Pakistan should be conditional on Pakistani action. And we must be clear with Musharraf that if Pakistan won't take out al-Qaida, the United States will. Here, we have many tactical options that do not involve a substantial ground force: covert actions, special operations and air strikes, including unmanned aircrafts. Before acting, we would have to be certain that our action was the only remaining option to eliminate the sanctuary.
Musharraf's argument against this kind of direct action -- by his government, or the United States -- is that it would cause his government to fall and enable Islamic extremists to come to power. The reality is that his rule is endangered because of his own heavy-handed tactics, and his current behavior has facilitated the growth of Islamic extremism. Furthermore, Islamic extremists are not strong enough to take over the country; it is far more likely that another Pakistani general or a political bloc led by a former prime minister would take over were Musharaff's government to fall.
The United States must make clear that our interests in Pakistan go beyond the rule of its president. Musharraf has insisted on keeping his position as the head of Pakistan's military despite promises to transfer to civilian leadership, refused to permit former civilian prime ministers to enter the country, cracked down on independent media, and rigged elections. His recent attempt to fire the chief justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court sparked intense protests and was eventually overturned.
There have been some improvements in Pakistani life, including economic growth. But most ordinary Pakistanis see the United States backing an autocratic leader. As we take a tougher line on counter-terrorism, we should broaden our engagement with the Pakistani people. We should increase aid for secular education and civil society, so that we help create alternatives to radical Islam, and show the Pakistani people that we want to help them achieve a better future.
We need to proceed with care in Pakistan, a country beset by radical Islam. But we must also have red lines. In the rugged tribal areas of Pakistan, those red lines are being crossed as al-Qaida has reconstituted a base. For the security of the American people -- and for the future of Pakistan -- we must send President Musharraf a clear message: Enough is enough.
Musharraf promised much, delivered little (Sydney Morning Herald)
<b>The Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, is now not only a widely opposed leader but also a humiliated leader.</b> He is at his weakest point since seizing power in a military coup nearly eight years ago. Neither Pakistanis nor the United States and its allies, which have backed him as a critical player in the war on terrorism, can easily view him as a credible and sustainable leader any longer. What has brought this about and what is Washington's best option in the event of his downfall?
Musharraf is largely responsible for his predicament, but the US role should not be ignored. The virtually unqualified support he received from the Bush Administration following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US was instrumental in enabling him to renege on promises to put Pakistan on a path of genuine democratisation. The US too easily bought the line that Musharraf was the key to a stable Pakistan, just as it once consented to Pakistan's backing of the Taliban and a Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance in the naive belief it would stabilise Afghanistan.
Musharraf publicly emphasised the importance of democracy and what he called "enlightened Islam". But he never failed to suppress and humiliate the main opposition parties - the Pakistan People's Party, led by the former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, and the Pakistan Muslim League, headed by another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, whom he overthrew. He did everything possible to keep the leaders of these parties in exile, expanded the role of the military in politics and allowed Pakistan's military intelligence to continue its role as a government within a government.
He talked about reforming Pakistan's system of religious education to stem Muslim extremism, fighting al-Qaeda and preventing the Taliban from receiving help for cross-border operations in Afghanistan. Yet he did not address any of these issues effectively. He made little headway in exercising control over Pakistan's tribal areas on the border with Afghanistan, where many al-Qaeda's operatives are believed to be hiding. In 2005 Musharraf deployed 80,000 troops to bring those areas under his authority but the subsequent truce agreement left the Taliban and al-Qaeda uncontrolled.
<b>Musharraf seems to have acted on an expectation that when foreign forces left Afghanistan Pakistan would reclaim the influence it enjoyed while the Taliban were in power.</b>
Publicly, Musharraf has sought to assuage the nationalist demands of two smaller groups, the Pathans and the Baluch, in the provinces of North-West Frontier and Baluchistan on the border with Afghanistan. In reality, he did little to address the poverty and social and economic disparities in these provinces. Instead, <b>he allowed many of his generals to buy large tracts of land at cheap prices and ruthlessly suppressed the Baluchi nationalist movement.
Musharraf initially allowed a degree of freedom in the media and the judiciary. But early last year he turned against them and recently moved to dismiss Pakistan's respected Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, for corruption. The real reason is Chaudhry's refusal to kowtow.</b>
Indeed, Chaudhry's refusal to step down has turned him into a credible opposition figure. His reinstatement by the Supreme Court this month humiliated Musharraf. The military's storming of the Red Mosque in Islamabad to end a stand-off between Musharraf and a group of Islamic militants two weeks ago - and the subsequent spate of suicide bombings across Pakistan - has only compounded Musharraf's problems.
<b>The weekend announcement that the US and India have reached agreement on peaceful nuclear co-operation - allowing trade in nuclear reactors, technology and fuel, permitting India to reprocess nuclear fuel and opening the way for the US to become a "reliable" supplier for India's energy program - is another embarrassment to Musharraf.</b>
His position is now dire. If he is overthrown or assassinated, it leaves the US and its allies with difficult choices. One certainly would be to institute civilian-military rule, but this could only work if it led to democratic transformation. The US may not find this the most palatable option, but it is the best it can hope for under the circumstances.
<b>Pakistan cannot be left to its own devices; it is a nuclear-armed state, whose instability could have grievous consequences for the world.</b>