05-03-2006, 07:21 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Dangers of Saltor demilitarisation </b>
Pioneer.com
G Parthasarathy |
There has been significant progress in recent months in expanding cooperation and reducing tensions between India and Pakistan, despite continuing incidents of ISI sponsored terrorism. The composite dialogue process, back channel and other contacts have led to an unprecedented increase in people-to-people contacts. A common ground is even being found in efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue, through greater interaction and dialogue, recognising that "borders cannot be redrawn". It would, however, be a Himalayan blunder if we are lulled into a sense of complacency and presume that the military establishment in Pakistan has become so benign that it would give up its efforts to "bleed India," or seek parity with India.
Remarks by <b>National Security Adviser MK Narayanan and calculated leaks to the Press suggest that the Government is considering a precipitate withdrawal of forces from the Siachen region as part of deal with Pakistan on "demilitarisation" of the Siachen region</b>. Such withdrawal would ignore the factors that led to distinguished Prime Ministers like Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao and Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee exercising caution and circumspection in approving proposals for demilitarisation in the region.<b> The Siachen region lies on the Indian side of the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. This territory has been defended by our Army, displaying immense courage and dedication</b>.
Military commanders of India and Pakistan met in Karachi in 1949 and agreed on the precise location of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Jammu & Kashmir. The CFL was demarcated up to a point in the Kargil sector near the Shyok River defined as NJ 9842. The commanders agreed that beyond NJ 9842 the CFL would lie "thence north to the glaciers". As borders proceed along mountain ranges in such terrain, the CFL was, therefore, to move northwards along the Saltoro Range, to the west of the Siachen Glacier.
<b>The CFL that was replaced by the LoC was strangely never formally delineated beyond NJ 9842. It was only after Pakistan tried to establish control over this area and sought to extend the LoC eastwards, to link up with China at the Karakoram Pass that Prime Minster Indira Gandhi approved plans for the Army to take firm control of the passes on the Saltoro Range in 1984. The Army has held these positions for the past 22 years in the face of relentless Pakistani attacks that ended only when the ceasefire across the entire LoC came into effect in November 2003. Pakistan eventually recognised that it could not overrun the Indian military positions in the Saltoro Range.</b>
Several rounds of negotiations have been held with Pakistan to end tensions in the Siachen sector. The talks failed primarily because Pakistan refused to authenticate the Actual Ground Positions Line (AGPL) presently held by the two countries. The seventh round of discussions on the Siachen issue in 1998 enabled the Indian side to make it clear for the first time that the main issue was not the Siachen Glacier, which was well within areas under Indian control, but Pakistani attempts to dislodge Indian forces from the Saltoro Range, which was on the LoC, overlooking Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
The Government reached the conclusion in 1998 that given Pakistan's assistance to cross border terrorism and its propensity to seize Kashmir by coercive force, the only issues to be discussed on tensions along the Saltoro Range were: (a) A comprehensive ceasefire along the AGPL (b) A bilateral mechanism to ensure the cease fire was respected and © Authentication of existing ground positions. The then Defence Secretary Ajit Kumar declined to consider the issue of pulling back Indian forces from the strategic heights of the Saltoro range.
Both Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao eventually concluded that by supporting cross border terrorism Pakistan had violated the provisions of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan could, therefore, not be trusted to keep its word on respecting the sanctity of a zone of demilitarisation in the Siachen region. No one with even a rudimentary knowledge of the propensities of the Pakistani military would have backed any scheme for demilitarisation that placed Indian forces at a strategic disadvantage. Besides, the Kargil conflict engineered by General Pervez Musharraf only confirms that what Pakistan army could not take in war from India in the past, will be sought to be acquired by subterfuge, stealth and low intensity conflict.
There are now indications that New Delhi is having negotiations with Pakistan that will involve a pull back of Indian forces from the strategic heights of the Saltoro Range and the establishment of an extensive demilitarised zone. There is also talk of a "peace park" in the demilitarised area. <!--emo&:angry:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo--> The Government appears to be even willing to pull back without Pakistan formally and irrevocably agreeing to specify the location of the Actual Ground Position Line along the Saltoro Range, both in the text of a main agreement and in appended maps. <b>Such "compromises" are said to be necessary to bail out an embattled Gen Musharraf, who acknowledges that his personal popularity in Pakistan is waning.</b> <!--emo&:angry:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo-->
It would be virtually impossible, after any such withdrawal, to retake these areas, if the Pakistan army chooses to intrude and capture the heights in the Saltoro Range, as it did in Kargil. Is it prudent or wise to trust a dispensation that harbours and assists those who behead an Indian engineer in Afghanistan, and refuses to abide by its commitment of January 6, 2004, to end support for terrorism on its soil, on an issue involving India's territorial integrity?
The Saltoro issue needs widespread parliamentary and public debate. It should not be dealt with behind a veil of secrecy. There should be no pull back from positions of strategic advantage in the Saltoro Range, unless Pakistan agrees to authenticate existing ground positions and foolproof mechanisms are devised to ensure verification and prevention of a Kargil type intrusion in the future. As the Defence Minister Mr Pranab Mukherjee stated: "If we vacate the posts and they occupy them tomorrow, how do we establish before the international community that this was what we had"?
In any case, a pull back from the Saltoro Range should take place only when agreement on a framework for a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir is reached and inked. Pakistan's then Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan had, after all, proclaimed in November 1993 that the Kashmir and Siachen disputes were linked and could not be discussed and negotiated separately.
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Pioneer.com
G Parthasarathy |
There has been significant progress in recent months in expanding cooperation and reducing tensions between India and Pakistan, despite continuing incidents of ISI sponsored terrorism. The composite dialogue process, back channel and other contacts have led to an unprecedented increase in people-to-people contacts. A common ground is even being found in efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue, through greater interaction and dialogue, recognising that "borders cannot be redrawn". It would, however, be a Himalayan blunder if we are lulled into a sense of complacency and presume that the military establishment in Pakistan has become so benign that it would give up its efforts to "bleed India," or seek parity with India.
Remarks by <b>National Security Adviser MK Narayanan and calculated leaks to the Press suggest that the Government is considering a precipitate withdrawal of forces from the Siachen region as part of deal with Pakistan on "demilitarisation" of the Siachen region</b>. Such withdrawal would ignore the factors that led to distinguished Prime Ministers like Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao and Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee exercising caution and circumspection in approving proposals for demilitarisation in the region.<b> The Siachen region lies on the Indian side of the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir. This territory has been defended by our Army, displaying immense courage and dedication</b>.
Military commanders of India and Pakistan met in Karachi in 1949 and agreed on the precise location of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in Jammu & Kashmir. The CFL was demarcated up to a point in the Kargil sector near the Shyok River defined as NJ 9842. The commanders agreed that beyond NJ 9842 the CFL would lie "thence north to the glaciers". As borders proceed along mountain ranges in such terrain, the CFL was, therefore, to move northwards along the Saltoro Range, to the west of the Siachen Glacier.
<b>The CFL that was replaced by the LoC was strangely never formally delineated beyond NJ 9842. It was only after Pakistan tried to establish control over this area and sought to extend the LoC eastwards, to link up with China at the Karakoram Pass that Prime Minster Indira Gandhi approved plans for the Army to take firm control of the passes on the Saltoro Range in 1984. The Army has held these positions for the past 22 years in the face of relentless Pakistani attacks that ended only when the ceasefire across the entire LoC came into effect in November 2003. Pakistan eventually recognised that it could not overrun the Indian military positions in the Saltoro Range.</b>
Several rounds of negotiations have been held with Pakistan to end tensions in the Siachen sector. The talks failed primarily because Pakistan refused to authenticate the Actual Ground Positions Line (AGPL) presently held by the two countries. The seventh round of discussions on the Siachen issue in 1998 enabled the Indian side to make it clear for the first time that the main issue was not the Siachen Glacier, which was well within areas under Indian control, but Pakistani attempts to dislodge Indian forces from the Saltoro Range, which was on the LoC, overlooking Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
The Government reached the conclusion in 1998 that given Pakistan's assistance to cross border terrorism and its propensity to seize Kashmir by coercive force, the only issues to be discussed on tensions along the Saltoro Range were: (a) A comprehensive ceasefire along the AGPL (b) A bilateral mechanism to ensure the cease fire was respected and © Authentication of existing ground positions. The then Defence Secretary Ajit Kumar declined to consider the issue of pulling back Indian forces from the strategic heights of the Saltoro range.
Both Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao eventually concluded that by supporting cross border terrorism Pakistan had violated the provisions of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan could, therefore, not be trusted to keep its word on respecting the sanctity of a zone of demilitarisation in the Siachen region. No one with even a rudimentary knowledge of the propensities of the Pakistani military would have backed any scheme for demilitarisation that placed Indian forces at a strategic disadvantage. Besides, the Kargil conflict engineered by General Pervez Musharraf only confirms that what Pakistan army could not take in war from India in the past, will be sought to be acquired by subterfuge, stealth and low intensity conflict.
There are now indications that New Delhi is having negotiations with Pakistan that will involve a pull back of Indian forces from the strategic heights of the Saltoro Range and the establishment of an extensive demilitarised zone. There is also talk of a "peace park" in the demilitarised area. <!--emo&:angry:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo--> The Government appears to be even willing to pull back without Pakistan formally and irrevocably agreeing to specify the location of the Actual Ground Position Line along the Saltoro Range, both in the text of a main agreement and in appended maps. <b>Such "compromises" are said to be necessary to bail out an embattled Gen Musharraf, who acknowledges that his personal popularity in Pakistan is waning.</b> <!--emo&:angry:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo-->
It would be virtually impossible, after any such withdrawal, to retake these areas, if the Pakistan army chooses to intrude and capture the heights in the Saltoro Range, as it did in Kargil. Is it prudent or wise to trust a dispensation that harbours and assists those who behead an Indian engineer in Afghanistan, and refuses to abide by its commitment of January 6, 2004, to end support for terrorism on its soil, on an issue involving India's territorial integrity?
The Saltoro issue needs widespread parliamentary and public debate. It should not be dealt with behind a veil of secrecy. There should be no pull back from positions of strategic advantage in the Saltoro Range, unless Pakistan agrees to authenticate existing ground positions and foolproof mechanisms are devised to ensure verification and prevention of a Kargil type intrusion in the future. As the Defence Minister Mr Pranab Mukherjee stated: "If we vacate the posts and they occupy them tomorrow, how do we establish before the international community that this was what we had"?
In any case, a pull back from the Saltoro Range should take place only when agreement on a framework for a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir is reached and inked. Pakistan's then Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan had, after all, proclaimed in November 1993 that the Kashmir and Siachen disputes were linked and could not be discussed and negotiated separately.
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