Spread Of Islam In Indonesia And Sri Lanka

[Guest]

Group,

Can people shed light on the subject?

-Digvijay

[Guest]

Brief history

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->In the 11th century, traders brought Islam to the islands of the archipelago. Just as the Indonesian had earlier adapted Buddhism to their own needs and beliefs, so they accepted Islam very much on their own terms. However, there was no centre of Indonesian Islamic culture, this scatteredness influence provide a major weakness when the Dutch arrived.
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[Guest]

Some google hours, and the following:

It was through the trade networks that Islam came to Indonesia around 13/14th century

Marco Polo, who visited the island in 1292, noted in his diary that the state of Perlak, on the northeast coast, was by this time Muslim. The neighbouring state of Pasai was probably also Muslim by the same time, to judge by a royal tombstone found here, dated to 1297 and written entirely in Arabic. The channel through which Islam flowed into the archipelago was trade.

By the end of this era most of the traders taking Indonesian spices west to Europe were Muslims from south Asia and the Middle East. Some Chinese traders were Islamic too, especially those coming from Fujian province with its long history of prominent roles in trade and administration being played by foreign-born and local Muslims.

For many Indonesian traders, conversion to Islam made sense simply because it gave them something in common with their non-indonesian muslim trading partners, who showed a preference for dealing with fellow believers.

For local rulers, conversion to the new religion offered more than economic benefits. In particular, the faith gave them direct access to fellow Muslim rulers in India and the Middle East, and especially to the Ottoman empire, then a major world power. Such contacts enhanced their political standing in the eyes of their populations and—perhaps more importantly—in the eyes of potential rivals. They also provided a conduit for the supply of military equipment, especially firearms (including cannon), and military advisors.

The conversion to Islam of the entrepot of Aceh, at the northern tip of Sumatera, in the mid-fourteenth century, and of Melaka, on the other side of the Straits of Melaka, perhaps half a century later, marks the point when the spread of Islam through Indonesia became significant.

From Sumatera, Islam followed the trade routes east. Gresik, an important port just to the west of Surabaya in east Java, was converted a decade after Aceh. Then followed Ternate, 2000 kilometres to the east in the Maluku islands (1460), Demak in central Java (1480), Banten in west Java (1525), Buton in southwest Sulawesi (1580) and Makasar in south Sulawesi (1605).

By the early decades of the seventeenth century, Islam had been introduced to virtually all the major coastal societies of the archipelago, <b>but from this point it made no further substantial territorial advances. </b>

[Guest]

<!--emo&--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/sad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='sad.gif' /><!--endemo--> I<span style='font-size:21pt;line-height:100%'><span style='font-family:Geneva'> don't know historical dts but it looks like precursor to East India company</span></span>.

[Guest]

I believe that in some parts of <b>South India</b>also Islam came via trade.

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-PC Guleria+Oct 8 2006, 11:28 PM-->QUOTE(PC Guleria @ Oct 8 2006, 11:28 PM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->I believe that in some parts of <b>South India</b>also Islam came via trade.
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To Kerala. Nowhere else.

[acharya]

Historical perspectives
http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/487/487%20ram.htm

A. N. RAM

back to issue

FOR anyone who seeks to understand Southeast Asia, the French historian and doyen of Southeast Asian studies, G. Coedes’ classic treatise, The Indianized States of South-East Asia, is a highly recommended reading. Coedes describes much of Southeast Asia and Indochina as ‘Indianized’ states, where two great civilizations of Asia, the Chinese and the Indian, merge and converge in unique harmony. Coedes calls this area ‘Farther India’: ‘From Burma, Malaya peninsula and the island of Sumatra, the western face of Farther India is turned toward the Indian Ocean.’

The same thought, in a different context, is echoed by historian K.M. Panikkar, who in his brilliant exposition, India and the Indian Ocean, speaks about the ‘influence of the Indian Ocean on the shaping of Indian history.’ For Panikkar, the geographical ‘imperative’ of the Indian Ocean – and indeed the Himalaya in the North – has conditioned and shaped the history and civilisation of this subcontinent. ‘The importance of geographical path on the development of history is only now receiving wide and general recognition,’ he says.





That Southeast Asia has always been an integral part of the Indian consciousness is borne out by the fact that the countries of Southeast Asia so comprehensively embraced Buddhism in all its aspects. This spiritual and cultural affinity became an inseparable part of their ethos and way of life. Successive Indian kings and kingdoms from the first century AD and even before to the beginning of the 15th century, had regarded Southeast Asia and the lands lying beyond as vital for their own strength, security and sustained development. This intricate and abiding web of relationships in turn contributed significantly to India’s sense of security in an extended neighbourhood in which India is neither seen as an alien power nor as a country with a colonial past. The relationship spanning nearly 2500 years was founded and nurtured on mutual interest and security in which both partners constantly enriched and reinforced each other.

The advent of the British in India and the struggle for influence between European powers that ensued all over Southeast Asia, suspended the continuous interaction that had existed between India and the region. Southeast Asia itself was carved up into areas of influence by the major colonial powers, viz., the British, French, Dutch and Portuguese. India’s cultural and commercial interaction with this region was therefore subordinated to the political and strategic considerations of the great powers. This left the ‘Indianized’ states of ‘Farther India’ free to nurture, develop and evolve a distinct cultural personality of their own, albeit heavily influenced by their long association with India and China.





Independent India, preoccupied with pressing domestic and other problems, took time to revive its age-old and all encompassing links with Southeast Asia. The end of the war and the decolonisation process in Southeast Asia, in turn, sucked these countries into the very core of the Cold War, leaving them totally submerged in its power play. In fact, many of these countries, for geopolitical and strategic reasons, were left with no choice other than to align with one or the other of the two superpowers in their quest for elusive security and promise of prosperity and development.

In the Cold War context, non-aligned India was perceived by the West as being inimical to its interests. Therefore, its Southeast Asian allies were discouraged from taking a non-partisan view of India and building independent relations with this neighbouring country. Not that India was immune from the vortex of Cold War politics. Our own close links with the erstwhile Soviet Union and an independent non-aligned foreign policy were sufficient reasons for the West to project and perceive India as tied to the apron strings of the erstwhile Soviet Union and to be viewed with a great deal of reserve and suspicion. The net result of this was that India and Southeast Asia drifted further apart, their relations lacking in substance, renewal and content.

For a brief period in the mid and late 1960s after the Sino-Indian conflict and emergence of China on the international scene, some Southeast Asian states did endeavour to explore the possibility of drawing India into their fold, as a possible partner in the context of their concerns over the lengthening Chinese shadows in the region. The tentative suggestion to invite India to become a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) mooted by some had to be seen in the context of ASEAN’s own concerns and perceptions at that time of possible expansionist designs and the threat of subversion from communist China. The events in Indonesia and China’s increased presence and profile in Indochina caused some consternation in Southeast Asia and possibly beyond. The creation of ASEAN in 1967 was also in response to this prevailing perception. Unfortunately, India was neither prepared nor in a mood to join this nascent grouping of Southeast Asian countries. Consequently, an important opportunity to renew and develop strong and abiding links with the countries of Southeast Asia was missed.





From then on, the hiatus in India-Southeast Asia relations continued unabated. India was perceived by many as too close to the erstwhile Soviet Union for any meaningful partnership. India’s policy towards Cambodia, when we were one of the few countries to support and recognize a Soviet backed government in that country, caused an enormous setback to our relations with other Southeast Asian countries. For Southeast Asia this was a test of India’s objectivity as a leader of the non-aligned movement. That India chose, for her own valid and compelling reasons, not to take what was regarded as an objective position, has not been forgotten by most Southeast Asian leaders, scholars and opinion makers.

India’s efforts to normalise relation with ASEAN, both bilaterally and as a regional association, met with limited success in the late ’80s. It is against this background that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao came to power and took some bold and far reaching initiatives to restore normal relations with ASEAN and the countries of Southeast Asia. His ‘Look East’ policy was well calculated and thought out. He saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to broadbase India’s relations and to focus on countries which were our traditional, and long standing friends of special importance to India.





Southeast Asia, under the ASEAN umbrella, had already become one of the new growth areas: countries like Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and even Indonesia were making rapid strides. They were variously being described as newly industrialised countries (NICs) and success stories. In the mid ’90s, after joining ASEAN, Vietnam also showed what was possible given pragmatic policies and the right opportunities. ASEAN, in short, was seen as a model for India to emulate. ASEAN had also become a rapidly growing source of investments, technology, trade and tourism for India (Table 1). It was impossible for India not to take note of this dynamic region which offered a real opportunity and a new, diversified option.

ASEAN too, surfeit with capital and exportable goods and technology, was looking for new markets to further its growth prospects. Many ASEAN heads of states had declared their intention of making their countries members of the ‘richman’s club’ by 2020. This vision needed to be translated through a pragmatic foreign policy in regard to potential partners – China, and more recently India, for obvious reasons, being on top of the list. ASEAN found it of great interest to launch a ‘Look West’ policy of its own, primarily focusing on India.

The early ’90s were a propitious time for India to vigorously launch and pursue a policy of intensifying, deepening and expanding relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. At the same time, in some ASEAN quarters, there were still lingering reservations about India’s reliability as a partner in view of the entrenched perception that India had failed the ASEAN countries during their most trying times. Mindful of the difficulties that existed about opening up, Narasimha Rao first wanted to dismantle the barriers and create a climate of confidence between India and Southeast Asia. His first visit abroad outside the Indian subcontinent, after becoming prime minister was planned to Thailand, the closest ASEAN neighbour.

The Thais took their own time to respond to this initiative but when the Rao visit eventually took place in April 1993, it was a resounding success. Both countries agreed to expand bilateral linkages in trade, investments, joint ventures, education, HRD, culture and at the people to people level. In a symbolic gesture, which was deeply appreciated by the conservative Buddhist society of Thailand, visa fees was waived for Thai monks visiting India on pilgrimage. An India Study Centre, the first of its kind, was inaugurated by the prime minister at the prestigious Thammasat University and academic links were intensified. It was decided to increase slots for Thai students desirous of pursuing studies in India, research proposals were identified for implementation, political level dialogue between two countries was initiated, and an ambitious trade target agreed upon.





Briefly, Rao succeeded in opening new avenues for evolving a mutually beneficial partnership with Thailand. He was received by the King of Thailand and given an audience for nearly two hours, a rare gesture. In my view, much credit is due to Rao for his foresight and vision that led to our Look East policy of which he was the unquestioned author and architect. He also made several short visits to other ASEAN countries during the next few years. This gave impetus and substance to the rapidly growing bilateral relations with ASEAN which was reflected at the regional level in India’s evolving links with ASEAN. He directed that special attention be paid to strengthening and deepening bilateral relations with ASEAN countries recognising that at the regional level it is the sum total of bilateral interaction which would make us a desired partner.

India’s Look East policy, to a great extent, was propelled and conditioned by the difficult economic situation in the country in the early 1990s. India had unfortunately missed the first wave of economic reforms in the late 1970s and 1980s and failed to benefit from the ongoing process of globalisation. Our economy was under great stress and strain and needed an infusion of new ideas, economic reforms, capital, technology, a large dose of investments in socio-economic infrastructure and modernisation. India’s domestic and regional economic space was too constrained for a large country like ours to grow in a rapidly globalised world economy.

An obvious and natural extension of India’s economic space, it was perceived, was ASEAN which in the 1980s had emerged as a significant and promising growth area of the world. With a combined population of nearly 400 million today and a land area larger than India’s, ASEAN’s GDP is in the region of US $ 400 billion; its exports, already significant, have grown steadily and are in the region of US $220 billion; it is an important destination for foreign investments and a major source of investments abroad.

In so far as India is concerned, in less than four years from 1992, our two way trade has more than doubled; in 1996-97, it stood at US $ 6 billion and a target of US $ 15 billion set for the year 2001 seemed attainable. From negligible investments in 1992, investment approvals from ASEAN upto 1997 were in excess of US $ 5 billion (Table 2). In the reverse direction, ASEAN accounts for a significant proportion of Indian investments abroad. Significantly, the region has emerged as a promising growth area in trade, investments, joint ventures, tourism, etc. The potential for increased cooperation, though immense, is largely untapped.

Just as for India ASEAN has emerged as a major economic space, for ASEAN too India has emerged as an attractive destination for export of goods, services, technology and capital. Faced with growing difficulties in accessing and sustaining growth in traditional markets, both players see opportunities to develop a mutually beneficial partnership.

The recent financial crisis in Southeast and East Asia, in fact, should have been seen as an opportunity for enhanced economic and commercial interaction. Unfortunately, India was slow to appreciate the nature and extent of the crisis and failed to make use of this opportunity to explore new avenues of partnership. While China and the other major regional powers not only demonstrated solidarity with ASEAN by providing financial support (bailout package) as also specific bilateral cooperation measures, India did not come up with any meaningful proposals.

The crisis could have hastened and helped ASEAN investment flows and trade with India: In the end, ASEAN investments and trade with India actually decreased (see tables). Yet another missed opportunity! The crisis, happily, seems to be ending now with ASEAN and East Asian countries ‘exporting’ their way out of trouble. India will have to look to the future by taking advantage of the expected sustained recovery of the ASEAN economies in the coming years.





It is precisely this rationale that hastened the process of India being invited to become a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992 and, thereafter, in a relatively short period being elevated to full dialogue partner status in 1996. Many ASEAN leaders openly conceded that they found India’s participation in their activities very useful. The four areas of cooperation, viz., trade, investment, science and technology and tourism have since been enlarged and given content through the setting up of working groups on trade and investments and science and technology.

A notable feature of cooperation in trade and investment is a study of India-AFTA (Asean Free Trade Area) linkages aimed at exploring enhanced trade and investment opportunities. Simultaneously, at the level of business and industry, an ASEAN-India Business Council (AIBC) and an India-Asean Economic Cooperation Committee (AIECC) have been functioning. Direct meetings between the business entities and industry associations of the two sides have been held regularly. The working group on science and technology has registered notable successes and joint programmes have been evolved.

The setting up of an ASEAN-India Informatics Centre at India’s initiative and through Indian funding has opened up a potentially important area for Indo-ASEAN cooperation. The other areas of enlarged cooperation include human resource development, people to people contact, tourism and cultural and academic exchanges. That all this has been achieved in a short span of 5-6 years speaks for itself and demonstrates that both India and ASEAN look at this evolving partnership with hope and expectation.

India has also participated as a full member in the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) since 1996. ARF is an ASEAN driven regional security forum which has as its members all the ASEAN countries and the major non-regional powers including the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, EU, Australia, Canada and India (there are at present 21 members). India’s participation in the ARF meetings has largely been unspectacular though quietly pragmatic. It has given us an opportunity to understand in the changed context ASEAN perspectives on strategic issues having economic and political ramifications as also explain our perspectives on major regional and other issues.





The ARF is not a security forum or an alliance; it is a forum for exchange of views and consultations among member countries. India is able to have a dialogue with her extended neighbourhood partners with a view to moving forward incrementally in building trust and understanding each others security concerns. The opportunity of having bilateral meetings on the sidelines of ARF has been particularly useful in so far as India is concerned. For example, at the recently concluded Singapore ARF meeting, India’s foreign minister was able to talk with the foreign ministers of the U.S., China, Australia, Japan, E.U. and the ASEAN countries who now have a much better idea of India’s concerns and perspectives.

ARF has also demolished the Cold War myth of India-Pak ‘parity’ in the eyes and calculations of major powers. India comes to the ARF as a major power and is now seen outside the prism of Indo-Pak equations as a distinct emerging power centre which is responsible, able and willing to play a constructive role consistent with its regional and global interests. India’s decision, announced at Singapore, to support the ASEAN nuclear free zone is at once a reflection of this reality and India’s geopolitical interests in this important neighbouring region. Likewise, India’s views and concerns on issues like terrorism and its nexus with drug trafficking, dangers of extremism and fundamentalism and the restraint exercised by India in the Kargil conflict have all found ready resonance in the ARF forum.





While our Look East policy was undoubtedly well conceived, articulated and successfully implemented in the early years, there are signs that we may be loosing the momentum and consequently a historic opportunity. Our bilateral relations with the 10 members of the ASEAN, though trouble free, have not yet evolved into a meaningful partnership in which both sides have a vital stake. ASEAN trade and investments in India, after an initial spurt, have stagnated, in part because of ASEAN’s own preoccupation with the financial crisis in the region, but also largely due to its disillusionment with India’s daunting procedures, requirements and an unresponsive bureaucracy. India’s trade, likewise, has not lived up to the promise of the early 1990s when bilateral trade with Thailand alone had exceeded US $ 1 billion and was growing at a healthy 25% per annum.

The ‘flagship’ ASEAN companies which had hoped to make India their hub for future operations are apparently having second thoughts and have slowed down their involvement. The now abandoned Tata-SIA airline project and the project to build a new airport at Bangalore for which a consortium of ASEAN and Indian companies had made a bid, are cited as examples of India’s inability to benefit from ASEAN capital, technology and entrepreneurship even in a priority area like infrastructure. These two cases, more than anything else, have been responsible for a change in perception about India among ASEAN investors.





The list of proposals that have not materialised even after protracted negotiations, delays and waiting is too long to be recounted and does make potential investors wonder whether India is in fact serious in promoting foreign investments and joint ventures. The damage has been incalculable and will take a long time to correct. One of the biggest problems facing ASEAN investors is their inability to comprehend and come to terms with the maze of India’s multi-layered administration and business practices. It must be candidly pointed out that India’s private sector too has been unable to respond adequately to the challenge. India’s joint venture partners generally look to the immediate future and short term gains in establishing partnerships.

Another related problem is our inability to identify and propose projects particularly in the infrastructure sector and indicate the terms on which these are being offered to foreign investors. There is a suggestion of non-transparency in our approach. ASEAN’s interest in some road and highway projects is a case in point. The result has been that major ASEAN investments in India have been slow to take off. In many cases proposals have been abandoned (for example, a major fishery project). We are now left with small projects in relatively low priority areas. They will move along only because they are too small to call for new policy initiatives or effort. In this climate it is difficult to visualise how ASEAN investments will prosper in the foreseeable future. These, however, are early days. Perhaps both sides will weather the difficulties and remain on course for the promise which the future holds.





Here it is pertinent to remark that the ASEAN model is of special relevance and interest to India. Inspite of the remarkable progress they have achieved, ASEAN countries are still at a developing stage, lacking a self-sustaining industrial and human resource base needed to propel and sustain a high growth economy. At the same time their experience in managing reforms, liberalisation and coping with globalisation holds many lessons for India. Many of them are today well integrated with the global economy and able to manage the socio economic fallout and negative effects of globalisation. ASEAN experience in evolving modern banking and financial structures is also noteworthy (notwithstanding the recent crisis in Southeast Asia and the collapse of some leading financial institutions).

There are other areas too in which the experience of ASEAN is relevant, for example, investments in education, primary health, population control, poverty alleviation, environmental protection and building of the socio-economic infrastructure to sustain economic growth. It is a model that we might profitably study and emulate with appropriate changes. Indeed, the evolution of ASEAN itself brings out many lessons for regional cooperation under SAARC and shows how to achieve incremental progress towards harmonising and integrating our economies to mutual advantage.

ASEAN has successfully experimented with growth areas and identified and evolved synergies and complementalities. Today, it is poised to optimise its potential not only through individual effort of its members but also by effective regional and global cooperation. Its future vision is not dissimilar to our own for a prosperous SAARC. While comparisons are sometimes invidious there is always scope to profit from each others experiences.

Our Look East policy in recent months has also stalled because of a preoccupation with domestic problems. Few visits have been exchanged between India and ASEAN. There has been no head of state/government level visit in either direction in 1998 (there were five or six such visits in 1997). Exchanges at other levels have also dried up. There are, evidently, no new initiatives on the anvil at the government or Track II level. ASEAN, though preoccupied with its own crisis, seems to have momentarily relegated relations with India to the backburner. Their disillusionment with India has only made things slide further. This hiatus must be corrected if Indo-ASEAN relations are to move forward.





Admittedly, governments cannot do everything; their primary responsibility is to create propitious conditions and provide a policy and administrative framework conducive to promoting partnership. The private sectors of the two sides have an equal responsibility. Here Track II has a special responsibility to come up with new ideas and initiatives. Unfortunately, there is at present no Track II forum in India to play this role. The entire civil society, including business leaders and operators, academics, media persons, opinion moulders, cultural personalities and the government must play their part in reviving the stalled Look East policy.

Apart from forging and strengthening abiding links with ASEAN in pursuit of her Look East policy, India will also need to take a fresh look at the opportunities of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. This region, which includes such strong and vibrant economies as Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, Australia and Hong Kong, already accounts for over 40% of our economic exposure and is both strategically and economically important to India. The APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Community) extends from the Pacific coast of the Americas to Australasia and includes the whole of Southeast Asia, thus bringing India in the ‘footprint’ of this region.





Recognising this, India has not only given importance to diversifying and developing bilateral economic linkages with these economies, but has also sought to become a member of APEC. This, unfortunately, has not yet materialised, though India qualifies both in terms of geographical location and an ability to contribute to the development of the Asia-Pacific region. However, it is significant that in 1997, India did succeed in becoming a participant in two of the APEC working groups, viz. on energy and industrial science and technology. However, at the APEC summit meeting held in Canada in 1997, a moratorium on inducting new members was imposed. India should use the intervening period to comply with the criteria and requirements for membership and intensify bilateral economic links with the countries of the region.

Unfortunately, as in the case of ASEAN, we seem to have lost momentum and our participation in the working group meetings so far has either been extremely purposeless or simply proforma. There is little awareness of the significance and benefits of APEC membership. It must be pursued seriously through intensified lobbying with member countries and by regularly placing it on the agenda of our high level political dialogues with important member countries like the U.S. and Japan.





There are many within APEC who continue to harbour reservations about India’s ability to participate effectively in the forum; there are others who believe that India’s compliance with APEC and WTO requirements is unsatisfactory. There are also those who are reluctant to bring India into the fold for fear that India may distract attention by bringing up extraneous issues. Our diplomacy will have to dispel such doubts. India’s goal should clearly be to first become an effective member of all the three working groups and thereafter to pursue membership by demonstrably complying with the rules of the ‘APEC club’.

India’s non-inclusion in the Asia-Europe (ASEM) dialogue is also most unfortunate. India is at the heart of Asia and a major economy and a political power; her absence from this forum makes little sense. Here again, entrenched perceptions of the members of ASEM about India are, apparently, a stumbling block. Indian diplomacy will have to work hard to ensure that India’s case does not go by default.

In pursuit of our extended neighbourhood policy, in 1997, India had made a good beginning in sub-regional cooperation with some immediate neighbours in the Bay of Bengal region. This nascent cooperation arrangement involving two countries of ASEAN, viz. Thailand and Myanmar and three countries of SAARC, viz. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and India, called BIMSTC, was meant to explore and optimise cooperation in trade, transport, tourism and infrastructure by developing sub-regional linkages and synergising opportunities on the basis of mutual advantage and complementarity.

This is a sound approach and needs to be pursued more actively. Here again, our authorities have failed to grasp the importance of sub-regional cooperation and follow up on some agreed upon arrangements at the 1997 meeting of BIMSTC ministers. Our initial response to such proposals as the setting up of a regional airline, shipping service and connecting the region by a road network has been hesitant and slow. The other sub-regional SAARC grouping involving India, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh, has also failed to take off effectively.





The approach based on evolution of growth areas and sub-regional cooperation had proved successful in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. India must make better use of these emerging opportunities to compete in a complex environment. India has no choice but to adopt a multi-layer approach to benefit from her geographical location at the meeting points of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and the vast hinterlands spread on both flanks of India.

Both Coedes and Panikkar were, in fact, referring to this civilisational and geographical advantage which not only gives India a unique opportunity but also makes it imperative for her to pursue an extended neighbourhood policy. It would be in consonance with Indian history, geography and traditional links with friends and partners in the region who have enriched each other for thousands of years. This, in essence, is the rationale and imperative of our Look East, extended neighbourhood policy.

[acharya]

http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/487.htm