Twirp : Terrorist Wahabi Islamic Republic Pakistan

[Naresh]

<b>Guess Mush the Tush’s Future :

1. Tête à Tête with the Lamp Post?

2. Ranch in Texas, Wyoming etc.?

3. Al Saud Al Arabia?</b>

[center]<b><span style='font-size:21pt;line-height:100%'>Musharraf is part of the problem, not the solution’</span></b>[/center]

<i>South Asia expert and co-founder of the Henry Stimson Centre</i>, <b>Michael Krepon</b> <i>tells</i> <b>HARINDER BAWEJA</b> <i>that America’s interests lie in Musharraf’s quick exit</i>

<b>How should the US be interpreting the election results in Pakistan?</b>

It is clear. The results are a reflection of the desire by most Pakistanis for the military to go back to focusing on military matters, not governance.

<b>More than a sympathy wave for Benazir, an anti-Musharraf wave seems to have been visible. Should Musharraf step down?</b>

My sense is that the Bush administration still views Musharraf as an important figure in the new set up. Washington doesn’t let go of Pakistani military strongmen easily. My reading of Pakistan’s history suggests a different course — that once a military strongman has made a big mess, he becomes part of the problem, not part of the solution. The Bush administration and a few highly respected voices in Pakistan remain unwilling to accept what they believe to be a stark choice between pre- and post-Musharraf Pakistan. The best reason for caution is the fear of the unknown, which may be worse than what we know too well. But the accumulation of political events may well have passed the point where familiar Pakistani and US techniques of political management and manipulation can succeed. These techniques have, after all, led to the current impasse; their continued employment could now accelerate the very trends that are most worrisome within the country, even if they are sufficient to keep Musharraf in power.

<b>How wise was it for the Bush dispensation to pursue a Musharraf-centric policy rather than a Pakistan-centric one?</b>

Patterns exist because they are repetitive. This is a familiar pattern. When a military strongman in Pakistan produces a big mess, the strongman doesn’t clean up the mess. Instead, he leaves the stage to allow others to clean up the mess. It is therefore essential that the United States proceed wisely during the troubled times that Pakistan now finds itself in.

<b>What should the fresh approach be?</b>

The hope of a transitional partnership between Musharraf and the political center has floundered. The die is increasingly cast between Musharraf and his narrowing circle of backers and the large ranks of those who believe his service to Pakistan is effectively over.

<b>The US still appears to be backing Musharraf. In fact, Zardari has had more than one meeting with the American ambassador in Pakistan. Is the US still backing the wrong person?</b>

My sense is that Pakistani politics will follow a logic rooted in Pakistan, and not in Washington. The PPP and PML-N are not well disposed toward Musharraf, and they will both support steps toward making the judiciary more independent — at least in the short run. This suggests that Musharraf will be hounded by court cases and judicial proceedings. The more his wings are clipped, the less he will enjoy being President. The United States needs Pakistan, and Pakistan needs the United States. If the forces of extremism prevail in Pakistan, its relations with all of its neighbours — Iran, Afghanistan and India — will become inflamed. The US and NATO military effort in Afghanistan will become much harder. The export of terrorism would grow significantly and it would not just be confined to Pakistan’s immediate neighbours. Most importantly, the disposition of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, which may well be larger than many suppose, would be in question.

<b>The results could be interpreted as also being a vote against the war against terror. On what lines should America be rethinking this?</b>

Pakistani society is very diverse, and holds diverse views, but a growing part of society now understands that Islamic extremism is an existential threat to Pakistan’s well-being. This has long been apparent, and will become more so. This threat, which counts Muslims as its primary victims, will grow unless it is tackled by the security organs of the State. The United States can help, but it can’t lead this horse to water.

<b>What would be worse for Pakistan and the United States: if Musharraf stays or if he goes?</b>

With great hesitation, I have come to the following conclusions : First, the political trendlines within Pakistan are likely to grow worse the longer Musharraf remains in any position of leadership. Second, the corporate interests of the Pakistan Army with respect to counter-terrorism, control of the country’s nuclear assets, and in handling troubled ties with Washington are unlikely to change appreciably if or when Musharraf goes. And third, the longer Musharraf stays, the greater the difficulties Washington can expect on all three fronts.

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