March 4, 2004
By GARY MILHOLLIN and KELLY MOTZ
WASHINGTON
America's relations with Pakistan and several other Asian countries have been rocked by the discovery of the vast smuggling network run by the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Unfortunately, one American ally at the heart of the scandal, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, seems to be escaping punishment despite its role as the key transfer point in Dr. Khan's atomic bazaar.
Dubai's involvement is no surprise to those who follow the murky world of nuclear technology sales. For the last two decades it, along with other points in the emirates, has been the main hub through which traffickers have routed their illegal commerce to hide their trails. Yet the United States, which has depended on the emirates as a pillar of relative stability in the Middle East and, since 1991, as a host to American troops, has done little to pressure it to crack down on illicit arms trade.
In the wake of the Khan scandal, Washington has at least acknowledged the problem. President Bush singled out SMB Computers, a Dubai company run by B. S. A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman living in Malaysia, as a "front for the
proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network." According to the White House, Mr. Tahir arranged for components of high-speed gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium so it can be used in nuclear weapons, to be manufactured in Malaysia, shipped to Dubai and then sent on to Libya. (In its investigation, the Malaysian government implicated another Dubai company, Gulf Technical Industries.)
American authorities say that Mr. Tahir also bought centrifuge parts in Europe that were sent to Libya via Dubai. In return for millions of dollars paid to Dr. Khan, Libya's leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi, was to get enough centrifuges to make about 10 nuclear weapons a year.
Why ship through Dubai? Because it may be the easiest place in the world to mask the real destination of cargo. Consider how the Malaysian government is making the case for the innocence of its manufacturing company. "No document was traced that proved" the company "delivered or exported the said components to Libya," according to the country's inspector general of police. The real destination, he said, "was outside the knowledge" of the producer. One can be certain that if the Khan ring's European suppliers are ever tracked down, they will offer a
similar explanation.
Dubai provides companies and governments a vital asset: automatic deniability. Its customs agency even brags that its policy on re-exporting "enables traders to transit their shipments through Dubai without any hassles." Next to Dubai's main port is the Jebel Ali free trade zone, a haven for freewheeling international companies. Our organization has has documented 264 firms from Iran and 44 from rogue regimes like Syria and North Korea.
With the laxity of the emirates' laws, there is simply no way to know how many weapon components have passed through. But consider some incidents that our organization has tallied - based on shipping records, government investigations, court documents, intelligence reports and other sources - over the last 20 years.
⢠In 1982, a German exporter and former Nazi, Alfred Hempel, sent 70 tons of heavy water, a component for nuclear reactors, from Sinochem in China to Dubai. The shipping labels were then changed to mask the transaction, and 60 tons of the heavy water were forwarded to India, where it enabled the government to use its energy-producing reactors to create plutonium for its atomic weapons program. The other 10 tons went to Argentina, which was interested in atomic weapons at the time.
⢠In 1983, Mr. Hempel sent 15 tons of heavy water from Norway's Norsk Hydro, and 6.7 tons from Techsnabexport in the Soviet Union, through the emirates to India.
⢠In 1985 and 1986, Mr. Hempel sent 12 more tons of Soviet heavy water to India that were used to start the Dhruva reactor, devoted to making plutonium for atomic bombs. (The details of these transactions come from German and Norwegian government audits, but Mr. Hempel, who died in 1989, was never convicted of a crime.)
⢠In 1990, a Greek intermediary offered Iraq an atomic-bomb design (probably of Chinese origin) from Dr. Khan in Pakistan, with a guarantee that "any requirements or materials" could be bought from Western countries and routed through Dubai. Iraq has said it rejected the offer and suspected it of being part of a sting operation, although a more likely explanation is that the impending 1991 Persian Gulf war precluded the deal.
⢠In 1994 and 1995, two containers of gas centrifuge parts from Dr. Khan's labs were shipped through Dubai to Iran for about $3 million worth of U.A.E. currency.
⢠In 1996, Guide Oil of Dubai ordered American-made impregnated alumina, which can be used for making nerve gas ingredients, and tried to pass it along to an Iranian purchasing agent, Drush Jamshidnezhad, in violation of American export control laws. A sample was delivered before the deal foundered when middlemen were caught by American officials in a sting operation.
⢠Also in 1996, the German government listed six firms in Dubai as front companies for Iranian efforts to import arms and nuclear technology.
⢠From 1998 to 2001, several consignments of rocket fuel ingredients shipped to Dubai by an Indian company, NEC Engineers, were sent to Iraq, in violation of Indian law and the United Nations embargo on Saddam Hussein's regime.
⢠In 2003, over Washington's protests, emirates customs officials allowed 66 American high-speed electrical switches, which are ideal for detonating nuclear weapons, to be sent to a Pakistani businessman with longstanding ties to the Pakistani military. American prosecutors have indicted an Israeli, Asher Karni, for allegedly exporting the switches through Giza Technologies in New Jersey to South Africa and then to Dubai.
The pattern is terrifying, and those examples are most likely a small part of the overall picture. So, will the Bush administration, with its focus on fighting terrorism
and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, start cracking down on the emirates? The first signs are not promising. President Bush has warned of interrogations in Pakistan and actions against the factory in Malaysia that supplied Dr. Khan, but has given no hint of any penalties against Dubai. Lockheed Martin is about to send 80 F-16 fighters to the emirates, and a missile-defense deal may be
in the offing.
The lesson of the Khan affair is that instead of focusing solely on "rogue regimes," we have to shut down the companies and individuals that supply them with illicit arms and technology. The United States and its allies have to put pressure on the countries that allow the trade to flourish - even if it means withholding aid and refusing arms sales. Unless Dubai cleans up its act, it should be treated like the smugglers it harbors.
Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on
Nuclear Arms Control. Kelly Motz is associate director.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/opinion/...1&en=b81a\
92350c13b154
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company
<b>THE NEW YORK TIMES
OP-ED COLUMNIST
A Nuclear 9/11
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF</b>
Published: March 10, 2004
EXCERPTS:
A10-kiloton nuclear bomb (a pipsqueak in weapons terms) is smuggled into Manhattan and explodes at Grand Central. Some 500,000 people are killed, and the U.S. suffers $1 trillion in direct economic damage.
That scenario, cited in a report last year from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, could be a glimpse of our future. We urgently need to control nuclear materials to forestall that threat, but in this war on proliferation, we're now slipping backward. President Bush (after ignoring the issue before 9/11) now forcefully says the right things â but still doesn't do enough.
there's the real rogue nation of proliferation, Pakistan. We know that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Islamist father of Pakistan's bomb, peddled materials to Libya and North Korea, and we don't know who else.
"It may be that A. Q. Khan & Associates already have passed bomb-grade nuclear fuel to the Qaeda, and we are in for the worst," warns Paul Leventhal, founding president of the Nuclear Control Institute.
It's mystifying that the administration hasn't leaned on Pakistan to make Dr. Khan available for interrogation to ensure that his network is entirely closed. Several experts on Pakistan told me they believe that the administration has been so restrained because its top priority isn't combating nuclear proliferation â it's getting President Pervez Musharraf's help in arresting Osama bin Laden before the November election.
"We're at this crucial point," warns Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "And how we handle these situations in the next couple of years will tell us whether the nuclear threat shrinks or explodes. Perhaps literally."
<i>Excellent article..</i> <b>Cost Pakistan Incurred to Build the Nuclear Bomb</b>
Guest Column-by Hari Sud
Cost of building the Pakistani Nuclear Bomb, since Zulfikaar Ali Bhutto initiated the program in 1974, has been variously estimated. Some experts have put the cost at $10 to $25 Billion dollars. Others estimate it as at low as $5.5 Billion. It is hard to pin down the costs as most of the Bomb making costs from 1974 till the 1989 cold test, have been deliberately disguised.
In the absence of any data, various peace groups, government agencies, and leaks in the various newspapers have attempted to estimate these costs. These estimates have served their purpose. American do not wish every country in the world to attempt building nuclear bombs, hence they suggest prohibitive costs. Present day dictators wish to challenge the super powers, hence embark upon this program to give himself or herself, parity with the super powers hence ignore costs at the expense of economic development.
........
.....
Pakistan and Its Quest for the bomb
Pakistan currently is exhausted with its Jihad, nuclear parity expenses and general economic collapse brought on by diverting monies to needless causes. It has probably lost a bit of its internal sovereignty to US by letting US joint control over its nuclear weapons. Columnist Khursheed Nadeem has asked recently:
* Why did Regular Pakistani army with nuclear weapons fail to win over Kashmir?
* Why did Jehad fail in Kashmir?
* Why has diplomacy failed to win Kashmir?
His point â Is it worthwhile to continue with high expenses on army, nuclear weapons and missiles, since there is no possibility of catching up with India and grabbing Kashmir. The technology developed so far can only be gifted away not sold for a price to defray the initial expenses. The driving force for these expenses i.e. the Kashmir issue and parity with India are still insolvable issues. Kashmir will always remain Indian and India is too big for Pakistan to get a meaningful parity, hence quite a bit of waste has happened in a country with poor resources.
<!--emo&:angry:--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo-->
<b>UN Council Unanimously Adopts Terrorist Arms Ban </b>
Wed Apr 28, 7:59 PM ET Add World - Reuters to My Yahoo!
By Evelyn Leopold
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - The U.N. Security Council voted unanimously on Wednesday for a U.S.-drafted resolution that would punish black marketeers who traffic in nuclear, <b>unless they go by the name of Khan chemical and biological weapons components. </b>
The measure would obligate all 191 U.N. member nations to punish "non-state actors" dealing in parts and technology for weapons of mass destruction.
Even Pakistan, which had misgivings until the last minute, voted for the resolution in the 15-nation council, giving the Bush administration and its allies a clean sweep.
Pakistan admitted this year that Abdul Qadeer Khan, a scientist revered as the father of the country's nuclear bomb, had smuggled nuclear secrets to North Korea (news - web sites), Iran and Libya, and was under house arrest.
<b>In an effort to get Pakistan's vote, the resolution was not made retroactive, a point noted by its U.N. ambassador, Munir Akram, in his address to the council</b>. <!--emo&:thumbdown--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/thumbsdownsmileyanim.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='thumbsdownsmileyanim.gif' /><!--endemo-->
The measure was sponsored by Britain, France, the Philippines, Romania, Russia and Spain as well as the United States. President Bush (news - web sites) at September's U.N. General Assembly called for a resolution to "criminalize the proliferation of weapons."
In a White House statement, Bush called the vote "an important achievement" and urged nations to enact appropriate measures. "We must continue to press these efforts to ensure that the world's most destructive weapons are kept from the world's most dangerous regimes and organizations," he said.
The resolution compels nations to adopt and enforce laws to prevent terrorists and black marketeers from being able to "manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery."
<b>'NAME AND SHAME'</b>
It was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which makes it obligatory for all nations and could allow for eventual sanctions and the use of force.
In this case, it does not provide any sanctions if the states do not comply. Instead, U.S. officials said they relied mainly on "name and shame" pressures on errant nations, and British envoys said any enforcement action would need another resolution.
<b>Pakistan's Akram earlier objected to the use of Chapter VII enforcement provisions. </b>
But Akram said on Wednesday that revisions in the text made it clear the council would not legislate for the world because it was not a representative body. The text now says it is up to individual nations to adopt specific legislation.
The U.S. deputy ambassador, James Cunningham, told the council, "No one nation can meet this challenge alone." He hoped states would cooperate in efforts to "stop the flow of these deadly weapons."
The resolution was negotiated over six months by the five permanent members of the council -- the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China.
It aims to fill a gap in the system of treaties negotiated since World War II to halt the spread of nuclear and other unconventional weapons to "non-state actors" rather than states alone.
In London, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said, "The importance of this resolution cannot be underestimated" as a demonstration "of the international community's determination to tackle the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."
Among the concessions in the resolution was to lengthen to two years from six months the life of a Security Council monitoring committee. The shorter period had raised questions of quick compliance in devising and adopting new legislation. (Additional reporting by David Morgan in Washington)
Moderate islamism and jihad are a contradiction in terms. It is a pity that Uncle Sam does not realise this while choosing the dancing partner in the dance with the devil. Wait for the nuclear 9/11 is like waiting for Godot. When it happens, there can always be a N9/11 commission of inquiry.
Kalyanaraman
Enemy in the ranks
Musharrafâs challenge: extremism, sectarianism. And the Pak army
G. PARTHASARATHY
Posted online: Monday, June 21, 2004 at 0000 hours IST
While Pakistanâs capital Islamabad is often described as a city of âbureaucrats, bores and boulevardsâ, the vibrant port city of Karachi has always prided itself with possessing the cosmopolitan ambience of Mumbai. And the posh suburb of Clifton, where the residence of Indiaâs Consul General is located next to the luxurious mansion of the Bhutto family, is regarded as the Malabar Hill of the city. Clifton is as heavily protected as Raisina Hill in Lutyenâs New Delhi. I still recall the relaxed ambience of the Clifton suburb where I used to jog past the Bhutto residence followed by two pot-bellied intelligence sleuths every morning. I was, therefore, shocked to learn on June 10 that terrorists had ambushed the heavily armed convoy of Karachiâs Corps Commander Lt General Ahsan Saleem Hayat at the very heart of the âhigh security zoneâ in Clifton. The corps commander barely escaped with his life. Seven of his security guards and his driver were killed. This is the first time a senior commander of the Pakistan army has been targeted in the heart of a metropolitan city.
The attack came barely two days after the Pakistan army commenced a second round of operations against alleged Al Qaeda terrorists and their Pakistani supporters in the tribal areas of south Waziristan along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These military operations have been undertaken because of increasing American pressure on the Pakistan army to âgetâ Osama bin Laden and his supporters. They followed military operations in April that had ended in disaster with scores of Pakistani soldiers being killed. There were reportedly instances of officers (up to the rank of brigadier) and soldiers refusing to fight their countrymen merely to please the Americans. With the Pakistan military now using air power to pummel alleged Al Qaeda strongholds and even the homes of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, the anger against Musharraf for his pro-American policies is mounting. These military operations have prompted the pro-Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda elements within Pakistan to vow revenge against Musharraf and his colleagues. But interestingly, there have also been reports suggesting that while the administration and army have acted against the Al Qaeda and its supporters, the ISI has been in continuing touch with these elements. Is Musharraf still trying to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds?
In a press conference just after he assumed office, Natwar Singh noted that while in India democratically elected governments based foreign policies on national consensus, the direction Pakistanâs policies had taken in the âWar on Terrorâ had provoked internal dissent, threatening Musharrafâs life. There have been a number of assassination attempts on Musharraf, who has revealed the involvement of members of the armed forces in one of them. Musharraf would obviously like to see generals whom he trusts assume high offices in coming months, as two four star generals, Mohammed Yusuf Khan and Mohammed Aziz Khan, are scheduled to retire in October. The favourites are Musharrafâs cousin Lt General Shahid Aziz, who is corps commander in Lahore, and Lt General Salem Hayat in Karachi. Was the assassination attempt on Lt General Hayat meant to be a signal to pro-Musharraf officers that they would be targeted? And more importantly, are there elements in the army who would like to see changes in policy towards Afghanistan and the Americans?
Evidently, there is increasing discontent within the Pakistan armed forces on current policies towards the US. Anti-Musharraf pamphlets are being circulated within the armed forces establishment. There is evidence of arbitrary arrests of officers whose loyalty and discipline are suspect. The Pakistan army has encouraged the growth of religiosity within its ranks from the days of General Zia. The numbers of bearded officers and men is growing, reflecting societal changes and the growth of Wahhabi influences within Pakistan. It is acknowledged that the plane crash in which General Zia died was engineered by Shia technicians of the Pakistan Air Force. General Zia earned the wrath of the Shias for his partisan approach that led to sectarian violence, in which Shias were targeted. General Musharraf was an ardent supporter of the Taliban and not unsympathetic to Osama bin Laden when Laden set up the âInternational Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusadersâ in February 1998 in Kandahar. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen were encouraged to join bin Ladenâs Islamic Front and to propagate the view that âHindusâ and not merely âJews and Crusaders,â were enemies of Islam. Ever since he was forced by Colin Powell to turn against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Musharraf has attempted a delicate balancing act of helping the Americans capture Al Qaeda figures while providing haven and support to the Taliban leadership and cadres within Pakistan. That strategy now lies exposed, as the Americans are attempting to force him to act militarily in south and north Waziristan where the Taliban, Al Qaeda and elements of the ISI appear to be still hand in glove.
Pakistan is going through troubled times, with its army divided on the approach towards fundamentalist groups it had patronised earlier. The army is still a disciplined force that functions with a clear chain of command. But it remains to be seen how Musharraf deals with growing signs of unease and discontent within what is the most pampered institution in Pakistan.
The CIA report entitled âGlobal Trends 2015â ominously noted in 2001: âPakistan will not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics and ethnic feuds. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the Central Governmentâs control will probably be reduced to the Punjab heartland and the economic hub of Karachiâ. India can only hope that the leadership in Pakistan will adopt enlightened policies that will enable it to end religious extremism and sectarianism and make Pakistan a âmoderate Islamic Stateâ. This effort would not only require a radical transformation of its internal polity, but also its approach to its neighbours and the world. A âmoderate Islamic Stateâ cannot afford to use jihad and militant Islam as instruments of foreign policy. It also cannot afford to just curb groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed that threaten internal stability, while giving others like the Lashkar-e-Toiba a free hand to wage jihad in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India.
http://indianexpress.com:8080/full_story.p...ontent_id=49383
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_pages/news_nukes.htm
This webpage provides a number of news links.
The following URL makes it scary pointing to the West Bengal and Bangladesh connection in the acquisition of material for the dirty nuke:
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Nuk...uke_news113.htm
The epicenter is Paki, with links to an octopus network connecting with Saudi, Libya, Iran, Malaysia, N. Korea and of course, the recognized nuke contractor, China.
It may be too deep for tears after a nuclear 9-11 occurs for Uncle Sam to cope with appointing a Nuclear 9-11 Commission.
How on earth can the policy makers and Brookings Institutions pundits assume the ability of US to control events in Paki, even assuming that it is a US-colony run by the military brass? Is US indeed such a super-cop that Uncle Sam can dance with the devil as a tactical ploy and get away with it?
Nuclear 9-11 is a game in town and US is playing literally with fire.
The West Bengal transit is an ominous report and should be investigated further by investigative indicjournalists. Or, is it a matter for the super-spy contractors of Uncle Sam to unravel?
Kalyanaraman
Title: Proliferator Pak hiding behind individuals: UN
Author: ANI
Publication: Times of India
Date: Jan 26, 2004
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll...show/445362.cms
PARIS : Individuals accused by President Pervez Musharraf of involvement in nuclear weapons proliferation serve as a front for states involved in leaking secrets, Therese Delpech, a UN disarmament commissioner has said.
"In reality, these private networks allow states to hide," The News quoted Therese Delpech as saying on Sunday.
Delpech is the French member of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
"Naturally, it's not the Pakistani state that is going to directly sell this information," she said, adding: "Private proliferation is often a front for public proliferation."
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Nuk...uke_news129.htm
Dirty Bomb?
New Evidence Raises Fears of Bin Laden Nuke
By Rebecca Cooper
Dec. 4 â A senior intelligence official tells ABCNEWS that Osama bin Laden has more advanced capabilities to detonate a radiological bomb than previously believed.
"Disturbing new information gathered by U.S. intelligence sources inside Afghanistan in recent weeks" indicates that bin Laden and his al Qaeda operatives have been working to develop so-called "dirty bombs" â nuclear weapons capable of spreading radiation across populated areas.
Dirty bombs are not traditional nuclear weapons, but a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material.
The intelligence official said there is "no proof that bin Laden has possession of a working nuclear weapon at this point," but adds that the new information gathered from inside Afghanistan "does indicate that al Qaeda is advancing in its knowledge of how to build a radioactive bomb."
The new intelligence on bin Laden's bomb-making capabilities is reported in today's Washington Post, and a senior administration official told ABCNEWS this new intelligence "contributed" to a decision by the Bush Administration to issue it's third warning to the public on Monday about the possibility of more terrorist attacks.
"It was one factor of many new concerns we have based on information we have picked up in recent days," the official told ABCNEWS.
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/Daily...bomb011204.html
Sleeping with the Nuclear Snake
Sunday, March 07 2004 @ 12:24 PM Eastern Standard Time
K Kapisthalam
In the furor following the surreal nuclear drama in Islamabad culminating with Pakistan?s dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf?s ?pardon? of Dr. A.Q. Khan, the world media missed another, more farcical event. It was US President George W. Bush and his administration spinning the Khan episode as a ?major success? in cracking down on global nuclear proliferation activities. As the famous boxing promoter Don King likes to say ? ?Only in America!?
The idea that A.Q. Khan was solely responsible for proliferating nuclear technology and material to Libya, Iran and North Korea is nonsense and accepted as such by most neutral experts and retired diplomats. Former Pakistan army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg openly called for nuclear ties with Iran in the early 1990s when the nuclear transfers supposedly began. Libya has had long standing ties with the Pakistani nuclear program starting with the funding of the then nascent Pakistani nuclear program by Col. Gaddafi when Z.A.Bhutto was the Pakistani leader in the 1970s. Surely the wily Libyan leader was not doing this out of the solidarity with a fellow Islamic nation. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear relationship was a simple nukes for missiles barter deal by which Pakistan was able to acquire North Korean NoDong ballistic missile by paying for it with nuclear technology, at a time when Pakistan was facing a financial crisis. The fact that Pakistan Air Force planes were involved in transferring this technology clearly shows state involvement in nuclear proliferation.
Reports quoting unnamed senior Bush administration officials in the media state that the US policy is now focused on uprooting the nuclear underground network that A.Q.Khan and his Pakistani associates had leveraged successfully to build the Pakistani nuclear program. For that reason, US officials argue, it would be worthwhile to ignore the A.Q.Khan pardon and not embarrass Gen.Musharraf by talking about Pakistan army and even his own links to the nuclear proliferation and focus on extracting promises from the embattled General to shut down the network for good. This theory looks good on paper but ignores certain facts, such as Gen.Musharraf?s track record in keeping his word. Be it action on the madrassas, cracking down on the Taliban or shutting down Pakistani terrorist groups, Gen.Musharraf?s record is abysmal. He usually makes grandiose promises in speeches to mainly Western audiences only to renege on them later. So why would Gen.Musharraf's promises on nuclear trade be any different?
Another point that the US seems to be ignoring is the critical role the nuclear underground has in Pakistan's nuclear program. Because of its weak indigenous scientific capacity, Pakistan has long relied on Western sources for sophisticated nuclear components. Even as the A.Q.Khan saga was unfolding, US Federal prosecutors were looking at the case of a South Africa based middleman who was caught in a sting operation sending nuclear bomb triggers to Pakistan. A UPI report mentioned that the South African's Pakistani contact was a person with ties to Pakistani intelligence. Clearly, for Gen.Musharraf to cooperate in dismantling the nuclear network would require him to give up details of his own army and intelligence service's hitherto secret ties to the nuclear underworld. In addition, were this network be dismantled, Pakistan would lose is nuclear component supply chain, bringing its nuclear weapons program to a grinding halt.
In this context, it is very likely that Gen.Musharraf's nuclear cooperation would be like his efforts in the terror and madrassa front - give misleading clues and eliminate low level expendable assets so that the Pakistani army interests are left unharmed, while doing just enough for America not to dump him totally. How does that help US National Security? The fact is that US policymakers have totally failed to grasp one point. American national security and Pakistani army interests are completely divergent. No amount of co-opting would make the Pakistani army destroy the nuclear proliferation or terrorist networks and logically so. Having a world devoid of pan-Islamic terrorists and a nuclear netherworld is simply not in the interests of the Pakistani establishment.
So what are the reasons behind this apparently injudicious US policy towards Pakistan? Outlook magazine?s excellent Washington reporter Seema Sirohi wrote in a recent column about a recent event she attended in Washington. The topic was ?Pakistan and Proliferation? and the person giving the talk was Robert Einhorn, the former US State Department non-proliferation Czar under the Clinton administration. Even though the topic was Pakistan, Ms.Sirohi reported, Einhorn wasted no time before he mentioned India as part of the ?regional problem? and said introducing nuclear weapons to South Asia was India?s ?original sin?. The best way forward with Pakistan, Einhorn said, was to ?forget the past and look to the future.?
In a nutshell, Mr. Einhorn illustrated the malaise afflicting US policymakers when it comes to Pakistan. It is called bureaucratic memory. In the 1970s and 80s, the US non-proliferation bureaucracy came to view Pakistan?s nuclear program as ?India?s problem.? After all, if India did not pursue nukes, why would the Pakistanis need them? Never mind that Pakistan?s nuclear program started after their defeat in 1971 by India and was a response to India?s conventional military superiority. The problem now is that this idea of associating India with Pakistan?s nuclear program and downplaying the clear and continuing Westward nuclear proliferation pattern coming out of Pakistan is so ingrained in the US diplomatic bureaucracy that it has become impossible to change.
If the decision makers in the US stopped to think about it, they would realize that the non-proliferation bureaucracy has been proven wrong time and again when it came to Pakistan. They believed Gen. Zia-ul-Haq?s assurances about not building a nuclear weapon in the 1980s, which proved to be a tissue of lies. As Einhorn himself admitted, the Pakistanis assured him the 1990s to look into the Iran dealings which we now know continued until recently. Gen.Musharraf gave his ?400%? assurance of non-proliferation to Colin Powell after the North Korea revelations came out in 2002. We now know that Pakistan continued to send nuclear material to Libya until late last year. We have seen Wall Street stock analysts called to account for their mistakes during the Dot Com disaster. We have seen US intelligence now being called to explain its recent failures in Iraq. Yet, the State Department South Asia Desk seems to be able to continuously make poor decisions with impunity.
The cliché goes ? ?If you sleep with snakes, you will get bitten.? One hopes that the American people don?t get a nuclear bite as a consequence of their government?s inexorable desire to consort with the Pakistani snake. (The Kashmir Telegraph)
http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.ph...7172416552
Outside View:Rewarding China's Proliferation
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
A UPI Ouside View
Atlanta, GA, Jun. 17 (UPI) -- In a move that went all but unnoticed by the rest of the world, the People's Republic of China was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group at a meeting in Sweden at the end of May. The NSG is an informal cartel made up of 40 nations that work together to coordinate and control the trade of nuclear reactor technology and 'dual-use' materials. More specifically, the NSG forbids its members from trading with nations which do not adopt "full-scope" International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their entire nuclear program.
The United States non-proliferation bureaucracy played an active role in supporting China's bid to join the NSG. In a hearing on May 18, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told the House International Relations committee that by the 1990s, China began "taking a more serious approach to nonproliferation issues" and that the U.S. began a long-term dialogue with the Asian giant which promised China more nuclear co-operation in return for stronger export control laws.
Wolf told congressmen that in the State Department's view, China's progress since then has been sufficient enough to warrant strong U.S. support for moves like China's joining of the NSG.
Unfortunately, this a short-sighted move that once again betrays an unwillingness to learn from history on the part of American non-proliferation bureaucracy. Just days before it formally joined the NSG, China finalized a deal with Pakistan to build a 300 Mega-watt nuclear reactor.
This is especially galling because China knew that it could not trade nuclear technology with Pakistan after it joined the group. What makes this more appalling is that China concluded this hasty deal even as Pakistan's role in the A.Q. Khan nuclear scandal, which is perhaps the worst nuclear proliferation scandal in history, was unraveling.
China itself was implicated in the same scandal with indisputable evidence of its transfer of a nuclear warhead design, with detailed manufacturing instructions, partly in Chinese, to Pakistan, in direct violation of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty commitment.
The 25 kiloton Chinese implosion device design freely circulated within the A.Q. Khan network and there is no telling which other countries and more ominously, terrorist groups managed to acquire the warhead design.
Nuclear weapons expert David Albright has stated that this Chinese bomb design would be ideal for a terrorist nuke that could fit in a pickup truck. In the wake of this embarrassing and deadly revelation, one would think that China would be circumspect in its dealings with its proliferation partner, Pakistan. Instead, China's decision to conclude a reactor deal with Pakistan now betrays the nation's lack of respect for multilateral restraint regimes and shows a willingness to thumb its nose at the rest of the world.
The claim that China started taking non-proliferation seriously since the 1990s also does not bear scrutiny. In 1992, the U.S. slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11 ballistic missile components to Pakistan. After a written assurance from China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the sanctions were lifted.
Nine months after the waiver, the Los Angeles Times quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China had delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port of Karachi, making a mockery of its earlier pledge. In 1996, after obtaining clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical uranium enrichment components, to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, American non-proliferation bureaucrats bailed out China yet again by refusing to make a "determination" whether China violated its NPT commitments. For the rest of the world however, the ring magnets sale was a clear breach of Article III (2) of the NPT.
And there is no sign of improvement in China's behavior yet. The 2004 Annual report to the Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes that "Continuing intelligence reports indicate that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan and Iran remains an integral element of China's foreign policy."
This view fits in well with the actual Chinese actions, which are aimed to create nuclear and ballistic missile armed regional troublemakers like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to both keep the U.S. occupied as well as to stymie China's local rivals like Japan and India, while China builds itself economically. The report also debunks the notion that the proliferation happens without the knowledge of top Chinese officials by pointing out many of the proliferating Chinese companies, which are state owned, have direct ties to top-level government and military officials.
Former Secretary of State James A. Baker noted in his memoirs that top Chinese officials partook in the profits from nuclear and missile proliferation by government owned Chinese companies.
Another red herring is the issue of "export controls." State Department officials have prided themselves in their ability to help China supposedly shore up its export controls by working with the Asian behemoth to come with lists of what can and cannot be sold to other nations. But given that government owned companies with ties to top Chinese officials are the ones proliferating, reducing China's problems to one of bureaucratic regulations is like working with the mob to write laws to regulate itself.
Within a totalitarian regime like China, government laws are meaningless and can be broken if top officials want to do so. Given this, framing the Chinese proliferation issue as one of export controls, instead of intent, flies in the face of facts.
By seeing an American willingness to repeatedly believe their bad-faith promises and eagerness to bail them out when they renege, Chinese leaders only get to draw one lesson -- that they can reap the benefits of belonging to multilateral nuclear regimes while being able to selectively break its commitments with impunity.
In the May 18 Congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary Wolf told lawmakers that the U.S. has not even seen the contract that China recently signed with Pakistan. What is the State Department likely to do should China try to pass more nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan under the cover of the reactor deal?
Unfortunately, China's entry into the NSG is likely to turn into a Trojan horse that could only serve to further undermine global non-proliferation efforts.
-0-
(Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.)
-0-
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breakin...12653-2661r.htm
Why did Rumsfeld visit Bangladesh, in June 2004?
Kalyanaraman
Rumsfeld: Bangladesh may not send troops
June 05 2004 at 04:48PM
By Charles Aldinger
Dhaka - United States Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld held talks on peacekeeping in Iraq with Bangladeshi leaders on Saturday, but told reporters he had not asked the moderate Muslim country to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq.
Rumsfeld, winding up a whirlwind Asian trip, met Bangladeshi Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, Foreign Minister M Morshed Khan and senior military officers.
The secretary told reporters travelling with him that he discussed both Iraq and Afghanistan with the leaders of the country, which has a tradition of sending peacekeeping troops around the world under United Nations mandate.
'We believe that what they're doing is a very good thing for the world'
"We talked a good deal about the fact that Bangladesh is probably among the countries that has the highest number of peacekeeping forces around the world," Rumsfeld said. "They are, at any given time, in four or five different locations."
"We believe that what they're doing is a very good thing for the world and encourage them in that."
The United States and Britain are pressing for a new UN resolution under which the world body might authorise an international peacekeeping force in Iraq, but Rumsfeld refused to say whether or not he intended to ask Bangladesh - the world's eighth most populous country and one of the poorest - for peacekeepers.
"If I answer that question and say 'yes', obviously it would suggest that I've asked them, which I haven't. And if I said 'no', it would imply that we didn't want them," he said. "In either case, it would be unfortunate."
"I have a lot of respect for the peacekeeping role that this country has played in a number of places," Rumsfeld said.
'In either case, it would be unfortunate'
An American defence official told reporters aboard Rumsfeld's aircraft that "there are talks ongoing" between Washington and Dhaka.
"Bangladesh prefers to put their troops under a UN command. We think that's where they are now. I think there's room for discussion," said the official, who asked not to be identified.
On Friday, Khan had said his country would not send troops to any country "on behalf or against anyone."
Speaking to an Asian security conference in Singapore earlier on Saturday, Rumsfeld denied Washington was pressing its Asian allies to support the occupying force in Iraq.
Authorities clamped tight security over the capital Dhaka during Rumsfeld's stay, which coincided with an opposition-led general strike.
Dhaka officials said they considered Rumsfeld's visit as a seal of American trust for Bangladesh's firm stance against terrorism and recognition for the Muslim-majority country as a moderate democracy.
Thousands of Islamic activists and supporters of left-wing political parties staged noisy protests in the capital on Friday and Saturday to denounce Rumsfeld's visit and voice opposition to Bangladeshi troops going to Iraq.
They burnt American flags and chanted anti-US slogans before police drove them away, witnesses said.
Additional reporting by Anis Ahmed
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=12...37B215&set_id=1
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->United States Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld held talks on peacekeeping in Iraq with Bangladeshi leaders on Saturday, but told reporters he had not asked the <b>moderate Muslim country</b> to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--emo&:roll--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/ROTFL.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='ROTFL.gif' /><!--endemo-->
If you decimate your Hindu minority population by a few million you get accepted and even recognized as a moderate Muslim country. One has to read Jonathan swift (Gullivers travels) and George Orwelll to get a foretaste of the double speak that is practiced today.
In any event when our own government does not value Hindu lives why should the Americans or anybody else for that matter
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Sources in the National Security Intelligence, Bangladesh's internal intelligence agency, told NDTV that the package came from two Indian nationals who had crossed the border just south of Balurghat in West Bengal's South Dinajpur on the morning of May 26<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
This is serious.
Nuclear 9-11 is waiting to happen. Uncle Sam should get busy in his sphere of influence, Pakistan and really take real control of the Paki nukes and nuke-related human and physical resources there. Good luck to civilizations, while Uncle Sam continues to dance with the devil, calling it the only game in town.
It is scary. But these days even scary scenarios do not seem to scare Uncle Sam, the super cop. He can always appoint a Nuclear 9-11 Commission after the event. Sarcasm apart, it is time that the policy makers in US accept the reality of Paki links with Libya, Saudi, Iran, N. Korea, with the support of China, the officially recognized nuclear supplier. US policy-makers are literally playing with fire.
Kalyanaraman
Moscow Times Monday, June 21, 2004.
Report: Dirty Bomb Attack Likely Despite G8 Controls
The Associated Press Terrorists are "all but certain" to set off a radiological weapon in the United States, since it will take authorities too many years to track and secure the radioactive materials of such "dirty bombs," a team of nuclear researchers has concluded.
The U.S. and other key governments took an important step on controls this month, agreeing at the G8 summit to tighten -- by the end of 2005 -- restraints on international trade in highly radioactive materials.
But thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of high-risk radioactive sources are already in use worldwide, with few accurate registries for tracing them, the scientists say. They cite Iraq, where an undetermined number of such sources has gone missing in the postwar chaos.
The findings are being published in a 300-page book, "The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism," the result of a two-year study by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of California's Monterey Institute of International Studies.
Unlike warheads designed to kill and destroy through a huge nuclear blast and heat, these radiation weapons -- which thus far no one has employed -- would rely on conventional explosives to blow radioactive material far and wide. A successful bomb could make a section of a city uninhabitable for years.
The fear of such weapons grew in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States. Al-Qaida and Russia's Chechen rebels have shown an interest in highly radioactive material.
The CNS researchers highlighted a major loophole in radioactive commerce: U.S. and other exporters can ship high-risk sources abroad without a government review of the end user, including to such turmoil-ridden lands as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Colombia.
In many "end-user" countries, the domestic regulation of radiological sources is "fragmentary" at best, the study says. As a result, it says, "a radiological attack appears to be all but certain within the coming years."
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/20...1/253.html
June 21, 2004 SBS TV
DIRTY BOMB ALMOST CERTAIN SAY RESEARCHERS
21.6.2004. 09:35:43
A team of nuclear researchers has concluded that terrorists are "all but certain" to set off a radiological weapon in the United States.
They say it's because it will take authorities too many years to track and secure the radioactive materials for such "dirty bombs".
The United States and other key governments took an important step on controls this month, agreeing at the G-8 summit to tighten restraints on international trade in highly radioactive materials.
But the scientists say that thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of high-risk radioactive sources are already in use worldwide, with few accurate registries for tracing them.
They cite Iraq, where an undetermined number of such sources have gone missing in the postwar chaos.
The findings are being published in a 300-page book, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, the result of a two-year study by the authoritative Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, or CNS, of California's Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The team also examined the potential for terrorists to steal or build an actual nuclear weapon, but found that less likely than the construction of a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb.
Unlike warheads designed to kill and destroy through a huge nuclear blast and heat, these radiation weapons would rely on conventional explosives to blow radioactive material far and wide.
A successful bomb could make a section of a city uninhabitable for years.
The fear of such weapons grew in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States. Al-Qaeda and Russia's Chechen rebels have shown an interest in highly radioactive material.
http://www9.sbs.com.au/theworldnews/region...=87651®ion=4
June 20, 2004 Strait Times
'Dirty bomb' terror attack likely
The US government cannot track down and secure radioactive materials used to make such devices in time, warns study
NEW YORK - The likelihood of terrorists setting off a 'dirty bomb' in the United States is 'all but certain' as it will take the authorities many years to track down and secure radioactive materials, a team of nuclear researchers has concluded.
Smuggled ricin may be in Britain
LONDON - French police have warned that jars of ricin may have been brought to Britain after being manufactured by an Islamic militant, The Observer newspaper reported yesterday.
French investigators have been trying to track down dozens of jars of the deadly poison suspected to have been made by Menad Benchellali, arrested 18 months ago.
It is believed to have been stored in the form of a white powder in jars of face cream.
A British police spokesman declined to comment. -- Reuters
The US and other key governments took an important step on controls this month, agreeing at the Group of Eight summit to tighten - by the end of next year - restraints on the international trade in highly radioactive materials.
But thousands, possibly tens of thousands, of high-risk radioactive sources are already in use worldwide, with few accurate registries for tracing them, the team says.
It cites Iraq, where an undetermined number of such sources have gone missing in the post-war chaos.
It has published the findings in a 300-page book, The Four Faces Of Nuclear Terrorism, the result of a two-year study by the authoritative Centre for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS).
The team also examined the potential for terrorists to steal or build a nuclear weapon, but found that less likely than the construction of a radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb.
Unlike warheads designed to kill and destroy through a huge nuclear blast and heat, radiation weapons rely on conventional explosives to blow radioactive material far and wide.
A successful bomb could make a section of a city uninhabitable for years.
The fear of such weapons grew in the aftermath of the Sept 11 attacks in the US.
Al-Qaeda and Russia's Chechen rebels have shown an interest in highly radioactive material.
This month, for example, the Justice Department said Al-Qaeda-linked detainee Jose Padilla planned to wrap explosives in uranium to make a dirty bomb. But uranium would add nothing; it has minimal radioactivity.
Instead, specialists who study the threat focus on isotopes with millions of times more radioactivity than uranium - such as cesium-137, cobalt-60 and iridium-192.
These nuclear reactor byproducts have uses ranging from radiation treatment of cancer and sterilising food and medical equipment to gauging thicknesses.
The CNS study notes steps taken by the US government, including:
An order quietly sent to operators of sterilising irradiators last year instructing them to strengthen security against theft and attack. These devices hold immense amounts of lethal radioisotopes.
Research to develop a substitute for cesium chloride, a talc-like powder that could spread radioactivity widely and insidiously in a blast. Experts consider it the most worrisome material in use.
Approval of sale of Prussian blue, a drug that counteracts ingested cesium. The US military is 'fast-tracking' research into drugs to treat a broader array of radioactive poisons.
The US alone has an estimated two million licensed radioactive sources, thousands of them high-risk materials, the CNS reports.
But transfers are not always noted, and sources go astray.
The CNS researchers also highlighted a major loophole in radioactive commerce: US and other exporters can ship high-risk sources abroad without a government review of the end user, including to such turmoil-ridden lands as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Colombia.
As a result, it says, 'a radiological attack appears to be all but certain within the coming years'. -- AP
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/world/sto...,257395,00.html
Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs
Printable Version
Background
In order to better inform the public on what a dirty bomb is and what terrorists might intend to try to accomplish in setting off such a weapon, the following information is provided. Given the scores of exercisesââ¬âfederal, state and localââ¬âbeing staged to assure that all emergency response organizations are properly equipped, trained and exercised to respond to terrorist chemical, biological or radiological attack, we believe members of the public, as well as news organizations, will value some concise, straightforward information.
Basically, the principal type of dirty bomb, or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), combines a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, with radioactive material. In most instances, the conventional explosive itself would have more immediate lethality than the radioactive material. At the levels created by most probable sources, not enough radiation would be present in a dirty bomb to kill people or cause severe illness. For example, most radioactive material employed in hospitals for diagnosis or treatment of cancer is sufficiently benign that about 100,000 patients a day are released with this material in their bodies.
However, certain other radioactive materials, dispersed in the air, could contaminate up to several city blocks, creating fear and possibly panic and requiring potentially costly cleanup. Prompt, accurate, non-emotional public information might prevent the panic sought by terrorists.
A second type of RDD might involve a powerful radioactive source hidden in a public place, such as a trash receptacle in a busy train or subway station, where people passing close to the source might get a significant dose of radiation.
A dirty bomb is in no way similar to a nuclear weapon. The presumed purpose of its use would be therefore not as a Weapon of Mass Destruction but rather as a Weapon of Mass Disruption.
Impact of a Dirty Bomb
The extent of local contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and weather conditions. Prompt detectability of the kind of radioactive material employed would greatly assist local authorities in advising the community on protective measures, such as quickly leaving the immediate area, or going inside until being further advised. Subsequent decontamination of the affected area could involve considerable time and expense.
Sources of Radioactive Material
Radioactive materials are widely used at hospitals, research facilities, industrial and construction sites. These radioactive materials are used for such purposes as in diagnosing and treating illnesses, sterilizing equipment, and inspecting welding seams. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, together with 32 states which regulate radioactive material, have over 21,000 organizations licensed to use such materials. The vast majority of these sources are not useful for constructing an RDD.
Control of Radioactive Material
NRC and state regulations require licensees to secure radioactive material from theft and unauthorized access. These measures have been stiffened since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Licensees must promptly report lost or stolen material. Local authorities make a determined effort to find and retrieve such sources. Most reports of lost or stolen material involve small or short-lived radioactive sources not useful for an RDD.
Past experience suggests there has not been a pattern of collecting such sources for the purpose of assembling a dirty bomb. Only one high-risk radioactive source has not been recovered in the last five years in the United States. However, this source (Iridium-192) would no longer be considered a high-risk source because much of the radioactivity has decayed away since it was reported stolen in 1999. In fact, the combined total of all unrecovered sources over a 5-year time span would barely reach the threshold for one high-risk radioactive source. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said world-wide. The U.S. Government is working to strengthen controls on high-risk radioactive sources both at home and abroad.
What People Should Do Following an Explosion
Move away from the immediate area--at least several blocks from the explosion--and go inside. This will reduce exposure to any radioactive airborne dust.
Turn on local radio or TV channels for advisories from emergency response and health authorities.
If facilities are available, remove clothes and place them in a sealed plastic bag. Saving contaminated clothing will allow testing for radiation exposure.
Take a shower to wash off dust and dirt. This will reduce total radiation exposure, if the explosive device contained radioactive material.
If radioactive material was released, local news broadcasts will advise people where to report for radiation monitoring and blood and other tests to determine whether they were in fact exposed and what steps to take to protect their health.
Risk of Cancer Just because a person is near a radioactive source for a short time or gets a small amount of radioactive dust on himself or herself does not mean he or she will get cancer. The additional risk will likely be very small. Doctors will be able to assess the risks and suggest mitigating measures once the radioactive source and exposure level have been determined.
It should be noted that Potassium Iodide (KI) would not be protective except in the very unlikely event that the dirty bomb contained radioactive iodine isotopes in large quantities. Radioactive iodine isotopes are not particularly attractive for use in an RDD for a variety of technical reasons. KI only protects the thyroid from radioactive iodine, but offers no protection to other parts of the body or against other radioactive isotopes.
A number of federal agencies have responsibilities for dealing with possible detonations of dirty bombs. Reporters or other interested parties may wish to check out their websites. In addition, their offices of public affairs stand ready to promptly answer press questions on the subject or to provide access to experts in and out of government. Their websites and phone numbers follow:
Department of Energy: www.energy.gov/ ; tel 202-586-4940.
Environmental Protection Agency: www.epa.gov ; tel 202-564-9828.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: www.nrc.gov; tel 301-415-8200.
Federal Emergency Management Agency: www.fema.gov ; tel 202-646-4600.
Department of Justice: www.usdoj.gov ; tel 202-514-2007.
Federal Bureau of Investigation: www.fbi.gov ; tel 202-324-3691.
Department of Health and Human Services: www.hhs.gov ; tel 202-690-6343.
Department of Homeland Security: www.dhs.gov ; tel 202-282-8010.
Transportation Security Administration: www.tsa.gov/public/ ; tel 571-227-2829.
National Nuclear Security Administration: www.nnsa.doe.gov/ ; tel 202-586-7371.
March 2003
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collecti...irty-bombs.html
<b>A Blind Eye to the Islamic Bomb </b>
According to the world's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, it's now just a matter of time before terrorists strike with a nuclear weapon. Earlier this week, the agency's head, Mohamed ElBaradei, announced that the danger of terrorists acquiring nuclear capability was now imminent. If ElBaradei's horror scenario unfolds it may be thanks to Pakistan. Earlier this year, it was revealed that Pakistan had been leaking nuclear technology and expertise to some of the world's most unstable and dangerous regimes for years. As Nick Lazaredes reveals, the West, consumed as it was with Iraq, largely turned a blind eye to this trade and is still showing remarkable patience in uncovering how much damage was done.
Transcript
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Pakistan's nuclear proliferation was finally revealed earlier this year. It stands accused of establishing a virtual pan-Islamic nuclear supermarket, with clients like Libya and Iran and an underground network that spread from the Middle East to Malaysia and Europe.
But in a remarkable feat of blame-shifting, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has managed to deflect any punishment for what is clearly a shocking development in heightening nuclear tensions. Content with looking the other way while Pakistan helps them in the war on terror, the United States has rewarded Musharraf with even more money and military hardware.
Before the nuclear proliferation scandal stole the headlines, monuments to Pakistan's atomic might were scattered throughout the capital, Islamabad. Now only this one - a replica of the mountain where the country detonated its first nuclear device - remains intact. It's all part of a drive by President Musharraf to sweep the whole proliferation affair under the carpet.
But despite his best efforts to conceal the truth - efforts condoned by the US government - intriguing new details about this dangerous black market in nuclear technology are coming to the surface.
This is the man blamed for letting Pakistan's nuclear cat out of the bag. In Pakistan, Abdul Qadeer Khan was not just any national hero. He was an icon, a living treasure. True, without him, Pakistan would never have been able to build the bomb. But is he the Dr Strangelove character that the authorities suggest he is - a rogue scientist heading his own private underground network trading in nuclear technology around the world?
Certainly, the Pakistani military want the world to believe that Dr Khan acted alone. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->To allow Pakistan and Saudi Arabia access to nuclear material seems particularly foolhardy. Despite both governments' friendly relations with the United States, their deeply Muslim populations see America as waging war on Islam.
Fundamentalist political parties in Pakistan have a mindset that is ominously close to that of Osama bin Laden.
PROFESSOR PERVEZ HOODBHOY, NUCLEAR PHYSICIST: <b>The religious parties in Pakistan, they call it with great pride, an "Islamic bomb". They say this is a bomb that should be used for the defence of the entire Muslim ummah, for the collective defence of Islam everywhere.
Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy is a Pakistani nuclear physicist who has spoken out against his country's proliferation abroad. He believes the situation in Pakistan is dangerously unstable</b>.
PROFESSOR PERVEZ HOODBHOY: There is a lot of hatred for the United States, especially after what it has done in Iraq and what it is continuing to do in Israel. I fear that if Musharraf is assassinated, that there could be a dangerous situation in the country and that the nuclear weapons then would possibly be hijacked.
By turning a blind eye to Pakistan's bomb and the efforts to set up a worldwide Islamic nuclear network, has America seriously misread the real threat?
Could short-term strategic expediency have blinded them to what could turn out to be the ultimate case of blow-back?
MICHAEL WILDES: The American Government supported bin Laden only to find him to be the greatest risk to our national security years later. The government supported the likes of Pakistan now. Are we going to be at war two months, five years from now with Pakistan?
The glue that holds the Pakistan-US alliance together is President Musharraf himself. And he has already narrowly escaped two assassination attempts. Senior figures in Pakistan think it's time to re-evaluate the relationship with America.
GENERAL HAMID GUL: So what is it that Pakistan has not done? And yet they are not satisfied with us. It only shows that it is very dangerous to be friends of America. Sometimes it's good to be their enemy.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Islamic nuke: Iran asks, What moral promise?
Iran resumes work "on nuke bomb"
Guardian News Service
June 30: Iran is to resume elements of its uranium enrichment programme in a move which worsens the confrontation with the west over Tehran's suspected ambition to develop a nuclear bomb.
Withdrawing from previous pledges to freeze all uranium-enrichment activities, Tehran said yesterday it would resume manufacturing parts for centrifuges tomorrow and would also restart the assembly of the centrifuges, the machines that refine crude uranium into bomb-grade material or nuclear fuel for power stations.
Iran's decision was criticised on Monday by the EU, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna and the White House. It will fuel further suspicions about Iran's nuclear programme and increase mistrust at the IAEA, whose 35-strong governing board regularly seeks to come up with a policy towards Iran.
The announcement was a blow to Britain, France and Germany which reached the Tehran Agreement last October, an accord under which Iran promised to freeze its enrichment activity.
Iran's decision reflects anger at the EU troika who co-authored a recent censure of Tehran at the IAEA. Trying to close down the enrichment programme has been the central plank of the EU's strategy for the past year. Enriching uranium and developing the technology required are key steps in making a nuclear bomb.
Germany trumpeted October's deal as a triumph for European diplomacy, implicitly criticising Washington's more confrontational approach.
The Iranians wrote to the EU troika last week serving notice that the deal was now void. Unlike Washington, which urges that Tehran be reported to and punished by the UN security council, the EU has been eager to avoid a showdown, keep the channels open to Tehran and hope to mitigate Iranian behaviour. As a result of the latest Iranian move the Europeans may take a harder line.
Iran's foreign ministry said, "Europeans failed to respect their commitments. There is no reason for us to keep our moral promise."
While assembling centrifuges and manufacturing components for them Tehran said it would maintain its freeze on uranium enrichment. But it is also continuing to produce uranium hexafluoride, the gas which is fed into the centrifuges to be turned into nuclear fuel or material for warheads.
Iran's main enrichment facility is at a reinforced underground complex at Natanz in central Iran which will be able to house tens of thousands of centrifuges when complete.
In addition to the EU agreement, twice last year the IAEA urged Iran to halt "all enrichment-related activities."
Last November, the Iranians told the agency they would freeze the programme, butthe freeze was not implemented until April. Western diplomats following the case closely say the Iranian promise has never been fully honoured.
"They had suspended about 95% of the activities, but it's the other 5% that bothers us," said one source.
Iran is furious that its nuclear project continues to dominate the quarterly board meetings of the IAEA and says the Europeans promised to have Iran removed from the agenda in Vienna, but failed to deliver.
The EU is also delaying approving a trade agreement with Iran until the nuclear issue is resolved. A statement from the EU-US summit in Ireland on Saturday said, "The US and EU were disturbed by Iran's ... announcement of its intention to resume manufacturing and assembly of centrifuges and called on Iran to rethink its decision."
Mohamed El Baradei, the IAEA's Director-General, said the Iranian decision would worsen the "confidence deficit" produced by Iran's repeated refusals to come clean on a nuclear programme which was conducted covertly for 18 years until being partially uncovered over the past two years.
At the NATO summit in Istanbul yesterday, the White House's spokesman, Scott McClellan, sought greater international support for the US's hard line on Iran.
"We have expressed concern within the IAEA about the need to consider sending this matter to the Security Council of the United Nations and I think this latest move may only serve to convince others of the need to seriously consider that step," he said.
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/00120...n~resumes~work~
Allah, Army and Americans rule Paki? Islamic nuke work continues
The sins of Jamali
July 01, 2004
Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Pakistan's first Baloch prime minister, resigned on June 26, and designated Chaudhry Shujjat Hussain, leader of the Pervez Musharraf-controlled Pakistan Muslim League, as his interim successor.
It was indicated that Shujjat himself would ultimately hand over to Shaukat Aziz, allegedly a US citizen of Pakistani origin, who was the finance minister in Jamali's cabinet, after he got himself elected a member of the national assembly, the lower house of Pakistan's parliament. At present, Aziz is a member of the senate, the upper house. Under the Pakistan constitution, only a member of the national assembly can be prime minister.
The announcements regarding Jamali's exit and Aziz's impending elevation as prime minister came after Jamali met the military dictator. For over a month now, there has been widespread speculation in Pakistan about Jamali's likely exit because of Musharraf's alleged displeasure over his perceived lack-lustre performance as prime minister. Jamali was elevated to this office by Musharraf after the highly controversial general election of October 2002.
After the election, Shujjat Hussain was elected by the PML (the PML Qaid-e-Azam as it was known, to distinguish it from Nawaz Sharif's party by the same name) as leader of the parliamentary party. Generally, in Pakistan, as it was in India till recently, the tradition had been that the parliamentary leader of the party -- which has an absolute majority or the largest number of seats if it is part of a coalition -- became the prime minister.
To the surprise of many, Shujjat Hussain did an act of self-abnegation and designated Jamali to be the prime minister and rallied the support of other members of the coalition to his candidature. Even though Shujjat, a Punjabi, gave the impression that Jamali's nomination was his decision in order to enable a minority Baloch to hold this high office, nobody accepted his explanation. It was widely believed that it was Musharraf who ruled out Shujjat taking over as the prime minister and directed that Jamali should be chosen by the PML for this post.
Well-known Pakistani sources cited the following reasons for Musharraf's decision:
Jamali's well-known proximity to the Americans in general and to the Central Intelligence Agency in particular right from the days of the anti-Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s.
His image as a pliable leader, who would let Musharraf continue to wield the reins of power and would not try to assert himself so long as he enjoyed the perks of office.
His belonging to the Baloch community, which is again in a state of political ferment and Musharraf's expectation that he would calm down his community.
His perceived acceptability to the six-party religious coalition called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, many of whose leaders held Jamali in some esteem despite his proximity to the Americans.
Musharraf's hopes that with his contacts in the MMA he would be able to weaken their opposition to his continuing as chief of the army staff.
Musharraf's expectations from Jamali on the question of his continuing as army chief were belied. Jamali could not succeed in making the MMA drop its opposition to his continuing as army chief. Ultimately, faced with an embarrassing constitutional deadlock which lasted several months because of the MMA's refusal to support the incorporation of the various constitutional changes introduced by Musharraf through executive orders before the elections into the constitution through an Act of Parliament, Musharraf had to give an assurance that he would resign from the office of army chief by the end of 2004. Only then, he could secure the MMA's support for the constitutional amendments which have, inter alia, restored the presidential powers of dismissal of the elected prime minister and dissolution of the national assembly, which the late Zia-ul Haq had arrogated to himself and which Nawaz Sharif had got abolished when he came to the office of prime minister for a second time in 1997.
Since the beginning of this year, there were indications that Musharraf was preparing the ground to wriggle out of his commitment to resign as army chief by the end of this year on the ground that the situation presently prevailing in the country due to its role as the frontline ally of the US in the war against terrorism demanded his continuation as the army chief. He got the idea of his continuing on the post in the 'supreme national interest' (a favourite phrase of his) floated by some ministers of Jamali's cabinet.
It was widely believed that Musharraf wanted that the suggestion for his continuance as chief of army staff should come from Jamali and his cabinet in the form of an unanimous resolution requesting him to do so and that Jamali should either persuade the MMA to support this or, failing to do so, engineer a split in the MMA in order to get the required number of votes in parliament for the constitutional amendment to enable him to continue in the post while holding office as president.
Jamali's attitude on this was non-committal. He indicated on more than one occasion that while he would not take the initiative in preparing the ground for Musharraf's continuance, he would support whatever decision Musharraf took in the matter in the national interest and work for its implementation. It was Musharraf's unhappiness over what he perceived as the ambivalent attitude of Jamali in this matter which initially caused his disenchantment with Jamali.
An aggravating factor was Jamali's failure (in Musharraf's eyes) to vigorously explain to the people and to support in public the operations launched by the army in the South Waziristan area of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas -- FATA -- in its hunt, under US pressure, for the dregs of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The operations have caused considerable resentment not only among the tribals, but also in the lower and middle ranks of the army and have been bitterly opposed by the religious parties.
Jamali, who has many friends in the tribal communities of Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province and FATA, adopted an ambivalent attitude on this too. His stance was: Musharraf and the army know best. If they feel the operations are necessary, they must have valid grounds. The people should support them. He was avoiding making a categorical statement that he himself was convinced that the operations were necessary and hence should be supported by the people.
Since the middle of last year, Jamali showed signs of unhappiness over what he perceived as his increasing marginalisation by Musharraf and by the prominence given to Shaukat Aziz. Before Musharraf's visit to Camp David in the US in June 2003 for talks with President Bush, there were indications of growing US concerns over the rogue proliferation activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistani atomic bomb, and his cronies in Pakistan's nuclear and missile establishment and the army.
In order to divert suspicion from himself and the army, Musharraf ordered Shaukat Aziz to inspect the security and accounting procedures at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and took Aziz along with him to the US to reassure the US that everything was in order in the nuclear establishment.
Before this, no civilian political leader of Pakistan had ever been allowed by the army to visit any of its nuclear and missile establishments. Jamali was put in a highly embarrassing position when questions were raised as to why this task of seeming civilian supervision over the nuclear and missile establishment was given to Aziz and not to him (Jamali) and why Aziz reported his findings directly to Musharraf and not through Jamali.
Subsequently, when the interception of a ship carrying centrifuges from Malaysia to Libya off the Italian coast by the US and UK navies in October 2003 forced Musharraf to take Qadeer Khan and other scientists into informal custody and interrogatre them, Musharraf made Shaukat Aziz in charge of the co-ordination of the investigation and the interrogation and kept Jamali totally out of the picture.
Peeved over this, Jamali again adopted an ambivalent stand when the interrogation of A Q Khan created a public furore in Pakistan. His stand once again was: Musharraf knows best. If he had taken this action there must be valid grounds for it in the national interest.
Since the middle of last month, there was speculation in Pakistan that Musharraf's disenchantment with Jamali was complete and that he would be eased out before Musharraf embarked on a foreign tour on July 3. Jamali continued denying that his exit was imminent, but ultimately succumbed to Musharraf's pressure to quit on June 26.
Shaukat Aziz, the ultimate beneficiary of the 'palace intrigues' as sections of the Pakistani media have dubbed the happenings, enjoys the trust of the USA and Saudi Arabia, where he had lived before and worked for Citibank. He is a close personal friend of a brother of Musharraf who lives in the US. It was he who had suggested his induction into the cabinet as finance minister after Musharraf seized power in October 1999. His induction was also strongly backed by the Saudi ruling family.
But he is likely to be a red rag to the fundamentalist bull in Pakistan. Many religious clerics distrust him because they look upon him as the USA's cat's paw. Moreover, since he was inducted as finance minister after the coup of October 1999, there have off and on been allegations that he comes from a family of Ahmediyas, the ultimate sin in the eyes of the fundamentalists.
Would such a man be accepted by the fundamentalists of the madrassas and the army? If they don't, what impact this would have on internal political stability?
If Musharraf had wanted, he could have got Shaukat Aziz elected overnight as a member of the national assembly and made him prime minister. He has not done so apparently because he wants the ground prepared for his continuing as army chief. This would require parliamentary endorsement. Parliamentary endorsement would be feasible only if the MMA's solidarity on this issue is broken and large-scale defections caused in its parliamentary ranks.
These are political games, which Shaukat Aziz, being essentially a technocrat with no skills of political manipulation, may not be able to perform. Hence, the importance of the role of Shujjat Hussain, who as a trusted aide of Nawaz and as a member of his cabinet, had acquired a mastery of the required skills. Would he be prepared to exercise them for the benefit of Musharraf if a collateral beneficiary would be Shaukat Aziz and not he himself?
Musharraf knows that his continued survival in power depends on the continued support of the US and senior army officers and on his continued ability to divide and dominate the religious elements. He has no reason to fear the loss of the US support. In the present army hierarchy, only Mohammad Yusuf Khan, the vice-chief of the army staff, and General Mohammad Aziz Khan, chairman, joint chiefs of the staff committee, owed their rise in their career beyond the rank of major general to the pre-1999 political dispensation and not to Musharraf. Once they retire in October next, all the other lieutenant generals would be officers who crossed the rank of major general due to Musharraf's benediction.
Hence, in his calculation, he has no reason to fear any threat to his position from them. Any threat to him, open or conspiratorial, would come from officers of the rank of brigadiers and below, amongst whom fundamentalist and anti-US feelings are strong. To keep them under effective surveillance and to nip any trouble in the bud, he needs to continue as army chief. So he feels. So, he will do unless the US exercises pressure on him to discard the army chief hat. It is unlikely to do so. The US has never shown any political wisdom in the past. It is unlikely to do so in future.
It is often said that Pakistan is ruled by a mix of Allah, the Army and the Americans. But the reality is that Allah has not always been on the side of a military dictator. One saw it in the case of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul Haq. When past military dictators thought they had secured their position, Allah had an uncomfortable way of indicating they had not.
Would history repeat itself? Would it be 'Musharraf proposes, Allah disposes'?
B Raman
http://in.rediff.com/news/2004/jul/01raman.htm
Musharraf promises Pak mother-of-all N-tests
AGENCIES[ THURSDAY, JULY 01, 2004 11:35:31 AM ]
ISLAMABAD: In his inimitable fashion, Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf has dropped yet another bomb.
Addressing a news conference at the Pakistan Presidential Palace on Wednesday evening, Musharraf said, "I am giving you breaking news that Pakistan will conduct an important nuclear test in the next two months."
According to Xinhua , Musharraf refused to give further details.
However, Pakistan daily The News reported that the 'extremely important substantive test' was most likely a longer range missile test. Musharraf also added that hectic arrangements were already under way.
"Chairman of Nescom Dr Samar, KRL Chairman Javed Mirza as well as PAEC Chairman Pervez Butt are aware of what is going on. Everything is being manufactured," the daily quoted Musharraf as saying.
Musharraf also completely ruled out the rolling back of nuclear programme in Pakistan.
"Those who think so are just mad, we will never roll back our nuclear programme and would continue developing credible deterrence and missile program," News Network International agency quoted Musharraf as saying.
"It has become a joke that people with negative minds are propagating the ill-notions of roll-back," added the President.
Pakistan had conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998, immediately after India carried out similar tests.
International concern on the safety of Islamabad's nuclear programme has been on the rise since a scandal, involving the father of the country's nuclear programme, A Q Khan, broke out earlier this year.
Khan had confessed to having sold nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Malaysia.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/article...490,curpg-2.cms
mullahs and nukes
There are two islamist countries with nukes: Pakistan and Iran. Israel may need help from India for preemptive action against islamist nuclear capabilities within the year.
Kalyanaraman
<b>Iran now pushing the limits</b>
By Carol Devine-Molin
web posted July 5, 2004
Iran has been exhibiting an increasingly bold and confrontational pattern in its dealings with the West. There's been a momentum growing, and not for the good. A few weeks ago, the Iranians detained eight British servicemen for three days and exploited them on a televised propaganda broadcast, claiming that their boat had illegally entered Iranian waters. This version of events is now questionable -- British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon has made recent assertions that the servicemen had been "forcibly" brought within Iran's waters by the Iranians themselves.
Moreover, during this last week, the US government expelled two Iranians that were ostensibly "security guards" at Iran's UN Mission in NYC, but were engaging in suspicious activities by photographing and videotaping NYC landmarks, subways, bridges, etc. However, this is nothing new on the part of Iranians, who have been caught on prior occasions participating in similar forbidden behaviors. The FBI was reportedly monitoring the two suspects over a period of time, leading the FBI to surmise they might very well have been involved in the development of "target folders" for future attacks on our nation's soil. Iran has long been dubbed the chief terror-sponsoring state of the Middle East, and is known to be harboring members of al-Qaeda at the current time.
Interestingly, there has been testimony before the 9/11 Commission that Iran and its surrogate Hezbollah have ties, albeit tenuous ones, to the September 11th attacks. As noted by the World Net Daily website: "Former CIA analyst Douglas MacEachin, a member of the 9-11 commission staff, said in testimony last week Iran and its terrorist group ally Hezbollah were linked to the al-Qaeda terrorist group. Other U.S. intelligence officials said there is also evidence Iran is linked to the Sept. 11 attacks. According to the officials, two of the hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, who were aboard the aircraft that hit the Pentagon, had stayed at the Iranian ambassador's residence in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, before entering the United States in January 2001."
However, some in the West are exceedingly alarmed that Iran is well on its way to acquiring a nuclear weapon. In the past, Iran played a game of jerking the chain of the International Atomic Energy Agency, manipulating the agency with only marginal cooperation and plenty of lip-service. Iran was to halt all enrichment-related reprocessing but it's apparently still bent on its nuclear ambitions. Iran will continue to construct centrifuges, so international concerns remain unabated. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is now raising the specter of sanctions against Iran because of its failure to comply with the IAEA run by Mohamed ElBaradei. Of course, Iran maintains that its nuclear involvement is for peaceful purposes only. But how can they be believed?
The truth here is not complicated. The ruling mullahs of Iran are a very dangerous class that despises the West, including Israel that is viewed as a western society and a significant affront to the Islamic world. The mullahs are in league with the jihadis that are determined to slaughter all infidels ââ¬â this is common knowledge. Therefore, we must be very focused on Iran's efforts to arm itself with nuclear warfare, a notion that is given short-shrift by many Europeans.
Essentially, what this all boils down to is that Iran's nuclear facilities will have to be taken out, and soon. Clearly, Israel cannot have these fanatical mullahs in possession of nukes ââ¬â one nuke would wipe out the tiny state. I think it's a fair bet that Israel will take preemptive action against Iran's nuclear capabilities within the year.
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/art...04/0704iran.htm
<b>Commentary: The real culprit of 9/11? </b>
By Arnaud de Borchgrave
UPI Editor at Large
Published 7/22/2004 5:13 PM
WASHINGTON, July 22 (UPI) -- On the eve of the publication of its report, the 9/11 Commission was given a stunning document from Pakistan, claiming that Pakistani intelligence officers knew in advance of the 9/11 attacks.
The document, from a high-level, but anonymous Pakistani source, also claims that Osama bin Laden has been receiving periodic treatment for dialysis in a military hospital in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province adjacent to the Afghan border.
The document was received by the Commission this week as its own report was already coming off the presses. The information was supplied to the Commission on the understanding that the unimpeachable source would remain anonymous.
The report received by the 9/11 Commission from the anonymous, well-connected Pakistani source, said: "The core issue of instability and violence in South Asia is the character, activities and persistence of the militarized Islamist fundamentalist state in Pakistan. No cure for this canker can be arrived at through any strategy of negotiations, support and financial aid to the military regime, or by a 'regulated' transition to 'democracy'."
The confidential report continued, "The imprints of every major act of international Islamist terrorism invariably passes through Pakistan, right from 9/11 -- where virtually all the participants had trained, resided or met in, coordinated with, or received funding from or through Pakistan -- to major acts of terrorism across South Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as major networks of terror that have been discovered in Europe."
Even before the 9/11 Commission received the report on Pakistan's role in the terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission's own report stated: "Pakistan was the nation that held the key to his (bin Laden's) ability to use Afghanistan as a base."
A spokesman for the Pakistani embassy categorically denied Thursday that Osama bin Laden had ever been treated "in any military hospital anywhere in Pakistan."
"The reports, based on unnamed intelligence sources, are usually a figment of the writer's imagination," Mohammed Sadiq, Pakistan's deputy chief of mission in Washington told United Press International.
Asked to comment on the claim that Pakistan was aware of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks before they occurred, Sadiq said: "This is basically the recycling of old charges, the unproven old charges ... We have been working very closely with the U.S. administration and it is important to note that the U.S. administration also has always rejected these charges as false. No one seems to know these imaginary intelligence sources."
Pakistan is still denying President Pervez Musharraf knew anything about the activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan, the country's most prominent nuclear scientist who had spent the last 10 years building and running a one-stop global shopping center for "rogue" nations. North Korea, Iran and Libya did their shopping for nuclear weapons at Khan's underground black market outlet.
After U.S. and British intelligence painstakingly pieced together Khan's global nuclear proliferation endeavors, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was assigned last fall to inform Musharraf.
Khan, a national hero for giving Pakistan its nuclear arsenal, was not arrested. Instead, Musharraf pardoned him in exchange for an abject apology on national television in English. Few in Pakistan believed Musharraf's story that he was totally in the dark about Khan's operation. Prior to seizing power in 1999, Gen. Musharraf was -- and still is -- Army Chief of Staff. For the past five years, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence chief reported directly to Musharraf.
Osama bin Laden's principal Pakistani adviser prior to 9/11 was retired Gen. Hamid Gul, a former ISI chief who is "strategic adviser" to the coalition of six politico-religious parties that governs two of Pakistan's four provinces. Known as MMA, the coalition also occupies 20 percent of the seats in the federal assembly in Islamabad. Hours after 9/11, Gul publicly accused Israel's Mossad of fomenting the 9/11 plot. Later, Gul said the U.S. Air Force must have been in on the conspiracy as no warplanes were scrambled to shoot down the hijacked airliners.
Gul spent two weeks in Afghanistan immediately prior to 9/11. He denied having met Osama bin Laden during that trip, but has always said he was an "admirer" of the al-Qaida leader. However, he did meet with Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader, on several occasions.
Since 9/11, hardly a week goes by without Gul denouncing the U.S. in both the Urdu and English-language media.
In a conversation with this reporter in October 2001, Gul forecast a future Islamist nuclear power that would form a greater Islamic state with a fundamentalist Saudi Arabia after the demise of the monarchy.
Gul worked closely with the CIA during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan when he was in charge of ISI. He was "mildly" fundamentalist in those days, he explained after 9/11, and indifferent to the U.S. But he became passionately anti-American after the U.S. turned its back on Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and began punishing Pakistan with economic and military sanctions for its secret nuclear buildup.
A ranking CIA official, speaking not for attribution, said the agency considered Gul to be "the most dangerous man" in Pakistan. A senior Pakistani political leader, also speaking on condition his name not be used, said, "I have reason to believe Hamid Gul was Osama bin Laden's master planner."
"Pakistan has harvested an enormous price," the anonymous report said, for its apparent 'cooperation' with the U.S., and in this it has combined deception and blackmail -- including nuclear blackmail -- to secure a continuous stream of concessions. Its conduct is little different from that of North Korea, which has in the past chosen the nuclear path to secure incremental aid from Western donors. A pattern of sustained nuclear blackmail has consistently been at the heart of Pakistan's case for concessions, aid and a heightened threshold of international tolerance for its sponsorship and support of Islamist terrorism.
"To understand how this works, it is useful to conceive of Pakistan's ISI as a state acting as terrorist traffickers, complaining that, if it does not receive the extraordinary dispensations and indulgences that it seeks, it will, in effect, 'implode,' and in the process do extraordinary harm.
"Part of the threat of this 'explosion' is also the specter of the transfer of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities to more intransigent and irrational elements of the Islamist far right in Pakistan, who would not be amenable to the logic that its present rulers -- whose interests in terrorism are strategic, and consequently, subject to considerations of strategic advantage -- are willing to listen to...
"...It is crucial to note that if the Islamist terrorist groups gain access to nuclear devices, ISI will almost certainly be the source...At least six Pakistani scientists connected with the country's nuclear program were in contact with al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden with the thorough instructions of ISI.
"Pakistan has projected the electoral victory of the fundamentalist and pro-Taliban, pro-al-Qaida Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in the November elections as 'proof' that the military is the only 'barrier' against the country passing into the hands of the extremists. The fact, however, is that the elections were widely rigged, and this was a fact acknowledged by the European Union observers, as well as by some of the MMA's constituents themselves. The MMA victory was, in fact, substantially engineered by the Musharraf regime, as are the various anti-U.S. 'mass demonstrations' around the country.
"Pakistan has made a big case out of the fact that some of the top line leadership of al-Qaida has been arrested in the country with the 'cooperation' of the Pakistani security forces and intelligence. However, the fact is that each such arrest only took place after the FBI and U.S. investigators had effectively gathered evidence to force Pakistani collaboration, but little of this evidence had come from Pakistani intelligence agencies. Indeed, ISI has consistently sought to deny the presence of al-Qaida elements in Pakistan, and to mislead U.S. investigators...This deception has been at the very highest level, and Musharraf himself, for instance, initially insisted he was 'certain' bin Laden was dead.
"...ISI has been actively facilitating the relocation of the al-Qaida from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and the conspiracy of substantial segments of serving Army and intelligence officers is visible."
"...The Pakistan Army consistently denies giving the militants anything more than moral, diplomatic and political support. The reality is quite different. ISI issues money and directions to militant groups, specially the Arab hijackers of 9/11 from al-Qaida. ISI was fully involved in devising and helping the entire affair. And that is why people like Hamid Gul and others very quickly stated the propaganda that CIA and Mossad did it."
"...The dilemma for Musharraf is that many of his army officers are still deeply sympathetic to al-Qaida, Taliban militants and the Kashmir cause. The radical sympathies of many ISI operatives are all too apparent. Many retired and present ISI officers retain close links to al-Qaida militants hiding in various state sponsored places in Pakistan and Kashmir as well as leaders from the defeated Taliban regime. They regard the fight against Americans and Jews and Indians in different parts of the world as legitimate jihad."
The report also says that "according to a senior tribal leader in Peshawar, bin Laden, who suffers from renal deficiency, has been periodically undergoing dialysis in a Peshawar military hospital with the knowledge and approval of ISI if not of Gen. Pervez Musharraf himself."
The same source, though not in the report, speculated Musharraf may be planning to turn over bin Laden to President Bush in time to clinch his reelection bid in November.
Staff at the 9/11 Commission did not immediately respond to requests for comments regarding the Pakistan memo.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/2004...51231-9906r.htm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/...17,00.html
Al Qaeda on the loose in Pakistan: US 9/11 panel
Washington | June 24, 2004 8:55:21 PM IST
The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States, the so-called 9-11 Commission, stated in a preliminary report that Saudi Arabia and especially Pakistan provided critical support to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization in the days and months before those shocking hijackings which killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.
Questions continue to be raised about whether America's key allies in its war against terrorism are doing enough, considering their history of supporting Islamic militants.
ANI spoke with U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee.
Excerpts of the interview: Tom Tancredo "Well, the commission's findings are certainly not earth-shaking. Who did not know this? I'm surprised it has gotten this kind of attention because of course, the whole world knew, that al Qaeda had operated freely in Pakistan for a long time and continued to do so, even after 9-11."
"I do believe that it is good to continually draw attention to it so as to maintain some degree of pressure on the present government in Pakistan. But it's certainly not a fact of which we were not aware."
"No...their efforts are those of a country that is very, very, very frightened about the balance that they are trying to maintain, so as to mollify a very vocal minority in their country and on the other hand mollify the pressure from the West. It's a tough position to try and hold.
But it seems to me to be to their benefit, just as the Saudis have learned, that it is actually to their benefit to try their best to eradicate these radical groups from their country. The pakistanis have yet to do anything significant for instance, about the madrassas. These schools still operate, they operate without really any kind of restriction or governmental oversight. And, these are the breeding grounds for terrorists. And so, no, it really is apparent to me that they have not done enough and I recognize why, but they will find they probably should have moved quicker."
"I think frankly there's little America can do. I know that they can portray their need as financial and that if we give them a lot of money, some how or another this will take care of their problems. But, when you look around the world and we look in vain and see where that has helped, that that has actually created a different kind of environment in the country. And, so, no Pakistan has really go to do it themselves,. And they can, its just that, do they have the will to do so?"
The U.S. Congress convened the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States to investigate in an independent manner how al Qaeda succeeded in hijacking four U.S. airliners, crashing the planes and killing nearly 3,000 people on one tragic late summer day on September 11th, 2001.
In the staff's recent preliminary background report on the "Overview of the Enemy," the role of Pakistan in providing shelter and resources to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization came up repeatedly. However, as Osama bin Laden had lived in the region during Afghanistan's war with the Soviet Union during the 1980s and moved his family there after Sudan kicked him out in 1996, it comes as no surprise to Tom Tancredo that al Qaeda found a home along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The Soviets were driven from Afghanistan by a rag-tag assortment of fighters, some of whom were motivated by the desire to establish a pure, traditional Islamic state. These fighters formed the foundation of the Taliban, the religious group under Mullah Omar which came to run Afghanistan. The Taliban were also supported by Pakistan.
In its report, the commission staff pointed out that Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. In fact, the report finds that the Taliban's ability to provide bin Laden ahaven in the face of international pressure and U.N. sanctions was significantly facilititated by Pakistani support. Pakistan even benefited from the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship, as the same terrorist training camps attended by the hijackers who attacked the United States may have also provided resources to militants looking to contribute to Pakistans' ongoing struggle with India over Kashmir.
In fact, in the weeks immediately following the attack, it was the Taliban's ambassador in Islamabad who served as a key go between as the U.S. threatened military action. It wasn't until President Bush insisted to President Musharraf that Pakistan's support was withdrawn weeks later.
Tancredo feels these are important facts to keep in mind.
Pakistan's role in the global war against terrorism is a line of questioning that comes up time and again at Congressional hearings. Earlier this week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca admitted to a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee that there is a battle for the soul of Pakistan going on right now. That battle is between the conservative Muslims who imagine a world similar to that of when Mohammed founded the religion in the 7th century and those who feel that Islam can co-exist with the modern world.
Tancredo is a member of the committee.
President Musharraf has told the Bush administration that he and his government do not support terrorism and that he is committed to bringing modern democracy to Pakistan. However, Musharraf also feels he needs help. The Bush administration has offered a 3 billion dollar aid package, which includes funds for development, health and education. Some members of the U.S. Congress believe that strings should be attached to that aid. But Tancredo is not convinced money will bring about an end to terrorism.
The final report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States is expected by the end of July.(ANI)
http://www.webindia123.com/news/showdetail...41505&cat=World
Support Pakistan if it stays the course: commission
By Khalid Hasan
Washington: While Pakistan comes in for a good deal of criticism for its pre- 9/11 role, the commission on terrorist attacks on the United States urges the government to make a long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan, as long as the Pakistani leadership remains willing to stay the course in the fight against terrorism.
The commission also calls on the US to make the hard choices that would be necessary provided Gen Pervez Musharraf continues to adhere to his declared policy of âenlightened moderation.â In the words of the report, âSustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistanâs government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistanâs leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.â
In the section of the report devoted to Pakistan, the commission talks of the countryâs endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government, all of which help create opportunities for jihadi recruitment. Poor education is a particular concern. The report notes that millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrassas. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism. According to Karachiâs police commander, there are 859 madrassas teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city alone.
The following are excerpts from the voluminous report that is bound to shape US policy in many fundamental ways in the years to come.
It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. Within Pakistanâs borders are 150 million Muslims, scores of Al Al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters, and â perhaps â Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A political battle among anti-American Islamic fundamentalists, the Pakistani military, and more moderate mainstream political forces has already spilled over into violence, and there have been repeated recent attempts to kill Pakistanâs president, Pervez Musharraf.
In recent years, the United States has had three basic problems in its relationship with Pakistan:
On terrorism, the report says Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Laden was bad. But before 9/11, preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence.
On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology. But proliferation concerns have been long-standing and very serious. Most recently, the Pakistani government has claimed not to have known that one of its nuclear weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed.
Finally, Pakistan has made little progress toward the return of democratic rule at the national level, although that turbulent process does continue to function at the provincial level and the Pakistani press remains relatively free.
Immediately after 9/11, confronted by the United States with a stark choice, Pakistan made a strategic decision. Its government stood aside and allowed the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime. In other ways, Pakistan actively assisted: its authorities arrested more than 500 Al Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban members, and Pakistani forces played a leading part in tracking down KSM, Abu Zubaydah and other key Al Al Qaeda figures.
In the following two years, the Pakistani government tried to walk a tightrope, helping against Al Qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with Taliban remnants and other Islamic extremists. When Al Qaeda and its Pakistani allies repeatedly tried to assassinate Musharraf, almost succeeding, the battle came home.
The countryâs vast unpoliced regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Almost all the 9/11 attackers traveled the north-south nexus of KandaharâQuettaâKarachi. The Balochistan region of Pakistan (KSMâs ethnic home) and the sprawling city of Karachi remain centres of Islamist extremism where US and Pakistani security and intelligence presence has been weak. The US consulate in Karachi is a makeshift fortress, reflecting the gravity of the surrounding threat.
During the winter of 2003â2004, Musharraf made another strategic decision. He ordered the Pakistani army into the frontier provinces of northwest Pakistan along the Afghan border, where Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahri have reportedly taken refuge. The army is confronting groups of Al Qaeda fighters and their local allies in very difficult terrain. On the other side of the frontier, US forces in Afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint operations, given Pakistanâs limited capabilities and reluctance to permit US military operations on its soil. Yet in 2004, it is clear that the Pakistani government is trying harder than ever before in the battle against Islamist terrorists.
Acknowledging these problems and Musharraf âs own part in the story, we believe that Musharraf âs government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In an extraordinary public essay asking how Muslims can âdrag our-selves out of the pit we find ourselves in, to raise ourselves up,â Musharraf has called for a strategy of âenlightened moderation.â The Muslim world, he said, should shun militancy and extremism; the West â and the United States in particular â should seek to resolve disputes with justice and help improve the Muslim world.
Having come close to war in 2002 and 2003, Pakistan and India have recently made significant progress in peacefully discussing their long-standing differences. The United States has been and should remain a key supporter of that process.
The constant refrain of Pakistanis is that the United States long treated them as allies of convenience. As the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises it is prepared to keep, for years to come.
Discussing the days after 9/11 and how the attacks on Afghanistan were launched, the Commission report said (in part):
The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against Al Qaeda. They concluded that if Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk. The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistanâs Military Intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed. Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps: to stop Al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations; to provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against Al Qaeda; to provide the United States with intelligence information; to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts; to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and, if the evidence implicated Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government. Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every US request for support in the war on terrorism. The next day, the US embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. âPakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us,â the embassy noted. âMusharraf said the government of Pakistan was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions.â
At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pakistanâs reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against the Taliban. The president wanted the United States to strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not. He made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the Talibanâs behavior. President Bush also tasked the State Department, which on the following day delivered to the White House a paper titled âGame Plan for a Political-Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.â The paper took it as a given that Bin Laden would continue to act against the United States even while under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific US demands for the Taliban: surrender Bin Laden and his chief lieutenants, including Ayman al Zawahri; tell the United States what the Taliban knew about Al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.
The State Department proposed delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban: produce Bin Laden and his deputies and shut down al Al Qaeda camps within 24 to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the terrorist infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply. Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from countries, according to their capabilities and resources.
Finally, the plan detailed a public US stance: America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any people, religion, or culture.
President Bush recalled that he quickly realized that the administration would have to invade Afghanistan with ground troops.
But the early briefings to the president and Secretary Rumsfeld on military options were disappointing. Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command (CENTCOM), said that the president was dissatisfied. The US military, Franks said, did not have an off-the-shelf plan to eliminate the Al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, amount to such a plan. All these diplomatic and military plans were reviewed over the weekend of September 15â16, as President Bush convened his war council at Camp David 45 Present were Vice President Cheney, Rice, Hadley, Powell, Armitage, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Mueller, Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Cofer Black, chief of the DCIâs Counterterrorist Center. Tenet described a plan for collecting intelligence and mounting covert operations. He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan warlords who would join the fight against Al Qaeda. These CIA teams would act jointly with the militaryâs Special Operations units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.
Also by September 18, Powell had contacted 58 of his foreign counterparts and received offers of general aid, search-and-rescue equipment and personnel, and medical assistance teams. On the same day, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was called by Mahmud Ahmed regarding a two-day visit to Afghanistan during which the Pakistani intelligence chief had met with Mullah Omar and conveyed the U.S. demands. Omarâs response was ânot negative on all these points.â
But the administration knew that the Taliban was unlikely to turn over Bin Ladin. The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled âDefeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.â The directive would now extend to a global war on terrorism, not just on Al Al Qaeda. It also incorporated the Presidentâs determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?p...3-7-2004_pg7_20
Pakistan & 9/11 - I
B. Raman
In an article on the interrogation of Omar Sheikh, one of the accused in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist belonging to the "Wall Street Journal", written on March 13,2002, ("The Man Who knows & Talks Too Much"---http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper424.html), I had stated as follows:
"When the Karachi Police took custody of Omar from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on February 12, he started talking to them freely and voluntarily about his activities since he was released by India in the last week of December, 1999, to terminate the hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM). He said that:
"He had since then been functioning from Lahore with the knowledge and permission of the ISI. At Lahore, he was in regular touch with Gen.Mohammad Aziz Khan, who was a Corps Commander there, till his appointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on October 8, 2001.
"He was frequently travelling to Kandahar to meet Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden and to Dubai.
"He had personally met Mohammad Atta, the mastermind of the September 11 terrorist strikes on the World Trade Centre in New York, during one of his visits to Kandahar and knew of the plans for the September 11 strikes. He had told Lt.Gen. Ehsanul-Haq, the present DG of the ISI, who was then a Corps Commander at Peshawar, and Gen. Aziz Khan about it." (End of citation from the previous article).
Since then, on many occasions, I had referred to this and pointed out that it was inconceivable that Ehsanul-Haq would not have mentioned this to Gen.Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, and stressed the importance of investigating as to why Musharraf chose not to pass on this information to the US authorities and alert them about the imminence of Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes in US territory. By not doing so, he had rendered himself guilty of causing the death of nearly 3,000 innocent civilians of different nationalities.I had also raised this on many occasions during my visits to the US since then.
While greeting my point with skepticism, a question, which was often posed to me by my American audiences and interlocutors, was: " Al Qaeda is known for its secrecy and operational security. It succeeds in its terrorist strikes because of this. That was how it was able to keep the rest of the world in the dark about its plans for 9/11. It is unacceptable that Omar would have come to know of its plans for 9/11 during a casual visit to Kandahar since no one outside a very small circle in the top leadership of Al Qaeda knew about its plans."
It seemed then a valid counter-point, but it is no longer so. If you have doubts, please go through a statement prepared by some members of the staff of the US National Commission, which had enquired into the 9/11 terrorist strikes and whose report was released to the public on July 22,2004. The statement, which has also become available to the public since July 22, says as follows in its introduction: "Outline of the 9/11 Plot--Staff Statement No. 16 Members of the Commission, your staff is prepared to report its preliminary findings regarding the conspiracy that produced the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. We remain ready to revise our understanding of this subject as our work continues. Dietrich Snell, Rajesh De, Hyon Kim, Michael Jacobson, John Tamm, Marco Cordero, John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille did most of the investigative work reflected in this statement. We are fortunate to have had access to the fruits of a massive investigative effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies, as well intelligence collection and analysis from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department, and the Department of Defense."
From a perusal of the statement, it is clear the staff had access to the interrogation reports of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM) and other top operatives of Al Qaeda in US custody. It says as follows in its concluding para: "As Atta made his final preparations during the summer of 2001, dissent emerged among al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan over whether to proceed with the attack.Although access to details of the plot was carefully guarded, word started to spread during the summer of 2001 that an attack against the United States was imminent.According to KSM, he was widely known within al Qaeda to be planning some kind of operation against the United States. Many were even aware that he had been preparing operatives to go to the United States, as reported by a CIA source in June 2001.
"Moreover, that summer Bin Ladin made several remarks hinting at an upcoming attack, which spawned rumors throughout the jihadist community worldwide. For instance, KSM claims that, in a speech at the al Faruq training camp in Afghanistan, Bin Ladin specifically urged trainees to pray for the success of an upcoming attack involving 20 martyrs. With news of an impending attack against the United States gaining wider circulation, a rift developed within al Qaedaâs leadership. Although Bin Ladin wanted the operation to proceed as soon as possible, several senior al Qaeda figures thought they should follow the position taken by their Afghan host, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who opposed attacking the United States. According to one al Qaeda member, when Bin Ladin returned after the general alert in late July, he spoke to his confidants about problems he was having with Omarâs unwillingness to allow any further attacks against the United States from Afghanistan.
"KSM claims that Omar opposed attacking the United States for ideological reasons but permitted attacks against Jewish targets. KSM denies that Omarâs opposition reflected concern about U.S. retaliation, but notes that the Taliban leader was under pressure from the Pakistani government to keep al Qaeda from engaging in operations outside Afghanistan. While some senior al Qaeda figures opposed the 9/11 operation out of deference to Omar, others reportedly expressed concern that the U.S. would respond militarily.
"Bin Ladin, on the other hand, reportedly argued that attacks against the United States needed to be carried out immediately to support the insurgency in the Israeli occupied territories and to protest the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Ladin also thought that an attack against the United States would reap al Qaeda a recruiting and fundraising bonanza. In his thinking, the more al Qaeda did, the more support it would gain. Although he faced opposition from many of his most senior advisersâincluding Shura council members Shaykh Saeed, Sayf al Adl, and Abu Hafs the MauritanianâBin Ladin effectively overruled their objections, and the attacks went forward." (Citation ends)
From this, it is quite clear that the plans for the 9/11 terroist strikes were not such a closely-guarded secret in Afghanistan as made out to be and that many,including Mulla Mohammad Omar, the Amir of the Taliban, knew about it.As many experts in the US itself have admitted, the Taliban was under the control of Pakistan's ISI. It had many serving and retired officers of the Pakistan Army serving in it. The Taliban's intelligence set-up was largely staffed by serving and retired officers of the ISI.
It is, therefore, impossible that the Pakistani authorities would not have known of Al Qaeda's plans for the 9/11 terrorist strikes from their officers working as advisers to the Amir of the Taliban. It is also not surprising that Omar Sheikh came to know of the plans during a visit to Kandahar and told Ehsan-ul-Haq about it.
The statement prepared by the staff does quote KSM as speaking of pressure on Mulla Omar from Pakistan not to let Al Qaeda carry out terrorist strikes outside Afghanistan. The relevant question from the point of view of any credible investigation is: Why the Pakistani military regime did not pass on the information conveyed by Omar Sheikh to the US and alert it to the imminence of the terrorist strikes? If it had and the US agencies had not acted on the information, they are guilty of gross negligence. If it had not,Pakistan is guilty of complicity in the terrorist strikes.
The Commission has avoided going into these questions and finding out the truth. This is a matter, which needs to be taken up by the relatives of the victims of the terrorist strikes, about 250 of them Indians or persons of Indian origin, before the judiciary in the US. (27-7-04)
http://www.orfonline.org/analysis/A233.htm
If a nuclear 9-11 happens in the US - I will feel sorry for the US. However, I will feel sorrier for India if it happens in India.
I sincerely believe that it is as useless to expect the US to control Pakistan, as it is to expect Paki leaders to "rein in" jihad against India. I see these thoughts as time wasting "high hopes" hallucinations which help us while away time arguing whether the US/Pakistan are unable to do something or are able to do so but unwilling to do so. The bottom line is that neither is the US going to control Pakistan, nor is Pakistan going to rein in terrorism.
We have to do what we have to do no matter what the Pakis or the US do.
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