Newsletter at http://www.indiacause.com
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According to intelligence circles, the evidence was so overwhelming that the Pakistani leadership lost its nerve, especially after they were told Islamabad would be in the dock internationally and risked losing the $ 3 billion US aid package Washington had just cleared.
Pak cracked under hard US proof
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/article...777,curpg-1.cms
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
WASHINGTON: The United States threatened Pakistan with sanctions after discovering its proliferation activities in order to force military leader Pervez Musharraf to act against his hero A Q Khan , it has been revealed.
The Bush administration confronted Musharraf with evidence of Khan's reckless activities last October, weeks before the IAEA got into the act. In a pincer move, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Central command chief John Abizaid traveled to Pakistan separately to present the evidence , Armitage tackling Musharraf and the political leadership, and Abizaid laying down the line for the Pakistani military.
According to intelligence circles, the evidence was so overwhelming that the Pakistani leadership lost its nerve, especially after they were told Islamabad would be in the dock internationally and risked losing the $ 3 billion US aid package Washington had just cleared.
Musharraf , who had already been warned by the Americans about Khan several months before, was shell-shocked by the volume of evidence they presented.
"It seemed that the Americans had a tracker planted on Khan's body...They know much more than us about Dr. Khan's wealth spread all over the globe," Pakistani officials later conceded to the media. "We were told that Pakistan's failure to take action will most certainly jeopardize its ties with the United States and other important nations."
Musharraf then played for time. He ordered an inquiry to verify all the American charges, while weighing ways to cut Khan to size and save Pakistan and his own hide. Intelligence agents were sent all over the world to crosscheck US documentation.
Musharraf also sent two of his most trusted aides, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, head of the Pakistan's (Nuclear) Strategic Planning and Development Cell, and Lt Gen Ehsan ul-Haq, the ISI chief, to confront Khan.
Khan initially mounted a brazen offense, telling the two that his activities were in Pakistan's interest and he had had the backing of all prime ministers and army chiefs. But as Musharraf's men produced evidence of his illegal dealings, including secret bank accounts, and the implications for Pakistan of the proliferation rap, he began to back down.
According to one account, the generals virtually blackmailed Khan into submission, warning him that he risked being kidnapped by American and Israeli agents and the Pakistani military could not guarantee his safety or that of his family, including a daughter in London who is said to have smuggled out evidence to implicate the Pakistani military and save her father if he was persecuted or prosecuted.
In fact, even after he was disgraced last week, Musharraf publicly said it was not advisable for Khan to travel abroad.
One of the most compelling pieces of evidence against Khan was a letter he had written to Iranian officials urging them to dismantle equipment from Pakistan and to identify dead Pakistani officials as their contacts.
In addition, US officials also had evidence of Khan offering to sell nuclear secrets to Saddam Hussain and traveling to Beirut for a clandestine meeting with a top Syrian official.
Indian intelligence circles in fact suspect that Khan may have helped spirit away some of Iraq's WMD to Pakistan. B Raman, a former intelligence official cites Pakistani sources as saying Khan used a Pakistani aircraft delivering supplies to Iran to stop by in Syria to pick up material, possibly related to its WMD, to prevent it from falling into the hands of US inspectors.
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<b>THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE, FEBRUARY 17, 2004
COMMENTARY
Abdul Qadeer Khan
By BERNARD HENRI LEVY</b>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->PARIS -- We observed the Abdul Qadeer Khan affair, the incredible story of this Pakistani nuclear scientist who delivered over 15 years -- freely and with impunity -- his most sensitive secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Then we learned that President Musharraf in person, after an interview from which little or nothing has been divulged, ended up granting Khan his "pardon." Case closed? End of story? That's what the American administration, falling oddly in step with the official Pakistani doctrine, would have us believe. But knowing something of the case -- and being the first French observer, to my knowledge, to have tried to alert public opinion to the extreme gravity of the situation -- I believe that we are only at the very beginning this story.
* * *
Far from ending on Sept. 11, 2001 -- the day, we are told, on which "the world changed" -- this terrifying nuclear traffic continued until well after: A last trip to Pyongyang, his thirteenth, was made in June 2002 by the good doctor Khan; not to mention the ship inspected last August in the Mediterranean, transporting elements of a future nuclear plant to Libya. The eyes of the world, emulating the eyes of America, were fixed on Baghdad, while the tentacles of nuclear proliferation were being extended from Karachi.
We will soon learn that far from being the overexcited, but in the end isolated, "Dr. Strangelove" that most of the press has described, Khan was at the center of an immense network, an incredibly dense web. There were Dubai front companies, meetings in Casablanca and Istanbul with Iranian colleagues, complicities in Germany and Holland, Malaysian and Philippine agents, and detours through Sri Lanka, with Chinese and London connections -- a world of crime and dirty war that the West, mired in a big game that is beginning to get ahead of it, has so blithely allowed to develop.
We will find that, since Pakistan is steered by the iron hand of its secret service and its army, it is inconceivable that Khan operated alone without orders or cover. We will understand more precisely that we cannot repeat without contradiction that, on the one hand, the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is under control, and that not a warhead can budge without the authorities' knowledge, and, on the other, that Khan was acting alone, working on his own account, with no official connivance. To put it simply and disconcertingly: Pakistan's nuclear weapons need to be secured. They cannot -- will not -- be secured by Pakistan alone.
We will come back to Gen. Musharraf -- and Pakistan being what it is, we will come back also to other generals and ex-generals, such as Mirza Aslam Beg and Jehangir Karamat, both former army chiefs of staff. But we must not shift our gaze from the president himself, whose knowledge of Khan's dark machinations no one in Islamabad doubts, and who, at the very moment of his confounding, celebrated Khan once more as a "hero." What does Khan know of what Gen. Musharraf knows? And what does Khan's daughter, Dina, who announced in London that she has suitcases of compromising files, know?
And at last, sooner or later, we will come to the real secret: that of al Qaeda; and of Khan's links to Lashkar-e-Toiba, the fundamentalist terrorist group at the heart of al Qaeda; and the fact that this "mad scientist" is first of all mad about God, a fanatical Islamist who in his heart and soul believes that the bomb of which he is the father should belong, if not to the Umma itself, at least to its avant-garde, as incarnated by al Qaeda. So let us not shrink from measuring the probability of a nightmare scenario: to wit, a Pakistani state which -- in the shelter of its alliance with an America that is decidedly not counting inconsistencies -- could furnish al Qaeda with the means to take the ultimate step of its jihad.
How much time will it take for all this to be said? How much longer will Islamabad's masquerade endure? Next month the American Congress will vote on the question of three billion dollars in aid to Pakistan: Will this aspect of things be taken into account? Will demands be made, at last, in exchange for this aid, for inspections of Pakistani sites, as well as the installation of a double-key system -- a system that some of us here in Europe have been calling for?
These are just a few elements I offer -- as part of a debate that has scarcely begun.
Mr. Levy is the author, most recently, of "Who Killed Daniel Pearl?" (Melville House, 2003).
Updated February 17, 2004
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Within Australia, we have not generally realised just what a profound crisis the world faces in Pakistan. On the face of this week's revelations, Pakistan has engaged in far worse nuclear proliferation than North Korea has ever dreamed of. We know now that Pakistan has actually done what the US, and the rest of us, only fear what the North Koreans might do.
The Americans bear a fair degree of indirect responsibility for this state of affairs. They pioneered the jihad technique for attacking the Soviets in Afghanistan, which Pakistan now uses against India in Kashmir and which has become an uncontrollable, worldwide movement.
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Pakistan's chilling sense of humour</span>
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/commo...5E25377,00.html
The Australian
YOU'VE got to love the Pakistanis, they're the world's greatest jokers.
This week, their top nuclear scientist, Dr AQ Khan, told the nation that he had sent nuclear weapons secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, but that he had done it on his own. He was deeply sorry for this, but he acted entirely on his own and, get this, entirely in good faith, whatever that means.
Pakistan's dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, made another broadcast confirming that Khan had acted alone and that no one from the army had helped him.
This is pure farce and a grim theatre designed to offer the flimsiest fig leaf to what is probably the single greatest act of nuclear proliferation in the world's history.
Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons has always been one of Australia's very highest foreign policy aims. It was one of the main reasons we participated in the war in Iraq.
It is worth reflecting that Australia is, for a country of our size, uniquely incapable of withstanding any nuclear strike, as virtually all of our population is clustered in six isolated coastal cities.
Six missiles and the Australian story is more or less over. That utter doom scenario has been made substantially more possible by the grotesque actions of Pakistan, which has engaged in some of the worst rogue state behaviour of any nation in our time. Musharraf, of course, immediately pardoned Khan.
I don't think there is a single person anywhere in the world who believes that Khan proliferated nuclear technology without the complete connivance of the Pakistani military. And the key man in the military for a long, long time has been Musharraf himself.
Khan's statement: "I also wish to clarify that there was never any kind of authorisation for these activities by the Government" is literally an insult to our intelligence.
If for a single second anyone took the statement seriously it would mean that the Pakistani military and Government are the most incompetent in history, manifestly unfit to be near any nuclear weapon under any circumstances.
But, of course, the Pakistani military is nothing like that incompetent. The Government knew exactly what he was doing at all times.
Within Australia, we have not generally realised just what a profound crisis the world faces in Pakistan. On the face of this week's revelations, Pakistan has engaged in far worse nuclear proliferation than North Korea has ever dreamed of. Yet the US, under both Clinton and Bush, has kept the prospect of military action against North Korea on the table to deter it from actually going into full scale nuclear weapon production and possibly exporting this to other nations. We know now that Pakistan has actually done what the US, and the rest of us, only fear what the North Koreans might do.
But this is not a historical crisis, something entirely in the past.
Musharraf has recently survived two assassination attempts. In New Delhi, where I've spent the past week, there was some serious speculation that the first assassination attempt was perhaps a fake, designed to impress on the Americans the depth of domestic opposition Musharraf faces and his indispensability. But no one thinks the second assassination attempt, in which the bomb missed Musharraf's car by seconds, was a fake and there is widespread suspicion of involvement by dissident factions of the army.
The whole future of Pakistan is truly in play. Musharraf, despite the shocking revelations of this week, is probably the least bad alternative as a leader for Pakistan at the moment. But no one knows whether his recent willingness to compromise and make peace with India, much less his promise to co-operate in preventing nuclear proliferation in the future, are a genuine strategic change of heart by Pakistan or just another tactical feint.
This is one of the most important questions the world needs to answer today. Under American pressure, the Pakistani military has isolated its most extreme leaders and put in place a chain of command in which secular officers, allegedly committed to the new Musharraf doctrines, are the next several in line after Musharraf. But if Musharraf were killed there would be chaos in Pakistan and any new general would know Musharraf was killed because of opposition to his new policies.
The future of the world's second largest Islamic nation, filled with extremist groups, with a long history of supporting the Taliban and exporting terrorism, and with we now know the world's worst history in spreading nuclear weapons technology, and most important of all with 30 to 40 of its own nuclear warheads, is truly in play.
The Americans bear a fair degree of indirect responsibility for this state of affairs. They pioneered the jihad technique for attacking the Soviets in Afghanistan, which Pakistan now uses against India in Kashmir and which has become an uncontrollable, worldwide movement.
Now the US, and Australia, are caught in a horrible bind. Musharraf, for all his appalling baggage, nonetheless is probably preferable to the chaos and risk that would follow if he were gone. I heard an American this week describe Pakistan as the scariest place on Earth. He was right about that.
Source Gives Details of Iran Nukes Deal <!--emo&  tupid--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/pakee.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='pakee.gif' /><!--endemo-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->``Payment for the two containers of centrifuge units, amounting to about $3 million,'' was paid by an unnamed Iranian, the report said.
``The cash was brought in two briefcases and kept in an apartment that was used as a guesthouse by the Pakistani nuclear arms expert each time he visited Dubai,'' the report says, identifying Khan as the arms expert.
Tahir said Khan told him ``a certain amount'' of enriched uranium was flown to Libya from Pakistan on a Pakistani airliner in 2001, and a ``certain number'' of centrifuges were flown to Libya direct from Pakistan in 2001-02, the report said.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<b>PRESS RELEASE BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE IN RELATION TO INVESTIGATION ON THE ALLEGED PRODUCTION OF COMPONENTS</b>
<b>FOR LIBYAâS URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROGRAMME</b>.
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of 10 Nov 2003, two intelligence representatives from the United States and Britain, i.e. the CIA and the MI6, met the Director of the Special Branch, Bukit Aman. The focus of their discussion was the ongoing investigation related to the international network that is suspected of being involved in the transfer of nuclear technology to third countries. Both the representatives asked for the co-operation of the Special Branch to prevent the spread of nuclear technology. They also provided information relevant for joint action.
INFORMATION
2. Among the informations passed are the following:
<b>2.1 Involvement of a nuclear scientist in PAKISTAN</b>
Alleged that a Pakistani nuclear arms expert was involved in the âonward proliferation of Pakistani nuclear technology to third countries, notably LIBYA.â
<b>2.2 BSA TAHIR</b>
Alleged that BSA TAHIR, a SRI LANKAN businessman based in DUBAI was a trusted and close confidante of the arms expert and was actively involved in supplying centrifuge components for LIBYAâs uranium-enrichment programme; and
2.3 SCOMI PRECISION ENGINEERING SDN BHD (SCOPE)
Alleged that BSA TAHIR, who was involved in the business of SCOPE had used the company to produce components for the centrifuge unit for the uranium enrichment programme. However, investigations have revealed that the components, on their own, cannot form a complete centrifuge unit. In this context, it has to be noted that SCOPE is a subsidiary of SCOMI GROUP BHD, i.e. a company involved in the petroleum services industry. As a subsidiary, SCOPE is also involved in precision engineering services which involves the production of components for a variety of equipments including parts for cars, petroleum and gas.
3. In relation to this, the Special Branch was also informed that on 4 Oct 2003, a ship named BBC China, owned by a GERMAN company, was examined in the port of Taranto, ITALY, where 5 containers bound for LIBYA were confiscated because they were believed to contain components related to the Libyan uranium enrichment programme. The components were said to have been packed in wooden boxes with the SCOPE logo on them. With this development a request was made to assist with the investigations related to the activities of BSA TAHIR and his connection with the Pakistani scientist in view of the âintense interest in this matter at the highest levels of the US/UK governmentsâ.
4. Following this development, the police launched an investigation to find out the real situation and itâs implication to the interest and security of MALAYSIA.
BRIEFING
5. Pursuant to this investigation, the Prime Minister was briefed on 13 Nov 2003. He ordered a detailed and transparent investigation to be expedited. At the same time, the Inspector-General of Police was informed. He gave an order to continue with the investigation had been given.
<b>POLICE INVESTIGATIONS </b>
6. In conducting this investigation, the Special Branch, took into consideration the above-mentioned allegations and focused on the following aspects:-
6.1 The allegation that BSA TAHIR had played the role of a middle man in supplying certain centrifuge components from MALAYSIA for LIBYAâs uranium-enrichment programme;
6.2 The allegation against SCOPE; and
6.3 Other related information.
7. As a responsible member state of the United Nations (UN), it is MALAYSIAâs responsibility to investigate and inform on any activity which involves nuclear proliferation. In relation to this, MALAYSIA is cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an agency under the UN, which is responsible for the enforcement of rules and regulations controlling nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is to ensure that the investigations are thorough and free of doubt. In relation to this, two preliminary reports were given to the Department of Safeguards, IAEA in VIENNA through the cooperation and help of the Director-General of the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB) MALAYSIA and an officer with Malaysiaâs Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT). One complete report will also be handed to IAEA to assist the agency to carry out investigations on individuals or companies outside MALAYSIA suspected to be involved in related activities.
<b>BACKGROUND OF BSA TAHIR</b>
8. BSA TAHIR, whose full name is BUHARY SEYED ABU TAHIR, is 44 years old and a citizen of SRI LANKA and a businessman based in DUBAI. BSA TAHIR and his brother own a company i.e. SMB GROUP, DUBAI where he is the Group Managing Director. In 1998, BSA TAHIR married a MALAYSIAN woman and gained permanent residency in MALAYSIA. SMB GROUP started as a family company in 1980 and is now involved in the computer and IT fields. Generally, BSA TAHIR spends time overseeing his businesses in DUBAI and only returns to MALAYSIA, once in a while, to visit his wifeâs family or look for business opportunities.
9. Upon his fatherâs death in 1985, BSA TAHIR took over the management of SMB and in the process visited PAKISTAN and succeeded in getting contracts to sell air conditioning equipment to Khan Research Laboratory (KRL). During this time, BSA TAHIR became acquainted with the Pakistani nuclear expert. At the same time, BSA TAHIR got to know middlemen from other countries, including EUROPE, who were involved in supplying uranium centrifuge components on behalf of the Pakistani nuclear expert.
<b>MODUS OPERANDI</b>
10. Investigation showed that the supply of components by middlemen was carried out in a discreet manner and involved suppliers from other countries to blur the sources of the components. Some of the suppliers were believed to be aware that these components could be for uranium enrichment centrifuges. Generally these suppliers mostly from Europe, were those who had had dealings with the nuclear expert since the 1980s, at a time when PAKISTAN was developing its nuclear technology. There were a number of individuals and companies which supplied the components but were unaware of the implications because some of the components were similar to components used in oil drilling, water treatment and equipment for several other general use.
<b>EARLY INVOLVEMENT â SUPPLY OF CENTRIFUGE TO IRAN</b>
11. During investigations, BSA TAHIR alleged that his involvement with the nuclear expert started sometime in 1994/1995. That year, the latter had asked BSA TAHIR to send two containers of used centrifuge units from PAKISTAN to IRAN. BSA TAHIR organized the transshipment of the two containers from DUBAI to IRAN using a merchant ship owned by a company in IRAN. BSA TAHIR said the payment for the two containers of centrifuge units, amounting to about USD$3 million was paid in UAE Dirham currency by the Iranian. The cash was brought in two briefcases and kept in an apartment that was used as a guesthouse by the Pakistani nuclear arms expert each time he visited DUBAI.
<b>BACKGROUND TO THE INVOLVEMENT WITH LIBYA</b>
12. From what BSA TAHIR could recall, LIBYA had contacted the nuclear arms expert in 1997 to obtain help and expertise in the field of uranium-enrichment centrifuge. Several meetings between the arms expert and representatives from LIBYA took place:-
12.1 Meeting in ISTANBUL sometime in 1997. During this meeting, the nuclear arms expert was accompanied by BSA TAHIR while LIBYA was represented by MOHAMAD MATUQ MOHAMAD and another person known only as KARIM. During this meeting, the Libyans asked the arms expert to supply centrifuge units for LIBYAâs nuclear programme; and
12.2 About 1998 to 2002. During this time, several meetings were held between the arms expert, accompanied by BSA TAHIR and the Libyans headed by MOHAMAD MATUQ MOHAMAD. One discussion was held in Casablanca, MOROCCO and several discussions in DUBAI.
13. As a result of these meetings, the following progress were made:-
13.1 Around 2001, the nuclear arms expert informed BSA TAHIR that a certain amount of UF6 (enriched uranium) was sent by air from PAKISTAN to LIBYA. BSA TAHIR could not remember the name of the Pakistan Airlines which transported the uranium;
13.2 Year 2001/2002. The nuclear arms expert informed BSA TAHIR that a certain number of centrifuge units were sent to LIBYA directly from PAKISTAN by air. There is a possibility that the design of the centrifuge units that were sent were of the P1 model, i.e. a DUTCH designed model;
13.3 Project Machine Shop 1001. This was a project to set up a workshop in LIBYA to make centrifuge components which could not be obtained from outside LIBYA. The machines for the workshop were obtained from SPAIN and ITALY. BSA TAHIR said the middleman involved in this project was PETER GRIFFIN, a BRITISH citizen who is believed to have once owned Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) based in DUBAI. PETER GRIFFIN is said to be retired and living in FRANCE. The management of GTI has been taken over by his son PAUL GRIFFIN. BSA TAHIR also said that the plans for the Machine Shop 1001 was prepared by PETER GRIFFIN.
<b>NETWORKING</b>
14. BSA TAHIR said that PAKISTANâs need to produce nuclear weapons became urgent after INDIA tested its nuclear weapon on 18 May 1974. In view of this, the Kahuta Plant was set up and the nuclear arms expert was forced to get equipment discreetly from developed nations, especially Europe. In the process, he developed contacts to get the needed material from several countries. This had to be done discreetly because PAKISTAN had to develop a nuclear weapon for national defence after INDIAâs nuclear test received opposition from many Western countries. Amid these difficulties, the nuclear expert successfully developed a network of middlemen that, not only involved BSA TAHIR, but also several people and companies from Europe seeking to make profits by selling certain materials and equipment. However, it was a loose network, without a rigid hierarchy, or a head and a deputy head as was alleged.
15. According to BSA TAHIR, some of the middlemen appeared to have known the nuclear expert for a long while and some amongst them knew him when he was in the NETHERLANDS. Among the middlemen alleged to have links with him are:-
<b>15.1 GERMANY</b>
Late HEINZ MEBUS, an engineer. He is alleged to have been involved in discussions between the nuclear arms expert and IRAN to supply centrifuge designs about 1984/85.
15.2 GOTTHARD LERCH, a German citizen residing in Switzerland. GOTTHARD LERCH once worked for LEYBOLD HERAEUS, a German company that is alleged to have produced vacuum technology equipment. GOTTHARD LERCH is alleged to have tried to obtain supplies of pipes for the Machine Shop 1001 Project by sourcing from SOUTH AFRICA but failed to obtain it even though payment had been made by LIBYA earlier.
<b>15.3 TURKEY</b>
GUNAS JIREH, a citizen of TURKEY who had once worked for the German company Siemens. GUNAS JIREH is alleged to have supplied aluminium casting and dynamo to LIBYA at the request of the nuclear arms expert;
15.4 SELIM ALGUADIS, a citizen of TURKEY. Also said to be an engineer. Alleged to have supplied electrical cabinets and power supplier-voltage regulator to LIBYA. Two weeks after action against the ship BBC China in Taranto, Italy on 4 Oct 2003, BSA TAHIR is alleged to have arranged the transshipment of electrical cabinets and power supplier-voltage regulator to LIBYA through DUBAI on behalf of SELIM ALGUADIS.
<b>15.5 UNITED KINGDOM</b>
PETER GRIFFIN, a citizen of UNITED KINGDOM who has business interests in DUBAI and currently residing in FRANCE. Alleged to have supplied the lay-out plan for the Machine Shop 1001 as a workshop to enable LIBYA to produce centrifuge;
15.6 About 2001/2002, PETER GRIFFIN is alleged to have supplied a lathe machine to LIBYA for the Machine Shop 1001 Project. After that PETER GRIFFIN arranged to send 7 to 8 LIBYAN technicians to SPAIN, twice, to attend courses on how to operate the machine. At the same time, PETER GRIFFIN is also said to have supplied an ITALIAN â made furnace to LIBYA for the workshop. Usually, lathe machines are used to make cylindrical objects, while the furnace is essential in the process of heating and refining during the manufacture of certain components;
<b>15.7 SWITZERLAND</b>
FRIEDRICH TINNER, mechanical engineer, alleged to have had dealings with the nuclear arms expert since 1980s. FRIEDRICH TINNER was reported to have prepared certain centrifuge components, including safety valves, and he sourced many of the materials that were made in several companies in Europe. FRIEDRICH TINNER did not keep the stock himself but arranged for the supply to reach DUBAI and then on to LIBYA. FRIEDRICH TINNER is also the President of CETEC, a company in SWITZERLAND; and
15.8 URS FRIEDRICH TINNER is the son of FRIEDRICH TINNER. URS TINNER is a consultant arranged by BSA TAHIR to set up the SCOPE factory in SHAH ALAM. He was actively involved in the manufacturing operations in the SCOPE factory. (See Passport | Work Permit)
16. Although the individuals above were alleged to have been involved, the governments of the countries concerned and some of the companies involved which supplied the components to the individuals above were unaware of the real use of the components.
<b>ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SCOPE</b>
17. The Special Branch also investigated the allegation that BSA TAHIR had used SCOPE and its business to manufacture certain parts of the centrifuge unit. A check on Malaysiaâs Security Commission records show that SCOPE or Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn. Bhd. was set up as a subsidiary to Scomi Group on 4 Dec 2001. Before SCOPE was set up as a subsidiary of Scomi, it was known as Prisma Wibawa Sdn. Bhd. (PWSB). At first, PWSB had no production facility but after SCOPE was set up, a production facility was set up in 2001.
18. SCOPEâs business is precision engineering services. Generally, SCOPE gets orders from a number of companies to supply parts or components for vehicle parts and machining high precision components. The work involved machining parts such as cutting, turning and milling. The SCOPE factory is located in SHAH ALAM and has a permanent staff of about 30 people. As such, it is not a very big factory or a complex when compared with other factories.
<b>19. Results of the investigation according to chronology is as follows:-</b>
<b>ROLE OF BSA TAHIR</b>
19.1 Sometime in 2001, BSA TAHIR is alleged to have planned to manufacture components with GUNAS JIREH in TURKEY. However, BSA TAHIR later changed his mind and offered a new business plan said to be legitimate to produce components for petroleum and gas to SCOPE. The staff were under the impression that the production was for petroleum and gas intended for DUBAI.
<b>ROLE OF URS FRIEDRICH TINNER</b>
19.2 Following this development, BSA TAHIR sent URS FRIEDRICH TINNER as a consultant to the SCOPE factory with the aim of giving expert advice on how to manufacture components in a business that was deemed legitimate.
19.3 URS FRIEDRICH TINNER or URS TINNER, as he is better known, is 39 years old and is the son of FFRIEDRICH TINNER. URS TINNER was made a full-time technical consultant to SCOPE starting Apr 2002 on the recommendation of BSA TAHIR. According to BSA TAHIR, URS TINNER was recommended after PETER GRIFFIN was found unsuitable for the job. Before this, PETER GRIFFIN presented a feasibility study recommending, among others, the type of machinery needed. One of the machinery, a Cincinnati Hawk 150 Machining Centre, is the same as that purchased and installed by URS TINNER. This evidence was found in a document in the nature of a brief note allegedly signed by PETER GRIFFIN himself dated 10 Mar 2001.
19.4 As a consultant, URS TINNER was responsible in importing and setting up the machine that was bought through the services of his father, FRIEDRICH TINNER. There were also machines imported through Traco Company, SWITZERLAND, owned by MARCO TINNER, the brother of URS TINNER. Among the types of machines that were bought and fixed by URS TINNER are CNC Lathe Hawk (Cincinnati) from the UNITED KINGDOM, CNC Machining Center Arrow 500 (Cincinnati), also from the UNITED KINGDOM, CNC Lathe Mexica 590 (Cazeneuve) in FRANCE and Emco PC Turn 155 from UNITED KINGDOM. Two other machines made in TAIWAN i.e. Automated Bandshaw Cutting Machine (Averizing) and Universal Tool Grinder (Monaset) were bought from local agents.
20. Throughout the time he was in the SCOPE factory, URS TINNER was seen by SCOPE staff as carrying out his duties with care and would always take back his component drawings once a component was finished. URS TINNER is also alleged to have said that he was doing that to safeguard trade secrets. At that time, his explanation was accepted by the staff. No suspicions were aroused.
21. Many SCOPE staff also said that URS TINNER would erase all technical drawings that were kept in the computer at the SCOPE factory. In Oct 2003, URS TINNER ended his term of service at the SCOPE factory and just before this, is said to have taken the hard-disc of the companyâs computer that was designated for his use. URS TINNER is also said to have taken his personal file from the SCOPE factoryâs records. This gave the impression that URS TINNER did not wish to leave any trace of his presence there and wanted to ensure that the technical drawings did not fall into the hands of the SCOPE factory staff. However, URS TINNER left behind a machine, i.e. a manual turning machine. It was a 1948 model made in Schaublins, SWITZERLAND. This machine was never used .
22. The SCOPE staff did not know that on 4 Oct 2003, a ship, BBC China, was examined in the port of Taranto, ITALY where a total of 5 containers bound for LIBYA were confiscated because they were alleged to contain components for certain parts of a centrifuge unit. In fact, URS TINNER left his position as a consultant in SCOPE also in Oct 2003.
<b>MATERIAL FOR MANUFACTURING COMPONENTS</b>
23. The investigations show that the raw materials for making the components were obtained from a German subsidiary company i.e. Bikar Metal Pte Ltd in SINGAPORE. A total of 300 metric tons of aluminium grade 6061 and 6082 were bought and obtained from Bikar Metal in the form of round bars or round tubes. These materials are not controlled items. Therefore, URS TINNER recommended the purchase and this did not give rise to any concern or suspicion among the SCOPE staff.
<b>MANUFACTURE AND EXPORT</b>
24. The materials obtained from Bikar Metal i.e. aluminium round tube and aluminium round bar are semi-finished products that were sent to the SCOPE factory in SHAH ALAM for machining to be made into components for export. The order from BSA TAHIR was a one-off production estimated at about RM13 million and was sent in four stages to DUBAI. This was not a long-term contract on a continuing basis.
25. The SCOPE factory records show that a total of 14 types of components were manufactured. The components were sent in four stages i.e. in the month of Dec 2002 to Aug 2003. All four shipments were sent to DUBAI to Aryash Trading Company.
26. Though a document, delivery note/packing list, dated 1 Aug 2002 (Appendix âAâ) shows that SCOPE had sent a shipment addressed to Gulf Technical Industries LCC, P.O. Box 29576, Dubai, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, the consignment was directed to Desert Electrical Equipment Factory, P.O.Box 51209, DUBAI on the instructions of URS TINNER. Documents related to the delivery to Desert Electrical Equipment Factory is as at Appendix âBâ.
27. From the document retrieved such as âdelivery note and packing listâ, it has been found that SCOPE only shipped the components to DUBAI. No document was traced that proved SCOPE had delivered or exported the said components to LIBYA. Only BSA TAHIR and URS TINNER are said to know any preparation or arrangements to LIBYA.
<b>SEARCH ON BBC CHINA VESSEL</b>
28. As explained, on 4 October 2003, a vessel, BBC CHINA, was searched at the Taranto port, ITALY where a total of 5 containers to LIBYA was seized following allegations it contained certain components for âcentrifuge.â The containers were sent by BSA TAHIR from DUBAI. Several items inside the container that is said to be components of a âcentrifugeâ are as follows :
Description Part Numbers Total
28.1 Casing 4 2,208
28.2 Molecular Pump 5 2,208
28.3 Top spacer 6 608
28.4 Positioner 8 10,549
28.5 Top end 9 1,680
28.6 Crash Ring 12 2,208
28.7 Stationary Tube 59 1,056
28.8 Clamp holder 73 400
28.9 Flange 77 4,525
29. All the above items, were made of âquality aluminiumâ and were in wooden boxes with the SCOPE logo. This was part of the âtransshipmentâ delivered by SCOPE to Aryash Trading Company, DUBAI. The shipment of the items or components by BSA TAHIR to LIBYA via the vessel BBC CHINA was outside the knowledge of the management of SCOPE.
30. Photographs of the above items or components was shown to local experts at the Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB), which is responsible for the implementation of guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) connected with âIAEA safeguard systemâ in MALAYSIA, and also the Malaysian Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT). They admitted that trained eyes like theirs found it difficult to positively confirm that the seized components were part of a âcentrifugeâ unit. This is because the said components could also be used by other industries besides Nuclear Technology. It was important and necessary to know the existence of a secret international network that planned to supply centrifuge components to LIBYA before making any assumptions on its use. In relation to this, it is appropriate to extract the AELB view on the seized components:
âThe sets of graphic images presented, it may be parts of many possible mechanical device or devices. These parts could easily be fitted into many industrial or home components. Without knowing the full or a significant portion of the total of sub assembly no definitive use of assignment of the possible device may be madeâ
(Photographs of components seized from BBC CHINA is as at Appendix âCâ)
<b>OTHER INFORMATION CONNECTED TO THE ACTION AGAINST THE VESSEL BBC CHINA</b>
31. The action against vessel BBC CHINA should also be viewed with scepticism in the light of the following allegations made by BSA TAHIR:
31.1 BSA TAHIR claimed thatâ together with the seized components on board BBC CHINA on October 4, 2003, was a consignment sent by GUNAS JIREH, a Turkish national who supplied âaluminum casting and dynamoâ to LIBYA for its âmachine shop 1001â project. These items were delivered through DUBAI using the services of TUT Shipping (TS) via vessel BBC CHINA. It is surprising that the consignment from GUNAS JIREH direct to LIBYA was allowed without any action; and
31.2 Two weeks after action taken against BBC CHINA, BSA TAHIR claimed to have arranged a âtransshipment of electrical cabinet and power supplier-voltage regulatorâ to LIBYA through DUBAI on behalf of SELIM ALGUADIS. These transshipment too arrived in LIBYA without any obstruction and this is unusual. SELIM ALGUADIS is said to have known AQK since the 1980sâ.
SCOPEâS STATUS
32 In general, the investigations revealed the following :
32.1 That the management of SCOPE were unaware that the exported components were part of certain centrifuge unit for LIBYA. The management of SCOPE considered it a legitimate business deal. To untrained eyes, such components would not raise any concern as the components are similar to components that could be used by the âpetrol -chemical industryâ and âwater treatmentâ and various other industries.
32.2 SCOPE obtained the semi-finished product to produce the said components from a German company Bikar Metal and this gives the impression that these items are not controlled items. In view of the foregoing, the work that was carried out on the semi-finished product is legitimate and does not give rise to suspicion.
32.3 BSA TAHIR and URS TINNER did not declare the use of the component or the true nature of the business. Moreover, the components that were confiscated cannot be used as one complete unit of centrifuge. Vital components such as rotor motor or in technical terms rotating components were not among the components seized. Besides, SCOPE does not have the ability or the technical know how to produce it. It must be stressed that rotating components are vital for a centrifuge unit for the process of uranium enrichment. To build one centrifuge unit, a number of sophisticated components are needed and SCOPE only prepared 12 types of components. In fact, SCOPE was misled into manufacturing the components for dual purposes for the petroleum and gas industry. As of now no factory in Malaysia is capable of manufacturing a complete centrifuge unit, what more, the construction of hundreds or thousands of centrifuges.
32.4 To SCOPE, the alleged manufacturing of components for centrifuges was a one-off production worth an estimated RM13 million. This means SCOPE did not receive any further orders and, as such, the manufacturing of such components is not its core business. As such, claims that the Malaysian authorities have shut down one of the networkâs largest plant has been exaggerated.
33. In this context it is worthy to note that Malaysia is a signatory to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NPT in general oversees control over nuclear materials like uranium, thorium and plutonium. Manufacturing, using or importing and exporting of uranium and plutonium and also other materials like thorium that can be converted into uranium are controlled by the NPT. All nations, including Malaysia, who are signatories to the NPT are required to report all inventories, and also the import and export of nuclear materials, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based in Vienna, Austria as the IAEA is the enforcement agency to the NPT. However, it has no control over nuclear equipments such as centrifuge components. As such SCOPE or Malaysia has not broken any of the NPT rules, as it is not among the listed items of the NPT. Besides, Malaysia has yet to sign the Additional Protocol to the IAEAâs enforcement control agreement. In general, this Additional Protocol ensures control over specific nuclear equipment like single-use items that covers materials such as centrifuge for uranium enrichment. However, this Additional Protocol does not cover dual-use items like centrifuge for petrochemical, water treatment and the use in molecular biology for protein separation for health. Therefore, Malaysia, which is not a party to the Additional Protocol, has not violated any of the provision in the Additional Protocol because the seized components at the Port of Taranto in Italy were basic components and not complete centrifuge unit for uranium enrichment. Moreover, under Malaysian laws under the Atomic Energy Licensing Act (Act 304) there is no provision under the law for the control of such components that were seized.
34. From the explanation above, it is clear that SCOPE has not violated any law under the NPT, Additional Protocol and also the Malaysian law under the AEL (Act 304). What is clear is that most individuals involved in the networking are from Europe whose countries are signatories to the Additional Protocol and also members of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). As such, these countries are governed by the rules and regulations that have been set including reporting any transaction of specific materials for the use of nuclear to the IAEA. Germany has signed the Additional Protocol on 22 September 1998 and also a member of the NSG. Therefore, it is the responsibility of Bikar Metal to report to the German Government and also to the IAEA if semi-finished products that was supplied to SCOPE had been listed as a controlled item.
<b>CONCLUSION</b>
35. The police, in handling the investigation took an open and transparent approach. In this context, a full and complete report in connection with the investigation will be submitted to the AELB Malaysia to be reported to IAEA, an agency under the United Nations. This is in line with Malaysiaâs policy in recognizing a multi-lateral approach under the aegis of the IAEA and rejecting a unilateral approach where investigations are monopolized by only certain countries. The Malaysian authorities are always ready to cooperate with the IAEA if there is a need for further investigation.
36. It is hoped that the IAEA will start investigations on several individuals from Europe allegedly involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Investigations undertaken by the Malaysian authorities prove the countryâs commitment to supporting efforts to curb the illegal transfer and proliferation of nuclear technology.
Released : 20 February 2004 0700hrs
<b>Scientist 'sent uranium to Libya'</b>
Tahir said he had been involved in nuclear trades since 1994/95
Disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan sent enriched uranium to Libya, Malaysian police have said.
Buhary Syed Abu Tahir - Dr Khan's alleged financier - said he was told in 2001 that the uranium was sent in a Pakistani jet, a police report says.
Mr Tahir, a Malaysian resident, also told police Iran paid Dr Khan $3m for used centrifuge parts in the mid-1990s.
The report also alleges that several European businessmen were involved in supplying Libya nuclear technology.
Around 2001, the nuclear arms expert informed BSA Tahir that a certain amount of UF6 (enriched uranium) was sent by air from Pakistan to Libya
Mr Tahir named British, German, Swiss and Turkish businessmen, who the Malaysian police are urging international authorities to investigate.
Two weeks ago, Dr Khan confessed to selling nuclear technology overseas.
He is still seen as a hero in Pakistan for instigating the nation's nuclear programme, and has been pardoned by President Pervez Musharraf.
But the Malaysian police report provided the first public details of how his network functioned, and shed new light on its reach.
<b>'Cash payment'</b>
Officers have been questioning Mr Tahir, a Sri Lankan businessman living in Malaysia, over his role in Dr Khan's network.
US President George W Bush last week called Mr Tahir the "chief financial officer and money launderer" of the black market network led by Dr Khan.
He has been under investigation since Malaysian centrifuge parts were found on a Libya-bound ship last year.
Malaysian police released a report into their investigation on Friday.
Their report said Mr Tahir is reported to have said a "certain amount" of uranium was flown to Libya in a Pakistani jet. He said he was told of this by Dr Khan around 2001.
A nuclear expert told the BBC that the amount of uranium involved - assuming the transfer did take place - would be crucial in determining its use.
Khan has been pardoned for his role
He also said it was not clear whether the UF6 uranium in question had been enriched, a key stage if it was intended for weapons use.
The police report said that from what Mr Tahir "could recall", Libya contacted Dr Khan in 1997 "to obtain help and expertise in the field of uranium-enrichment centrifuge".
He also says an "unnamed Iranian" paid $3m for two containers of centrifuge units to be sent from Pakistan to Iran. Mr Tahir said he was asked to arrange this in the year that his involvement with Dr Khan started - 1994/5.
"The cash was brought in two briefcases and kept in an apartment that was used as a guesthouse by the Pakistani nuclear arms expert each time he visited Dubai," Mr Tahir reportedly said.
Malaysian police have said Mr Tahir obtained the components from Scope, part of a publicly listed company jointly controlled by the Malaysian Prime Minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah, and two other men.
The police report clears Scope of culpability in the case, saying that the company's management had no idea what the components would be used for.
<b>The report's other findings include: </b>
Several meetings took place between Mr Khan and representatives from Libya regarding Libya's aspirations to get hold of enriched uranium. These took place between 1997 and 2002 in Istanbul, Casablanca and Dubai
Most of the components were supplied by a series of European middlemen, some of whom are believed to have been aware of the components' potential use
There was also a project to set up a workshop within Libya to make centrifuge components which could not be obtained outside the country
Mr Tahir said the middleman in this project was Peter Griffin, a British citizen who was based in Dubai and has now retired to France, the report said. Mr Griffin's son, Paul, has denied their company had any involvement in shipping nuclear components to Libya.
Mr Khan's network also involved middlemen in Germany, Switzerland and Turkey.
Interesting Editorial from Wisconsin...time for our letter writers to get busy B)
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--> Editorial: Pakistan: The unusual ally
From the Journal Sentinel
Posted: Feb. 16, 2004
An asterisk has to be appended to President Bush's assertion that those who support terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists themselves. Bush has given a pass to a military dictator who shields - even honors - a man who sold nuclear weapons expertise and equipment to nations described by the president himself as members of an "axis of evil."
The administration's supine acquiescence in this weapons trafficking calls into question Bush's professed desire to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and even his commitment to the war on terrorism.
On Feb. 4, an eminent Pakistani scientist named Abdul Qadeer Khan went on television to admit what had been widely believed for years - that he provided nuclear weapons expertise and equipment to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Khan professed "deepest regrets and unqualified apologies" for these deals. Although the deals went on for some 20 years, he claimed the transactions were made without authorization from the government, now headed by Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
Far from punishing Khan for this supposedly secret trafficking, Musharraf quickly pardoned him and said the errant scientist was "still my hero" for having led the project that gave Pakistan a nuclear bomb. And far from condemning Musharraf for this whitewash, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher saluted him for his commitment to the non-proliferation effort.
Bush has famously portrayed Iran, Iraq and North Korea as parts of an axis of evil. Last week, he even proposed a seven-point plan to make it more difficult to sell nuclear equipment on the black market to rogue governments and terrorist gangs. But when Boucher was asked to comment on Musharraf's decision to pardon a man who became a multimillionaire in this same black market, the State Department spokesman retreated to the shade of diplomatic restraint. "I don't think it's a matter for the United States to sit in judgment on," he said.
Perhaps this hypocrisy can be explained by the putative need to maintain Musharraf as an ally in the war on terrorism. But if Musharraf is not strong enough to punish Khan - if he is forced to pardon a man who, by investigators' accounts, is the worst criminal in the history of nuclear weapons proliferation - how effective an ally can he be?
If, on the other hand, Musharraf could have punished Khan but chose not to, then his partnership in the struggle against terrorism is merely rhetorical, and so is his partnership with the United States.
It is time for Bush to tell his wayward partner that the price of continued U.S. support is his signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the acceptance of regular inspections by the United Nations. If Musharraf can't or won't do that, he's not much of an ally.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Puke Nuke and North Korea
- from International Institute for Strategic Studies
Islamic bomb: partners in Europe
USA should know that Pakistan is a risky state placing US security at risk. 9/11 should be a wake up call. The islamic nuke in Pakistan is a time-bomb ticking which will make 9/11 look like a Diwali cracker. Hope this will be read by US policy brass.
Kalyanaraman
Roots of Pakistan Atomic Scandal Traced to Europe
By CRAIG S. SMITH
Published: February 19, 2004
Correction Appended
PARIS, Feb. 18 â The Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan has been demonized in the West for selling atomic secrets and equipment around the world, but the trade began in Europe, not Islamabad, according to court documents and experts who monitor proliferation.
The records show that industry scientists and Western intelligence agencies have known for decades that nuclear technology was pouring out of Europe despite national export control efforts to contain it.
Many of the names that have turned up among lists of suppliers and middlemen who fed equipment, materials and knowledge to nuclear programs in Pakistan and other aspiring nuclear nations are well-known players in Europe's uranium enrichment industry, a critical part of many nuclear weapons programs. Some have been convicted of illegal exports before.
The proliferation has its roots in Europe's own postwar eagerness for nuclear independence from the United States and its lax security over potentially lethal technology. It was abetted, critics say, by competition within Europe for lucrative contracts to bolster state-supported nuclear industries. Even as their own intelligence services warned that Pakistan could not be trusted, some European governments continued to help Pakistan's nuclear program.
"It was an economic consideration," said Paul Stais, a former Belgian member of the European Parliament who lobbied unsuccessfully for tighter export controls.
One name to emerge from the international investigations of Dr. Khan's nuclear trade was that of Urs Tinner, a Swiss engineer who monitored production of centrifuge parts at a factory in Malaysia. The parts were intended for Libya. Mr. Tinner's father, Friedrich Tinner, also an engineer, came under scrutiny by the Defense Department in the 1970's and again by Swiss export control authorities and the International Atomic Energy Agency in the last decade, because he was involved in exports to Pakistan and Iraq of technology used in uranium enrichment.
In the 1970's, Friedrich Tinner was in charge of exports at Vakuum-Apparate-Technik, or VAT, when the company was identified by the Defense Department as shipping items with possible nuclear-related uses to Pakistan, according to documents and VAT company officials. He later set up his own company, now called PhiTec AG, which was investigated by the Swiss in 1996 for trying to ship valves for uranium enrichment centrifuges to Iraq. The Tinners were never found to have broken any laws, Swiss officials said.
"Most of these people were heavily investigated in the 1970's, 80's and 90's," said Mark Hibbs, the European editor of the technical journal Nucleonics Week, published by McGraw-Hill.
The problem began with the 1970 Treaty of Almelo, under which Britain, Germany and the Netherlands agreed to develop centrifuges to enrich uranium jointly, ensuring their nuclear power industry a fuel source independent of the United States. Urenco, or the Uranium Enrichment Company, was established the next year with its primary enrichment plant at Almelo, the Netherlands.
Security at Urenco was by most accounts slipshod. The consortium relied on a network of research centers and subcontractors to build its centrifuges, and top-secret blueprints were passed out to companies bidding on tenders, giving engineers across Europe an opportunity to appropriate designs.
Dr. Khan, who worked for a Urenco Dutch subcontractor, Physics Dynamic Research Laboratory, was given access to the most advanced designs, even though he came from Pakistan, which was already known to harbor nuclear ambitions. A 1980 report by the Dutch government on his activities said he visited the Almelo factory in May 1972 and by late 1974 had an office there.
After Dr. Khan returned to Pakistan with blueprints and supplier lists for uranium enrichment centrifuges at the end of 1975, American intelligence agencies predicted that he would soon be shopping for the items needed to build the centrifuges for Pakistan's bomb. They soon detected a flow of equipment from Europe to Pakistan as Dr. Khan drew on Urenco's network of suppliers using a trusted group of former schoolmates and friends as agents.
The Dutch government report found that in 1976, two Dutch firms exported to Pakistan 6,200 unfinished rotor tubes made of superstrong maraging steel. The tubes are the heart of Urenco's advanced uranium-enriching centrifuges.
In 1983, a Dutch court convicted Dr. Khan in absentia on charges of stealing the designs, though the conviction was later overturned on a technicality. Nonetheless, in the late 1980's, Belgian ministers led delegations of scientists and businessmen to Pakistan, despite warnings from their own experts that they were meeting with people involved in the military application of nuclear technology.
"Every well-informed person knows the inherent danger of an intense collaboration with a country such as Pakistan," wrote René Constant, director of Belgium's National Institute of Radioactive Elements in February 1987, chastising Philippe Maystadt, then the country's minister of economic affairs, after one such visit.
That same year, despite American warnings to Germany that such a sale was imminent, a German firm exported to Pakistan a plant for the recovery of tritium, a volatile gas used to increase the power of nuclear bombs. The company simply called the plant something else to obtain an export license.
"The export control office didn't even inspect the goods," said Reinhard Huebner, the German prosecutor who handled the subsequent trial of the company's chief, Rudolf Ortmayers, and Peter Finke, a German physicist who went to Pakistan to train engineers there to operate the equipment. Both men were sentenced to jail for violating export control laws.
But there were clues that the technology had spread even further: a German intelligence investigation determined that Iraq and possibly Iran and North Korea had obtained uranium-melting expertise stolen from Urenco in 1984, Mr. Hibbs reported in Nucleonics Week several years later.
In 1989, two engineers, Bruno Stemmler and Karl Heinz Schaab, who had worked for Germany's MAN New Technology, another Urenco subcontractor, sold plans for advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges to Iraq. They went to Baghdad to help solve problems in making the equipment work.
In 1991, after the first Iraq war, international inspectors were stunned to discover the extent of Saddam Hussein's hidden program. Mr. Schaab was later convicted of treason but only served a little more than a year in jail. Mr. Stemmler died before he could be tried.
David Albright, a former weapons inspector for the International Atomic Energy Agency, said he helped retrieve a full set of the blueprints from Iraq after the major combat operations ended last year. United States inspectors have not found evidence that Mr. Hussein had restarted his nuclear program, but Mr. Albright said there were still drawings unaccounted for.
"It's an unnerving issue," said Mr. Albright, who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security. "A lot of nuclear weapons design stuff could be missing in Iraq."
As recently as last year, German customs agents seized high-tensile-strength aluminum tubes made by a German company and bound for North Korea. The tubes matched the specifications for the housings of Urenco's uranium-enriching centrifuges.
One name on a list of suppliers to Iran that came to light in recent investigations was Henk Slebos, who studied with Dr. Khan at Delft Technological University in Leuven, Belgium, in the late 1960's.
In the early 1980's, Mr. Slebos was arrested for shipping an oscilloscope, used in testing centrifuges, to Dr. Khan in Pakistan. He was convicted and sentenced to a brief prison term in 1985. Mr. Slebos declined to comment for this article.
In 1998, he withdrew five Pakistan-bound shipments that the Dutch authorities had stopped in the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria because they contained "dual use" items, which could be used for uncovventional weapons as well as civilian purposes.
Last September, Mr. Slebos was among the sponsors of an international symposium on advanced materials in Pakistan organized by Dr. Khan. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who was then the Dutch foreign minister and is now NATO's secretary general, told Dutch members of Parliament that Mr. Slebos was still doing business with Dr. Khan, though he did not elaborate.
Correction: Feb. 21, 2004, Saturday
An article on Thursday about a secretive European network used by the Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan for the sale of nuclear technology misstated the location of Delft Technological University, where he once studied. It is in Delft, the Netherlands, not Leuven, Belgium. The article also misspelled the surname of a former Belgian member of the European Parliament who lobbied unsuccessfully for tighter export controls on nuclear technology. He is Paul Staes, not Stais.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/19/internat...3&ex=1078179042
Iran Nuke Negotiator to Leave for India
Wed Feb 25, 9:13 AM ET
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI, Associated Press Writer
TEHRAN, Iran - Iran's top nuclear negotiator was heading Wednesday for talks in India, a visit that coincides with growing international concern that Iranian atomic experiments could be related to a secret weapons program.
Hasan Rowhani, head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, will hold three days of talks with top Indian officials, including Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the defense and foreign ministers, his office told The Associated Press.
Reza Rezaei, a member of Rowhani's staff, would give no other details about the visit.
But sources close to Rowhani, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the visit was related to growing pressure over new findings by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency about Iran's nuclear program.
India is a member of the 35-nation IAEA, whose board is convening in Vienna on March 8 to reassess the Iranian threat amid mounting pressure from the United States and other countries that contend Iran has been trying to build an atomic bomb.
Iran affirms that its nuclear program is peaceful and that it is fully cooperating with the U.N. agency.
The IAEA said in a report Tuesday that U.N. inspectors in Iran have found signs of polonium, a radioactive element that can help trigger a nuclear chain reaction, like that in a nuclear bomb.
The IAEA's report, however, suggested the agency is more concerned with the discovery in Iran this month of an advanced P-2 centrifuge system that could enrich uranium for weapons use. The United States, too, has said the finding raises "serious concerns" about Tehran's intentions.
Under international pressure last year, Iran pledged to cooperate fully with the IAEA in efforts to prove it was not interested in nuclear weapons, including opening its activities to full outside scrutiny.
Last week, Iran confirmed it had bought nuclear equipment from international dealers, including from the Indian subcontinent, but said it doesn't know where the components came from.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, has confessed to selling nuclear technology to Iran and Libya.
<b>LOTASTAAN THREATENED TO GIVE NUKES TO IRAN : FORMER PENTAGON OFFICIALS</b>
<b>WASHINGTON: Two former Pentagon officials have said that Pakistan had warned the United States as long as 14 years ago that transfers of nuclear weapons technology might be made to Iran.
The threat was conveyed in January 1990 from the Pakistani army chief to the administration of President George W Bushâs father, but the information doesnât appear to have made its way to President Bill Clintonâs administration when it took office three years later, according to interviews by The Associated Press.</b>
âWe knew they were up to no good,â said Henry Sokolski, the Pentagonâs top arms control official in 1990.
Henry S Rowen, at the time an assistant defense secretary, said former army chief Gen ® Mirza Aslam Beg issued the warning in a face-to-face meeting in Pakistan.
<b>âGen Beg said something like, âIf we donât get adequate support from the US, then we may be forced to share nuclear technology with Iranâ,â said Mr Rowen, now a professor at Stanford University. Gen Beg said he never authorised nuclear transfers to Iran or made threats to the United States. âI have said many times itâs all pure lies,â Beg said in a telephone interview. âAm I a fool, to tell the US what to do or what not to do?â
Mr Sokolski and Mr Rowen said former president George HW Bushâs administration did little to follow up on Gen Begâs warning. âIn hindsight, maybe before or after that they did make some transfers,â Mr Rowen said.</b>
Ashton Carter, an assistant defence secretary from 1993 to 1996, said he doesnât remember even being told about the problem when he joined the Pentagon.
Mr Rowen said he told Gen Beg that Pakistan would be âin deep troubleâ if it gave nuclear weapons to Iran. Rowen said he was surprised by the threat because at the time Americans thought Pakistanâs secular government dominated by Sunni Muslims wouldnât aid Iranâs Shiite Muslim theocracy.
âThere was no particular reason to think it was a bluff, but on the other hand, we didnât know,â Mr Rowen said.
<b>Former US officials say Pakistan never cracked down on its scientists when former President Clinton and other US officials shared their suspicions with Pakistani leaders.
âThe response was, âYes, weâll examine your concerns, but we donât believe they are well foundedâ,â said Robert Einhorn, who was the head arms control official in the State Department from 1999 to 2001.</b>
A decade earlier, President Ronald Reaganâs administration had looked the other way on Pakistanâs nuclear programme, said Stephen P Cohen, a State Department expert on the region from 1985 to 1987. Back then, âthey (the Pakistanis) were covering up our involvement in Afghanistan, pretending we played no role in Afghanistan, so they expected us to cover up their role in procuring a weapons system they saw as vital to their survival,â said Mr Cohen, now with the Brookings Institution think tank.
<b>He said American officials scolded Pakistan repeatedly for buying nuclear technology from sources in Europe, Asia and the United States but often those warnings were with âa wink and a nodâ that Washington would tolerate those activities. A declassified State Department memo from 1983 says Pakistan clearly had a nuclear weapons programme that that relied on stolen European technology and âenergetic procurement activities in various countries.â
Mr Cohen said the US suspected Pakistan was helping Iran in the late 1980s, in part because Pakistan had cooperated with Iran on nuclear matters before Iranâs 1979 Islamic revolution. The evidence, however, was murky, Cohen said.</b> âAP
Cheers
This news report, if true, could belie the claims that Khan was acting without the knowledge of the Pakistan government.
USA should get serious about the threat posed by the islamic nuke in Pakistan, rather than shoving the problem under the carpet. It may be too late for tears if USA doesn't act with alacrity.
Kalyanaraman
Did Pakistan, N Korea conduct joint N-tests?
AFP[ SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2004 01:38:43 AM ]
WASHINGTON: Pakistan may have helped North Korea test a plutonium-based nuclear device in 1998, former and current US intelligence officials were quoted in a report as saying on Friday.
Satellite image of Pakistan nuclear test site.
The report could influence the ongoing six-party talks in Beijing over North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program.
Clues to the possible joint nuclear test followed underground nuclear tests carried out by Pakistan in May 1998, the paper said.
According to the sources, a US military jet sent to sample the air over Baluchistan, Pakistan, after the final nuclear test found traces of plutonium, which surprised US experts since Pakistan had openly stated that it was testing bombs fuelled by highly enriched uranium.
The explanations for the plutonium included the possibility that North Korea could have given Pakistan some of its plutonium to conduct a joint test of an atomic weapon, the sources said.
The matter was debated but never settled and was mostly forgotten until Pakistani scientist and architect of the country's atomic bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, confessed last month that he passed nuclear technology on to North Korea, Libya and Iran.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/artic...525280.cms
This (the presence of plutonium in the air samples) was extensively discussed in BR after POK II. It was assumed at that time by BRites that the design that was tested at Chagai was not a uranium enriched bomb but a chinese supplied design. For plausibility they can say that the design was supplied by NKorea. But the diffference between NKorean designs and Chinese designs is the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee.
The US has consistently downplayed the traces of Pu in Chagai, knowing fully well that an admission of its veracity would be equivalent to pointing the finger at China and expose TSP as a proliferator. Such a stance would go against their overall policy of equating India and Pakist an. There is no question that there is a strong pro-PaKI Lobby in the US state department that would stoop to any level to protect their beloved PAKISTAN.
Senators criticize pardon for Pakistan nuclear scientist
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->We have a guy in Pakistan that 10 years ago, if you would have found him selling that stuff, you'd have hung him in the marketplace," said Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
silly question: OBL too is a "Paki national <i>herrow</i>" - believe the poll at one time after 9/11 had him at 90%+ popularity rating. So if the goon is caught, will Mushy pardon him too? Will then Bush pardon Mush <!--emo&  --><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/rolleyes.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='rolleyes.gif' /><!--endemo-->
US terms Khan's nuke network as 'criminal enterprise'
Press Trust of India
Washington, February 29
Dubbing as "criminal enterprise" the nuclear proliferation network of top Pakistani scientist AQ Khan, the US has insisted that those who indulge in trafficking of deadly weapons will be brought to justice.
Khan's network which sold nuclear equipment and materials to North Korea, Libya and Iran was a "criminal enterprise" motivated by "greed or fanaticism or perhaps both," National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice said at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum in Sun Valley, California.
"We must strengthen the world's ability to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes," she emphasised.
Rice said the world "recently learned of the network headed by AQ Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. For years, Khan and his associates sold nuclear technology and know-how to some of the world's most dangerous regimes, including North Korea and Iran".
Although president Pervez Musharraf has pardoned Khan, Rice insisted that those who traffic in deadly weapons will be brought to justice.
"Working with intelligence officials from the United Kingdom and other nations," she said, "we unravelled the Khan network and we are putting an end to its criminal enterprise. Its key leaders â including Khan â are no longer in business, and we are working to dismantle the entire network.
"Together, the nations of the civilised world will bring to justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, shut down their labs, seize their materials, and freeze their assets."
http://hindustantimes.com/news/181_591960,00050001.htm
The most dangerous country for the United States now is Pakistan, and second is Iran.â Gallucci (consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues) went on, âWe havenât been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.â
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->THE NEW YORKER, MARCH 1, 2004
THE DEAL
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH
<b>Why is Washington going easy on Pakistanâs nuclear black marketers?</b>
Issue of 2004-03-08
Posted 2004-03-01
On February 4th, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is revered in Pakistan as the father of the countryâs nuclear bomb, appeared on a state-run television network in Islamabad and confessed that he had been solely responsible for operating an international black market in nuclear-weapons materials. His confession was accepted by a stony-faced Pervez Musharraf, Pakistanâs President, who is a former Army general, and who dressed for the occasion in commando fatigues. The next day, on television again, Musharraf, who claimed to be shocked by Khanâs misdeeds, nonetheless pardoned him, citing his service to Pakistan (he called Khan âmy heroâ). Musharraf told the Times that he had received a specific accounting of Khanâs activities in Iran, North Korea, and Malaysia from the United States only last October. âIf they knew earlier, they should have told us,â he said. âMaybe a lot of things would not have happened.â
It was a make-believe performance in a make-believe capital. In interviews last month in Islamabad, a planned city built four decades ago, politicians, diplomats, and nuclear experts dismissed the Khan confession and the Musharraf pardon with expressions of scorn and disbelief. For two decades, journalists and American and European intelligence agencies have linked Khan and the Pakistani intelligence service, the I.S.I. (Inter-Service Intelligence), to nuclear-technology transfers, and it was hard to credit the idea that the government Khan served had been oblivious. âIt is state propaganda,â Samina Ahmed, the director of the Islamabad office of the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization that studies conflict resolution, told me. âThe deal is that Khan doesnât tell what he knows. Everybody is lying. The tragedy of this whole affair is that it doesnât serve anybodyâs needs.â Mushahid Hussain Sayed, who is a member of the Pakistani senate, said with a laugh, âAmerica needed an offering to the godsâblood on the floor. Musharraf told A.Q., âBend over for a spanking.ââ
A Bush Administration intelligence officer with years of experience in nonproliferation issues told me last month, âOne thing we do know is that this was not a rogue operation. Suppose Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear technology and equipment around the world. Do you really think he could do that without the government knowing? How do you get missiles from North Korea to Pakistan? Do you think A.Q. shipped all the centrifuges by Federal Express? The military has to be involved, at high levels.â The intelligence officer went on, âWe had every opportunity to put a stop to the A. Q. Khan network fifteen years ago. Some of those involved today in the smuggling are the children of those we knew about in the eighties. Itâs the second generation now.â
In public, the Bush Administration accepted the pardon at face value. Within hours of Musharrafâs television appearance, Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, praised him as âthe right man at the right time.â Armitage added that Pakistan had been âvery forthright in the last several years with us about proliferation.â A White House spokesman said that the Administration valued Musharrafâs assurances that âPakistan was not involved in any of the proliferation activity.â A State Department spokesman said that how to deal with Khan was âa matter for Pakistan to decide.â
Musharraf, who seized power in a coup dâétat in 1999, has been a major ally of the Bush Administration in the war on terrorism. According to past and present military and intelligence officials, however, Washingtonâs support for the pardon of Khan was predicated on what Musharraf has agreed to do next: look the other way as the U.S. hunts for Osama bin Laden in a tribal area of northwest Pakistan dominated by the forbidding Hindu Kush mountain range, where he is believed to be operating. American commanders have been eager for permission to conduct major sweeps in the Hindu Kush for some time, and Musharraf has repeatedly refused them. Now, with Musharrafâs agreement, the Administration has authorized a major spring offensive that will involve the movement of thousands of American troops.
Musharraf has proffered other help as well. A former senior intelligence official said to me, âMusharraf told us, âWeâve got guys inside. The people who provide fresh fruits and vegetables and herd the goatsââ for bin Laden and his Al Qaeda followers. âItâs a quid pro quo: weâre going to get our troops inside Pakistan in return for not forcing Musharraf to deal with Khan.â
The spring offensive could diminish the tempo of American operations in Iraq. âItâs going to be a full-court press,â one Pentagon planner said. Some of the most highly skilled Special Forces units, such as Task Force 121, will be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan. Special Forces personnel around the world have been briefed on their new assignments, one military adviser told me, and in some cases have been given âwarning ordersââthe stage before being sent into combat.
A large-scale American military presence in Pakistan could also create an uproar in the country and weaken Musharrafâs already tenuous hold on power. The operation represents a tremendous gamble for him personally (he narrowly survived two assassination attempts in December) and, by extension, for the Bush Administrationâif he fell, his successor might be far less friendly to the United States. One of Musharrafâs most vocal critics inside Pakistan is retired Army Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, a fundamentalist Muslim who directed the I.S.I. from 1987 to 1989, at the height of the Afghan war with the Soviets. If American troops start operating from Pakistan, there will be âa rupture in the relationship,â Gul told me. âAmericans think others are slaves to them.â Referring to the furor over A. Q. Khan, he added, âWe may be in a jam, but we are a very honorable nation. We will not allow the American troops to come here. This will be the breaking point.â If Musharraf has made an agreement about letting American troops operate in Pakistan, Gul said, âheâs lying to you.â
The greatest risk may be not to Musharraf, or to the stability of South Asia, but to the ability of the international nuclear monitoring institutions to do their work. Many experts fear that, with Khanâs help, the world has moved closer to a nuclear tipping point. Husain Haqqani, who was a special assistant to three prime ministers before Musharraf came to power and is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted, with some pride, that his nation had managed to make the bomb despite American sanctions. But now, he told me, Khan and his colleagues have gone wholesale: âOnce they had the bomb, they had a shopping list of what to buy and where. A. Q. Khan can bring a plain piece of paper and show me how to get it doneâthe countries, people, and telephone numbers. âThis is the guy in Russia who can get you small quantities of enriched uranium. You in Malaysia will manufacture the stuff. Hereâs who will miniaturize the warhead. And then go to North Korea and get the damn missile.ââ He added, âThis is not a few scientists pocketing money and getting rich. Itâs a state policy.â
Haqqani depicted Musharraf as truly âon the American side,â in terms of resisting Islamic extremism, but, he said, âhe doesnât know how to be on the American side. The same guys in the I.S.I. who have done this in the last twenty years he expects to be his partners. These are people whoâve done nothing but covert operations: One, screw India. Two, deceive America. Three, expand Pakistanâs influence in the Islamic community. And, four, continue to spread nuclear technology.â He paused. âMusharraf is trying to put out the fire with the help of the people who started the fire,â he said.
âMuch of this has been known for decades to the American intelligence community,â Haqqani added. âSometimes you know things and donât want to do anything about it. Americans need to know that your government is not only downplaying this but covering it up. You go to bed with our I.S.I. They know how to suck up to you. You let us get away with everything. Why canât you be more honest? Thereâs no harm in telling us the truthââLook, youâre an ally but a very disturbing ally.â You have to nip some of these things in the bud.â
The former senior American intelligence official was equally blunt. He told me, âKhan was willing to sell blueprints, centrifuges, and the latest in weaponry. He was the worst nuclear-arms proliferator in the world and heâs pardonedâwith not a squeak from the White House.â
The most recent revelations about the nuclear black market were triggered by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a now defunct opposition group that has served as the political wing of the Peopleâs Mujahideen Khalq, a group that has been on the State Departmentâs list of terrorist organizations since 1997. The National Council lobbied in Washington for decades, and offered informationânot always accurateâabout Iran. There had been suspicions about Iranâs nuclear intentions since the eighties, but the countryâs religious rulers claimed that its nuclear facilities were intended for peaceful purposes only. In August of 2002, the National Council came up with something new: it announced at a news conference in Washington that it had evidence showing that Iran had secretly constructed two extensive nuclear-weapons facilities in the desert south of Tehran. The two plants were described with impressive specificity. One, near Natanz, had been depicted by Iranian officials as part of a desert-eradication program. The site, surrounded by barbed wire, was said to include two work areas buried twenty-five feet underground and ringed by concrete walls more than eight feet thick. The second plant, which was said to be producing heavy water for use in making weapons-grade plutonium, was situated in Arak and ostensibly operated as an energy company.
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the organization that monitors nuclear proliferation, eventually followed up on the National Councilâs information. And it checked out.
A building that I.A.E.A. inspectors were not able to gain full access to on a visit in March, 2003, was found on a subsequent trip to contain a centrifuge facility behind a wall made of boxes. Inspectors later determined that some of the centrifuges had been supplied by Pakistan. They also found traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components manufactured in Iran and Pakistan. The I.A.E.A. has yet to determine whether the uranium originated in Pakistan: the enriched materials could have come from the black market, or from a nuclear proliferator yet to be discovered, or from the Iraniansâ own production facilities.
Last October, the Iranian government, after nine months of denials and obfuscationâand increasingly productive inspectionsâformally acknowledged to the I.A.E.A. that it had secretly been producing small quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium, and had been operating a pilot heavy-water reactor program, all potentially in violation of its obligations under the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. Some of the secret programs, Iran admitted, dated back eighteen years. At first, the countryâs religious leadership claimed that its scientists had worked on their own, and not with the help of outside suppliers. The ayatollahs later admitted that this was not the case, but refused to say where the help had come from.
Iranâs leaders continued to insist that their goal was to produce nuclear energy, not nuclear weapons, and, in a public report last November, the I.A.E.A. stopped short of accusing them of building a bomb. Cautiously, it stated, âIt is clear that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations . . . with respect to the reporting of nuclear material and its processing and use. . . . To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.â
Privately, however, senior proliferation experts were far less reserved. âI know what they did,â one official in Vienna told me, speaking of the Iranians. âTheyâve been lying all the time and theyâve been cheating all the time.â Asked if he thought that Iran now has the bomb, the official said no. Asked if he thought that Iran had enough enriched uranium to make a bomb, he said, âIâm not sure.â
Musharraf has insisted that any dealings between A. Q. Khan and Iran were independent of, and unknown to, the Pakistani government. But there is evidence to contradict him. On a trip to the Middle East last month, I was told that a number of years ago the Israeli signals-intelligence agency, known as Unit 8200, broke a sophisticated Iranian code and began monitoring communications that included talk between Iran and Pakistan about Iranâs burgeoning nuclear-weapons program. The Israeli intelligence community has many covert contacts inside Iran, stemming from the strong ties it had there before the overthrow of the Shah, in 1979; some of these ties still exist. Israeli intelligence also maintained close contact with many Iranian opposition groups, such as the National Council. A connection was madeâdirectly or indirectlyâand the Israeli intelligence about Iranâs nuclear program reached the National Council. A senior I.A.E.A. official subsequently told me that he knew that the Councilâs information had originated with Israeli intelligence, but he refused to say where he had learned that fact. (An Israeli diplomat in Washington, asked to comment, said, âWhy would we work with a Mickey Mouse outlet like the Council?â)
The Israeli intercepts have been shared, in some form, with the United States intelligence community, according to the former senior intelligence official, and they show that high-level officials in Islamabad and Tehran had frequent conversations about the I.A.E.A. investigation and its implications. âThe interpretation is the issue here,â the former official said. âIf you set the buzzwords aside, the substance is that the Iranians were saying, âWeâve got to play with the I.A.E.A. We donât want to blow our cover, but we have to show some movement. Thereâs no way weâre going against world public opinionâno way. Weâve got to show that weâre coöperating and get the Europeans on our side.ââ (At the time, Iran was engaged in negotiations with the European Union on trade and other issues.) Itâs clear from the intercepts, however, the former intelligence official said, that Iran did not want to give up its nuclear potential. The Pakistani response, he added, was âDonât give away the whole ballgame and weâll look out for you.â There was a further message from Pakistan, the former official said: âLook out for your own interests.â
In the officialâs opinion, Pakistan and Iran have survived the crisis: âThey both did what they said theyâd do, and neither one has been hurt. No one has been damaged. The public story is still that Iran never really got thereâwhich is bullshit.â And analysts throughout the American intelligence community, he said, are asking, âHow could it be that Pakistanâs done all these thingsâdeveloped a second generation of miniaturized and boosted weaponsâand yet the investigation has been shorted to ground?â
A high-level intelligence officer who has access to the secret Iran-Pakistan exchanges told me that he understood that âthe Pakistanis were very worried that the Iranians would give their name to the I.A.E.A.â The officer, interviewed in Tel Aviv, told me that Israel remains convinced that âthe Iranians do not intend to give up the bomb. What Iran did was report to the I.A.E.A. the information that was already out in the open and which they cannot protect. There is much that is not exposed.â Israeli intelligence, he added, continues to see digging and other nuclear-related underground activity in Iran. A nonproliferation official based in Vienna later explained that Iran has bored two holes near a uranium-mining operation that are âdeep enough to do a testââas deep as two hundred metres. The design of the bomb that could be tested, he added, if Iran chose to do so, came from Libya, via Pakistan and A. Q. Khan.
Last December, President Bush and Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, jointly announced that Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, had decided to give up his nuclear-weapons program and would permit I.A.E.A. inspectors to enter his country. The surprise announcement, the culmination of nine months of secret talks, was followed immediately by a six-day inspection by the I.A.E.A., the first of many inspections, and the public unveiling, early this year, of the role of yet another country, Malaysia, in the nuclear black market. Libya had been able to purchase hundreds of millions of dollarsâ worth of nuclear parts, including advanced centrifuges designed in Pakistan, from a firm in Malaysia, with a free-trade zone in Dubai serving as the main shipping point. It was a new development in an old arms race: Malaysia, a high-tech nation with no indigenous nuclear ambitions, was retailing sophisticated nuclear gear, based on designs made available by Khan.
The centrifuge materials that the inspectors found in Libya had not been assembledâin most cases, in fact, the goods were still in their shipping cases. âI am not impressed by what Iâve seen,â a senior nonproliferation official told me. âIt was not a well-developed programânot a serious research-and-development approach to make use of what they bought. It was useless. But I was absolutely struck by what the Libyans were able to buy. Whatâs on the market is absolutely horrendous. Itâs a Mafia-type business, with corruption and secrecy.â
I.A.E.A. inspectors, to their dismay, even found in Libya precise blueprints for the design and construction of a half-ton nuclear weapon. âItâs a sweet little bomb, put together by engineers who know how to assemble a weapon,â an official in Vienna told me. âNo question itâll work. Just dig a hole and test it. Itâs too big and too heavy for a Scud, but itâll go into a family car. Itâs a terroristâs dream.â
In a speech on February 5th at Georgetown University, George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, hailed the developments in Libya as an American intelligence coup. Tenet said, âWe learned of all this through the powerful combination of technical intelligence, careful and painstaking analytic work, operational daring, and, yes, the classic kind of human intelligence that people have led you to believe we no longer have.â The C.I.A. unquestionably has many highly motivated and highly skilled agents. But interviews with former C.I.A. officials and with two men who worked closely with Libyan intelligence present a different story.
Qaddafi had been seeking a reconciliation with the West for years, with limited success. Then, a former C.I.A. operations officer told me, Musa Kusa, the longtime head of Libyan intelligence, urged Qaddafi to meet with Western intelligence agencies and open up his weapons arsenal to international inspection. The C.I.A. man quoted Kusa as explaining that, as the war with Iraq drew near, he had warned Qaddafi, âYou are nuts if you think you can defeat the United States. Get out of it now. Surrender now and hope they accept your surrender.â
One Arab intelligence operative told me that Libyan intelligence, with Qaddafiâs approval, then quickly offered to give American and British intelligence details about a centrifuge deal that was already under way. The parts were due to be shipped aboard a German freighter, the B.B.C. China. In October, the freighter was seized, and the incident was proclaimed a major intelligence success. But, the operative said, it was âthe Libyans who blew up the Pakistanis,â and who made the role of Khanâs black market known. The Americans, he said, asked âquestions about those orders and Libya said it had them.â It was, in essence, a sting, and was perceived that way by Musharraf. He was enraged by what he called, in a nationally televised speech last monthâdelivered in Urdu, and not officially translated by the Pakistani governmentâthe betrayal of Pakistan by his âMuslim brothersâ in both Libya and Iran. There was little loyalty between seller and buyer. âThe Pakistanis took a lot of Libyaâs money and gave second-grade plans,â the Arab intelligence operative said. âIt was halfhearted.â
The intelligence operative went on, âQaddafi is very pragmatic and studied the timing. It was the right time. The United States wanted to have a success story, and he banked on that.â
Because of the ongoing investigation into Khan and his nuclear-proliferation activities, the I.A.E.A.âs visibility and credibility have grown.The key issue, Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the I.A.E.A., told me, in an interview at the organizationâs headquarters in Vienna, is non-state actors. âI have a nightmare that the spread of enriched uranium and nuclear material could result in the operation of a small enrichment facility in a place like northern Afghanistan,â he said. âWho knows? Itâs not hard for a non-state to hide, especially if there is a state in collusion with it. Some of these non-state groups are very sophisticated.â
Many diplomats in Vienna expressed frustration at the I.A.E.A.âs inability, thanks to Musharrafâs pardon, to gain access to Khan. âItâs not going to happen,â one diplomat said. âWe are getting some coöperation from Pakistan, but itâs the names we need to know. âWho got the stuff?â Weâre interested to know whether other nations that weâre supposed to supervise have the stuff.â The diplomat told me he believed that the United States was unwilling to publicly state the obvious: that there was no way the Pakistani government didnât know about the transfers. He said, âOf course it looks awful, but Musharraf will be indebted to you.â
The I.A.E.A.âs authority to conduct inspections is limited. The nations that have signed the nonproliferation treaty are required to permit systematic I.A.E.A. inspections of their declared nuclear facilities for research and energy production. But there is no mechanism for the inspection of suspected nuclear-weapons sites, and many at the I.A.E.A. believe that the treaty must be modified. âThere is a nuclear network of black-market centrifuges and weapons design that the world has yet to discover,â a diplomat in Vienna told me. In the past, he said, the I.A.E.A. had worked under the assumption that nations would cheat on the nonproliferation treaty âto produce and sell their own nuclear material.â He said, âWhat we have instead is a black-market network capable of producing usable nuclear materials and nuclear devices that is not limited to any one nation. We have nuclear dealers operating outside our front door, and we have no control over themâno matter how good we are in terms of verification.â There would be no need, in other words, for A. Q. Khan or anyone else in Pakistan to have a direct role in supplying nuclear technology. The most sensitive nuclear equipment would be available to any countryâor any person or group, presumablyâthat had enough cash.
âThis is a question of survival,â the diplomat said, with a caustic smile. He added, âIraq is laughable in comparison with this issue. The Bush Administration was hunting the shadows instead of the prey.â
Another nonproliferation official depicted the challenge facing the I.A.E.A. inspection regime as âa seismic shiftâthe globalization of the nuclear world.â The official said, âWe have to move from inspecting declared sites to âWhere does this sh1t come from?â If we stay focussed on the declared, we miss the nuclear supply matrix.â At this point, the international official asked me, in all seriousness, âWhy hasnât A. Q. Khan been taken out by Israel or the United States?â
After Pakistanâs role in providing nuclear aid to Iran and Libya was revealed, Musharraf insisted once again, this time at the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, in January, that he would not permit American troops to search for Al Qaeda members inside Pakistan. âThat is not a possibility at all,â he said. âIt is a very sensitive issue. There is no room for any foreign elements coming and assisting us. We donât need any assistance.â
Nonetheless, a senior Pentagon adviser told me in mid-February, the spring offensive is on. âWeâre entering a huge period of transition in Iraq,â the adviser said, referring to the coming changeover of forces, with many of the experienced regular Army combat units being replaced by National Guard and Army Reserve units. âWe will not be conducting a lot of ops, and so you redirect and exploit somewhere else.â
The operation, American officials said, is scheduled to involve the redeployment to South Asia of thousands of American soldiers, including members of Task Force 121. The logistical buildup began in mid-February, as more than a dozen American C-17 cargo planes began daily flights, hauling helicopters, vehicles, and other equipment to military bases in Pakistan. Small teams of American Special Forces units have been stationed at the Shahbaz airbase, in northwestern Pakistan, since the beginning of the Afghanistan war, in the fall of 2001.
The senior Pentagon adviser, like other military and intelligence officials I talked to, was cautious about the chances of getting what the White House wantsâOsama bin Laden. âItâs anybodyâs guess,â he said, adding that Ops Secâoperational securityâfor the planned offensive was poor. The former senior intelligence official similarly noted that there was concern inside the Joint Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, over the reliability of intercepted Al Qaeda telephone calls. âWhat about deception?â he said. âThese guys are not dumb, and once the logistical aircraft begin to appearââthe American C-17s landing every night at an airbase in Pakistanââyou know something is going on.â
âWeâve got to get Osama bin Laden, and we know where he is,â the former senior intelligence official said. Osama bin Laden is âcommunicating through sigintââtalking on satellite telephones and the likeââand his wings have been clipped. Heâs in his own Alamo in northern Pakistan. Itâs a natural progressâwhittling down alternative locations and then targeting him. This is not, in theory, a âLetâs go and hopeâ kind of thing. Theyâve seen what they think is him.â But the former official added that there were reasons to be cautious about such reports, especially given that bin Laden hasnât been seen for so long. Bin Laden would stand out because of his height; he is six feet five. But the target area is adjacent to Swat Valley, which is populated by a tribe of exceptionally tall people.
Two former C.I.A. operatives with firsthand knowledge of the PakistanAfghanistan border areas said that the American assault, if it did take place, would confront enormous logistical problems. âItâs impenetrable,â said Robert Baer, who visited the Hindu Kush area in the early nineties, before he was assigned to lead the C.I.A.âs anti-Saddam operations in northern Iraq. âThere are no roads, and you canât get armor up there. This is where Alexander the Great lost an entire division. The Russians didnât even bother to go up there. Everybodyâs got a gun. That area is worse than Iraq.â Milton Bearden, who ran the C.I.A.âs operations in Afghanistan during the war with the Soviet Union, recounted, âIâve been all through there. The Pashtun population in that belt has lived there longer than almost any other ethnic group has lived anywhere on earth.â He said, âOur intelligence has got to be better than itâs been. Anytime we go into something driven entirely by electoral politics, it doesnât work out.â
One American intelligence consultant noted that American forces in Afghanistan have crossed into Pakistan in âhot pursuitâ of Al Qaeda suspects in previous operations, with no complaints from the Pakistani leadership. If the American forces strike quickly and decisively against bin Laden from within Pakistan, he added, âMusharraf could say he gave no advance authorization. We can move in with so much force and firepowerâwith so much shock and aweâthat we will be too fast for him.â The consultant said, âThe question is, how deep into Pakistan can we pursue him?â He added, âMusharraf is in a very tough position.â
At home, Musharraf is in more danger than ever over his handling of the nuclear affair. âHeâs opened up Pandoraâs box, and he will never be able to manage it,â Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a former government minister who now heads an opposition party, said. âPakistani public opinion feels that A.Q. has been made a scapegoat, and international opinion thinks heâs a threat. This is a no-win situation for Musharraf. The average man feels that there will be a nuclear rollback, and Pakistanâs immediate deterrent will be taken away. It comes down to an absolute disaster for Musharraf.â
Robert Gallucci, a former United Nations weapons inspector who is now dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, calls A. Q. Khan âthe Johnny Appleseedâ of the nuclear-arms race. Gallucci, who is a consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues, told me, âBad as it is with Iran, North Korea, and Libya having nuclear-weapons material, the worst part is that they could transfer it to a non-state group. Thatâs the biggest concern, and the scariest thing about all thisâthat Pakistan could work with the worst terrorist groups on earth to build nuclear weapons. Thereâs nothing more important than stopping terrorist groups from getting nuclear weapons. <b><span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>The most dangerous country for the United States now is Pakistan</b></span>, and second is Iran.â Gallucci went on, âWe havenât been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.â
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<b>Europe's Iran Wimpout</b>
This is no time to go wobbly on the mullahs
Saturday, February 28, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST
Anyone who still believes the "international community" had the will to contain Saddam Hussein through inspections need only look at the non-functional non-proliferation process now taking place in neighboring Iran.
This week's report from the International Atomic Energy Agency is as close as could be expected to smoking-gun proof that Tehran's hardliners are building an atomic bomb. The country has been shown to be running multiple uranium-enrichment programs--all of which it originally failed to declare to the U.N. inspectors, and the more sophisticated of which it kept hiding even when given a chance to come clean in an international agreement last October.
Iran has absolutely no need to enrich uranium if its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, as it claims it is. What's more, IAEA inspectors discovered traces of polonium-210, an element they dryly note can be used "as a neutron initiator in some designs of nuclear weapons." In short, they've found work on what appears to be a bomb core and its trigger.
Yet barely had the ink dried on their pro forma denunciation of last Friday's rigged Iranian elections when European Union foreign ministers offered Iran another chance to deceive. A senior Bush Administration official tells us our European friends--including erstwhile disarmament stalwart Tony Blair--rebuffed an explicit request from President Bush, and cut a deal with Tehran to expand the definition of its ostensibly suspended "enrichment activities."
The IAEA says the agreement, which likely precludes a referral of Iran to the U.N. Security Council when the IAEA board meets next month, "will contribute to confidence building." That sounds about right--confidence on the part of Iran's ruling mullahs that they're going to get away with it.
Short of finding a bomb blueprint (which Iran probably got from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan as Libya did) or actual device, after all, the IAEA report could hardly be more damning. The agency threw cold water on Iran's excuse that numerous traces of highly enriched uranium were due to the contamination of foreign-purchased parts. It traced most of the contamination to elements of Iran's domestic program, and it noted that the purity of uranium from one site was 36%--less than the 90% needed for a bomb but much more than needed to fuel nuclear reactors.
As CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Intelligence Committee this week, "The difference between producing low-enriched uranium and weapons-capable high-enriched uranium is only a matter of time and intent, not technology." The IAEA report also notes the military links of what Iran claims is a civilian program: "Most workshops for the domestic production of centrifuges are owned by military industrial organizations."
But as in Iraq, IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei simply asked for better behavior. "I hope," he implored earlier this week, "this will be the last time any aspect of the program has not been declared to us." Most IAEA member states, meanwhile, seem more interested in oil contracts than in enforcing international atomic energy rules. In recent weeks French and Japanese companies signed petroleum exploration deals with the Islamic Republic. Not surprisingly, Iran's IAEA representative, Hassan Rohani, has responded to the Europeans with outright contempt: "We have other research projects which we have not announced to the agency and do not think it is necessary to announce them to the agency."
Mr. Rohani happens to be a close political ally of former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, who said a few years ago that "if a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world." By "colonialism," he means Anglo-American foreign policy. Iran wants the bomb to contain the U.S. and become the dominant power in the Middle East.
More than a decade ago Margaret Thatcher almost certainly saved the world from a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein by delivering her famous "Don't go wobbly" message to George H.W. Bush. Now's the time for the current occupant of the White House to return the favor by delivering a similar message of resolve to his British counterpart.
Prime Minister Blair may think he's defending the international non-proliferation system by drawing out negotiations with Iran, but the truth is he risks permanently discrediting it. If Iran's repeated deceptions are not cause for referral to the Security Council, then nothing is. And if Iran goes nuclear on the IAEA's watch, then the agency might as well cease to exist
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'> JANE'S: PAK NUKE SALES OVERT, GOV'T APPROVED </span>
Pakistan's government is now trying to portray the sale of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea as the cloak-and-dagger work of a few, isolated rogues.
But that's a lie, says Jane's Defense Weekly, in a report released today. Nuclear sales were so out in the open that underlings of Abdul Qadeer Khan -- the father of the Pakistani Bomb -- were handing out glossy brochures advertising their services at a 2000 arms conference.
One of the brochures, a 10-page catalogue from A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories' Directorate of Vacuum Science and Technology, offered virtually all the components needed to establish a uranium-enrichment plant. The specialised centrifuge pumps, gauges, valves and other components each have civilian uses, but together provide the means to enrich the rare uranium-235 isotope to a particularly pure grade so that it can be used to fuel a nuclear weapon.
If there was any doubt as to what was on offer, a second accompanying brochure under the heading of "nuclear-related products" listed "complete ultracentrifuge machines" and other components needed to build a uranium-enrichment plant.
JDW readily obtained the brochures on the spot and inquired whether all of the listed items were available for sale. Several KRL officials provided positive assurances that all had government approval for export...
KRL was not the only Pakistani organisation peddling worrisome technology at the Karachi exhibition. Its rival laboratory - the National Development Complex - was also handing out marketing packages offering a variety of technologies useful in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. While Pakistan is under no legal international obligation to control missile technology sales, it has often pledged to do so.
Moreover, Khan himself has alleged that he received approval for the Iranian transfers from officers in the Pakistani army. One former senior US intelligence officer agrees with this assessment, saying that the former Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff, Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, was "a crucial figure". The official added: "Whatever the network is, it has got to envelop part of the [Pakistani] military establishment."
<b>IS LOTASTAANâS NUCLEAR PROGRAMME DYING?</b>
In all the heat generated by Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, AQ Khan, confessing to nuclear proliferation, relatively little attention has been paid to the future of the country's nuclear weapons programme.
In the 1970s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto famously declared that Pakistanis would go to any sacrifice to match India's nuclear weapons programme, even if it meant the people being reduced to eating grass.
<b>Now they have a nuclear programme, they are discovering that weapons technology is a dynamic business which requires constant maintenance and upgrading.
That maintenance has been promised by President Pervez Musharraf.
But nuclear specialist and journalist Shahid ur Rehman believes the president will run into difficulties, the seeds of which were sown many years ago.
"Pakistan's programme was based on smuggled, imported technology," he says. "AQ Khan and his friends went shopping all over the world with the connivance of the Pakistani army.
"By contrast, India's programme was not as sophisticated, but it was indigenous. If there are curbs on India they will not suffer."
Shahid ur Rehman argues that it will be impossible for Pakistan to upgrade its nuclear programme legally.
"If Pakistan needs a nuclear component, they will have to approach the international market. They will not sell it, so Pakistan will have to buy it on the black market."
That means, he argues, that: "Pakistan's nuclear programme is now almost half dead. They won't be able to modernise facilities which are becoming obsolete. It is a de facto roll back."</b>
And that is precisely what President Musharraf has promised to avoid.
"We will continue to develop our capability in line with our deterrent needs. I am the last man who will roll back," General Musharraf promised recently.
<b>Inspections debate</b>
So far, there is no obvious pressure on Pakistan to embark on nuclear reduction or a roll back.
But that could come, if or when new revelations about its proliferation history come to light.
The country could also come under pressure to open its facilities for inspection.
"The outside world would be quite justified in asking the Pakistani government for proper assurances," says AH Nayyar, a physicist and nuclear expert from Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad.
"They could demand to inspect the log books of all sensitive organisations in Pakistan to make sure every single kilo of highly enriched uranium is taken account of. That could be very intrusive," he says.
But as long as President Musharraf is in power, that is extremely unlikely.
"No to an internal independent inquiry and no to United Nations inspections teams," he said after AQ Khan's dramatic confession last month.
He might have added 'no' to joining the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has been muted as a possible consequence of the proliferation scandal.
But it has been ruled out by one government official after another.
Pakistan would have to be legally recognised as a nuclear weapons state first, which is unlikely, and India would have to join the NPT at the same time, which is also unlikely.
<b>Double standards?</b>
NPT touches another nerve. There's a widespread belief in Pakistan that it is being singled out for scrutiny while India's weapons programme is overlooked.
Take the recent hi-tech agreement between India and the United States, on cooperation in nuclear power and space technologies.
Samina Ahmed, from the International Crisis Group, believes it is a green light for proliferation.
"Transfers of dual-use technology, nuclear technology and space technology is violating a basic principle of the Non Proliferation Treaty," she says.
"It is dangerous and counterproductive.
"Dangerous because with some of the gaps in India's nuclear weapons programme being filled in with American support, that will encourage India to go ahead with its ambitious nuclear programme.
"And counter-productive because it will lead to other states playing catch-up."
<b>While these argument rage, Pakistan is quietly hoping the whole issue will go away.
Or if it does not, that the focus of attention is turned on what President Musharraf says is the real menace - the European companies which he says form the backbone of the nuclear black market.
So far though, there is little sign of that happening.</b>
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