Geopolitics And The War On Terrrorism

[Guest]

Syria, the Ba`th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path?
By Eyal Zisser,
Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel
[From: Muslim World, Vol. 95, Issue 1 (January 2005)]

Abstract: Discusses the history of Ba'th regime and the Islamic
movement in Syria. Historical background of Ba'th, Neo-Ba'th and
Islam; Discussion on the Islamic rebellion against the Ba'th regime
from 1976-1982; Information on the alliance between the Islamist
forces in the Arab world and the Ba'th Regime.

Following the death of Hafiz al-Asad and the rise of his son Bashshar
to power in June 2000, a long chapter in the history of the complex
relations between religion (Islam) and the Syrian state came to an
end. Bashshar al-Asad refrained from opening his inaugural address at
the People's Assembly with the traditional Bismiallah (Bism Allah
al-Rahman al-Rahim) (In the Name of the all merciful Allah) which is
sine qua non in the speeches of any leader in the present day Arab
world, continuing his father's practice of excluding this phrase or
any other Islamic symbolism from his addresses.(n1) Nevertheless, one
of his earliest steps after assuming power was to repeal his father's
decree prohibiting the wearing of headscarves by girls in any part of
the educational system in Syria. The decree had been issued by Hafiz
al-Asad in 1982 after he succeeded in crushing and ending the Islamic
rebellion against his regime.(n2)

Does this move on the part of Bashshar signal the turning over of a
new leaf in the relationship between the Syrian Ba'th Regime and
Islamic forces, not to say the Muslim Brethren movement, in Syria? It
is still too soon to say. Nevertheless, Bashshar al-Asad's step is
significant, even if only symbolic, since it bore witness to the
regime's readiness to heal the fissures and bind the wounds left
behind by the events of the Islamic rebellion of 1976-1982, to the
point of relinquishing the regime's adherence and commitment to a
secular and even atheistic worldview that had been a cornerstone of
its past policies, replacing this view with the robes of Islam in
order to gain public legitimacy.

Following the final victory of the regime over its Islamic rivals,
Rif'at al-Asad, the president's brother and the number two man in his
regime at the time took the occasion to send the Daughters of the
Revolution (members of the Ba'th party's youth movement) into the
streets of Damascus to strip veils off the faces of women. For a long
time, it was also reported from Damascus that men refrained from
growing beards for fear of being accused of sympathy for the Muslim
Brethren, or even a membership, a crime which according to Syrian law
no. 49 from the year 1980 is punishable by death.(n3)

From this perspective, the reports from the streets of Damascus in the
spring of 1982 reminded one of the peaks of the past confrontation
between the Ba'th regime and Islamic circles in Syria. On April 25,
1967 a junior Ba'thist officer of 'Alawi origin named Ibrahim
al-Khallas published an article in the Syrian army organ Jaysh
al-Sha'b entitled "The Means of Creating a New Arab Socialist Person,"
in which he stated that "the way to fashion Arab culture and Arab
society is by creating an Arab socialist who believes that God,
imperialism and all other values that had controlled society in the
past are no more than mummies in the Museum of History.(n4)"

The article aroused angry protest among the urban Sunni population.
Strikes and anti-Ba'th demonstrations broke out in Syria's large
cities, forcing the regime to denounce the article and imprison its
author and editor. These two, the Syrian public was told, were agents
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Damascus Radio even stated that
"the article has been planted in the army organ as part of reactionary
Israeli-American plot, in collusion with anti-revolutionary elements
and merchants of religion to drive a wedge between the masses and
their leadership."(n5)

Though the Ba'th regime had to distance itself from the article there
is no doubt that the young 'Alawi officer expressed the views of many
Ba'th party activists and especially those of its radical neo-Ba'th
faction, which seized power in Syria in February 1966 to minimize the
role of religion in society and state and replace it with Arab
nationalist and secular ideology. In 1967, the Neo-Ba'th regime had to
give up, but in 1982 it seemed that the Asad regime had the upper hand.

However, twenty years after the Regime's decisive victory over its
rivals in the Muslim Brotherhood, it is becoming increasingly clear
that the last word regarding the fabric of relations between religion
and state, or even between the Ba'th Regime and Islamic circles in
Syria has yet to be said. In effect, it transpires that the two sides,
each for its own reasons, wishes to mount a new path of co-existence,
a path toward compromise between religion and state and between Islam
and the Ba'th Regime.

Historical Background -- Ba'th, Neo-Ba'th and Islam

Throughout the forty years since the Ba'th Party seized power in Syria
on March 8, 1963, Syria has been a bastion of secularism headed by an
Arab-secular regime wishing to push Islam out of the central place it
had occupied in the life of the individual, the society and the state.
This was the case under Michel 'Aflaq and his colleagues, and even
more so under his successors, members of the radical Neo-Ba'th faction
who seized power on February 23, 1966. While 'Aflaq did view Islam as
an important and even central element in the history and cultural
tradition of the Arab nation, he did not recognize it as an expression
of divine revelation, and thus as a religion of laws. He apparently
wished to see in the Arab nationalism of the Ba'th Party school a new
concept or even "religion," destined to replace Islam in the life of
the individual, the society and the state.(n6)

This trend grew stronger after the Neo-Ba'th coup in Syria in February
1966. The Neo-Ba'th challenge to Islamic forces in Syria was
unprecedented and even exceptional in its daring. The Regime forbade
preaching and religious education outside the mosques, increased its
involvement in the appointment of clerics to religious institutions in
the country, took over the management of the Waqf institutions, and
did not hesitate to arrest or even execute clerics who demonstrated
against it. The leaders of the Neo-Ba'th stood at the head of a social
coalition whose members had nothing at all to do with Islam, at least
in its Sunni-Orthodox form. This coalition was comprised of members of
the minority sects and even Sunnis from the rural areas and the
periphery in where there was practically no presence of the religious
establishment. Worth mentioning is the fact that the main political
and economic loser from the rising of this coalition was the urban
strata in which the Muslim Brotherhood had its roots; thus, it is no
wonder that the Brotherhood became the vanguard of these strata in
their struggle against the Ba'th Regime.(n7)

Hafiz al-Asad's rise to power in November 1970 led to the regime's
attempt under his leadership to open a new page in relations with
Islamic forces in the country. He wanted to widen the basis of
coalition in Syria and join this coalition with the urban Sunnis. Asad
worked to mitigate the anti-Islamic line that had characterized his
predecessors. He began to participate in prayers at Sunni mosques in
Damascus, made a pilgrimage to Mecca, raised the salaries of clerics
and actively tried to gain religious sanction for his community -- the
'Alawi community. In this, he achieved some success in the form of a
religious ruling (fatwa) handed down by the leader of the Lebanese
Shi'is community, Musa Sadr. It stated that the 'Alawis were Shi'is,
and as such were Muslims in all respects.(n8)

However, Asad's attempts to mollify religious circles in Syria and
gain their support were in vain and had perhaps come too late. In
1976, militant Muslims, some of them former activists in the Muslim
Brotherhood who had resigned from the movement and maintained only a
weak affinity with it, mounted a violent struggle against his regime
designed to bring it down and replace it with an Islamic state. Soon
after the Muslim Brotherhood joined this struggle.

The violent campaign against the Ba'th regime was in many respects a
deviation from the Muslim Brotherhood's traditional course. During the
first years after its establishment in 1944, this movement adopted a
middle path that sought to bridge the gap between religion and state.
In this framework, the Brothers were willing to accept the existing
political and socio-economic arrangement in Syria in those years, and
worked to blend into it. Thus, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood
movement took part in elections to the Parliament in the 1940s and
50s, and its representatives served as ministers in several Syrian
governments of that period. The Brothers thus concentrated their
efforts on influencing the existing political system from within in
favor of preserving and strengthening the Muslim character of the
Syrian state.(n9)

The path that the Muslim Brotherhood adopted for itself in Syria was
the inevitable result of social, economic and political circumstances.
These circumstances distinguished it from other Arab states, chiefly
Egypt, of course. Support for the movement came only from members of
the Sunni community, which constituted only 60 percent of the overall
population. Members of minority communities in the state --
Christians, 'Alawis and Druze -- who constituted some 40 percent of
the overall population, were, for obvious reasons, among the most
obdurate opponents of the movement. However, even the Sunni community
was not monolithic in its support for the movement. Many in the Sunni
street had reservations, particularly the educated, but they were not
alone. They were enchanted by the modernist-secular notions of "Arab
nationalism" from the school of the Ba'th party, "Syrian nationalism"
from the school of An un Sa'ada, a founder and leader of the Syrian
Nationalist Party (PPS), and, finally, communism. Even among the Sunni
community in the rural areas and the periphery -- constituting half of
the Syrian Sunni community -- there was no recognizable enthusiasm for
the messages of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. In those areas the
Islamic presence -- mosques and other religious institutions or even
the presence of clerics ('Ulama) -- was very small if it existed at
all. The main strongholds of support for the movement were thus to be
found among the Sunni middle class in the big cities, especially in
the northern region of the country. However, as previously mentioned,
even this support was not full and sweeping.(n10)

The challenge that the Ba'th regime, which had ruled Syria since March
1963, presented to the Islamic movement and the public it represented
was ideological, political and socio-economic. Indeed, from 1963 there
were repeated confrontations between activists of the movement, which
had in the meantime been outlawed, and the authorities. These
confrontations were mostly of a limited nature -- strikes and
demonstrations -- and usually broke out as a local reaction to
measures taken by the regime. Yet, these confrontations had a
cumulative influence.

Further contributing to the extremism that overcame the movement were
generational shifts -- the emergence of a young and militant
generation distinct in social background and education -- generally
secular -- from the movement's founders. It was also given to the
influence of Sayyid Qutb, with whom several of these activists met
while studying in Egypt. These young activists began preaching in the
spirit of Qutb's ideas. They advocated open confrontation with the
regime that was, in their view, heretical, i.e., secular and even
non-Muslim (Ba'thist with shades of 'Alawism). They were willing to
take the initiative and act independently once it became clear to them
that the veteran leadership of the Brotherhood movement was in no
hurry to adopt their notions and had reservations about a frontal
campaign against the Ba'thist regime. In the mid-1970s, one of these
activists, Marwan Hadid, established in the city of Hama the
"Battalions of Muhammad" (Kata'ib Muhammad). This was an underground,
fanatic organization that began violent activity against the regime.
In retrospect, it was the vanguard for the Islamic camp on the road to
a putsch in the Islamic revolt. There was nothing left for the veteran
leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had lost its power and
influence over rank and file activists, except to accept the
inevitable and join the revolt when it broke out.(n11)

The Islamic Rebellion Against the Bath Regime 1976-1982

From 1976 to 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood waged a violent campaign
against the Ba'th regime, known as the Islamic revolt. The "Brothers"
sought to establish an Islamic state in Syria. They succeeded in
mobilizing to their cause significant backing from among the Sunni
community that constituted a majority in the state, and took partial
control -- when the revolt reached its peak in early 1980 -- of
several cities in northern Syria. However, this was the extent of the
Brothers' achievements, and from that point on, the heavy hand of the
Regime bore down upon them. The revolt began to languish, ending in
February 1982 after the suppression of the uprising in Hama, during
which Syrian military and security forces killed thousands of
residents of the city. After the failure of the revolt, the Muslim
Brotherhood ceased to exist as an organized and active movement.
Hundreds of its activists met their deaths during its course,
thousands were sent to prison, and most of its leaders escaped over
the border.(n12)

In retrospect, it would appear that the rebellion was not a planned
and organized move. It should more accurately be viewed as a long
series of interconnecting acts of popular protest, such as trade
strikes and street demonstrations, alongside violent acts of terrorism
by Islamic activists all over Syria against the Regime, its leaders
and its institutions. These acts lacked a guiding hand, were not
accompanied by any kind of political or propaganda activity designed
to recruit Syrian public opinion to the side of the rebels, and bore
witness more than anything else to the fact that the Islamic
activists, and especially their leaders, had no overall strategy in
their struggle against the regime. It is quite possible that this is
what ultimately led to the rebellion's failure.

In the end, the Syrian Regime defeated its enemies and the Islamic
rebellion ended in total disaster for the rebels. The regime's
successful putting down of the rebellion was not only the result of
brutal methods of repression it employed against the rebels, but
mainly because it enjoyed the support of substantial portions of the
Syrian population. They preferred the continuation of the existing
regime over the alternative offered them by Islamic circles in the
country.

The Islamic revolt against the regime failed utterly, leading to the
liquidation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement as an organized
political organization in Syria. After the downfall, the Brotherhood's
leaders (those that remained alive) began looking for ways to placate
the regime. At the very least they hoped to establish a dialogue that
would enable the Brotherhood's continued activity as an organized
movement or as individuals in the state.

Against this background one can understand the readiness of the
Movement's leaders to enter into a dialogue with the Ba'th Regime. It
bore witness to the leaders' acceptance of the existence of the Ba'th
Regime in Syria since March 1963 as a fait accompli. This acceptance
also marked a return of the Movement to the path it had pursued in the
1940s and 50s: mainly the acceptance of the political and
socioeconomic order in the country and even efforts to become
integrated into it as a means or promoting minimal and specific aims
and the strengthening of the Syria's Muslim tinge, the preservation of
the slowing burning embers of Islam through education and religious
activities of those sectors of the population in which the Movement
had been active in the past.

From the mid-1990s, there was a recognizable improvement in the
regime's attitude toward Islamic circles in Syria and beyond even to
those previously involved in the Muslim Brotherhood's activities:
first, the regime began demonstrating more openness to manifestations
of religious faith among its citizens, such as traditional garb,
including veils for women, maintaining a Muslim way of life, increased
participation in festival and Friday prayer services in the mosques,
and religious preaching. Visitors to Syria returned to say that
religious schools had begun sprouting in the streets of the state --
some with governmental encouragement, some of them even named after
the president, (Madaris al-Asad li-T'alim al-Qur'an) and that
textbooks and religious propaganda were offered for sale or
distribution in the streets to all seekers. It was also reported that
the works of Sayyid Qutb were available in the country.(n13) By the
beginning of 2004, the number of religious schools all around the
country was, according to Syrian sources, 120, apart from 20 religious
institutions or study centers, 7 of them granted academic degrees.
Almost 25,000 students, 2,000 out of them were foreigners, studied in
these institutions.(n14)

In these renewed manifestations of religious faith there was of course
evidence of the existence of deep Islamic sentiment among various
sectors of the population, especially among residents of the big
cities. The Regime had not succeeded in rooting out these sentiments.
It also seems that, faced with severe social and economic problems,
chiefly the population's natural rate of increase, the rise in
unemployment and the increasing adversity of society's weakest
classes, these sentiments were likely to take root, as had happened in
neighboring Arab states. Foreign visitors in Syria in recent years
left with the impression that Sunni concentrations in the big cities
were slowly taking on a Muslim character, at least relative to the
norm in Syrian society since the Ba'th party took control, and in the
period preceding it.(n15)

Second, the Regime released most of the members of the Muslim
Brotherhood who had been in prisons in Syria since the suppression of
the Islamic Revolt at the start of the 1980s. They were released in
several presidential amnesties in December 1991 (2,864prisoners),
March 1992 (600 prisoners), November 1993 (554 prisoners), November
1995 (1,200prisoners), 1998 (250 prisoners), and November 2000 (600
prisoners).(n16)

Third, the Regime continued its efforts to "Islamize" the Alawite
community, efforts that, as will be recalled, had already begun in
1973 when Hafiz al-Asad obtained a fatwa from the Leader of the
Lebanese Shi'ite community Musa Sadr, declaring that the Alawites were
Shi'ites. Over the years hundreds of the Alawite students were sent to
Iran to engage in religious studies at Iranian religious institutions,
and at the same time the regime encouraged the activities of Iranian
clerics among the members of the Alawite community. In 1992, Asad even
initiated the construction of a mosque in the city of Qara where he
was born, near the grave of his mother Na'isa, who had died in July of
that year.(17)

Fourth, since the early 1990's, the regime permitted and even
encouraged moderate clerics, including those outside the official
religious establishment that was identified with it, to stand for
elections as independents to the People's Assembly. It should be
recalled that since the early 1990s the regime has been using the
People's Assembly as a tool to ease public pressures for change and
reforms and to promote his economic policy. On the eve of the election
to the Assembly in 1990, the Regime made an unsuccessful effort to
establish a pro-Regime moderate Islamic party under the leadership of
Muhammad Sa'id al-Buti (see below).(n18)

Nevertheless, quite a few clerics, among them Marwan Shaykhu, were
elected to the People's Assembly to those places set aside for
independent candidates. Their election as members to the People's
Assembly, as well as the considerable increase in the educational
activity of Islamic clerics in the large cities, is an apparent
indication that a new generation of Muslim activists has grown up
under the Regime's watchful eye and to a certain extent with its
encouragement and support. With the help of these clerics, the Syrian
regime is working to promote and preserve its notion of the place of
religion in the life of the state. This notion is a softened version
of the concept of Michel 'Aflaq that sought, as will be recalled, to
dwarf the status of Islam in the life of society and the state. The
Regime today thus recognizes the power and status of Islam. However,
like neighboring Arab regimes such as in Egypt or Jordan, it seeks to
preserve separation of religion and state and rejects the notion of
"political Islam" that stood at the basis of the Muslim Brotherhood
revolt from 1976 to 1982.

One example is al-Buti, born in 1927, a cleric of Kurdish extraction
known for his close relations with the late President Asad. In the
sermon he held on the eve of the referendum that was to approve Asad's
election to a fifth presidential term, Buti said, for example: "Under
the leadership of President Asad, Syria became the focal point of
support for the entire Muslim world. The mosques of Damascus are
flourishing, the number of worshippers present in them is on the
increase". Buti is a graduate of the Shari'ah Faculty of the
University of Damascus where he now teaches. His doctoral thesis was
on "The Sources of Islamic Religious Law" (Usul al-Shari'ah
al-Islamiyya). Buti also has a popular religious program on Syrian
television, "Dirasat Qura'niyya." He is also well known because of the
dozens of articles and books he has written, some of which, at least
those published in the past decade, were clearly designed to grant
Islamic legitimacy to the regime of Hafiz al-Asad.(n19) For example,
Buti wrote a book on the subject of jihad. In it he sharply attacked
the Muslim Brotherhood as having acted in contravention of the
principles of Islam and of bringing about a civil war (fitna) in
Syria. He added that he opposed the establishment of a religious
party. He said, "there is always the fear that extreme elements will
infiltrate such a party and turn it into a tool for sowing dissension
and violence in society."(n20) The Muslim Brotherhood was quick to
respond that it had not been the Muslim Brotherhood that removed
itself from the nation, rather it was the Regime to which Buti granted
religious legitimacy.(n21)

The late Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Kaftaru, b. 1910-d. 2004 and of Kurdish
origin, is another clear example of a cleric who had bound his fate
with the Ba'th Regime as early as 1964, when he was appointed to this
high-ranking position. In 1974 Kaftaru founded the Abi-Nur religious
center, which became the largest center in Syria. Sal al-Din Kaftaru,
the mufti's son who runs the center, stated that around 5,000 students
from 60 countries study there. Some years later, Ahmad Kaftaru founded
a Nakshabandi order called after him, the Kaftariyya.(n22) Ahmad
Kaftaru was known for his statement: "Islam and the Regime's power to
enforce the law are twin brothers. It is impossible to think of one
without the other. Islam is the base, and the Regime's power of rule
is the protector; after all a thing without a base is destined to
collapse and fall, and a thing without a protector will end in
extinction."(n23) In a newspaper interview Kaftaru explained: "I have
known President [Hafiz] Asad for 35 years. I admire his personality
and characteristics, his dedication and his steadfastness on the
principle of faith. I know him as a determined fighter who never
relinquished national rights and did not hesitate to assist in Arab
and Islamic activities. Asad's actions in the religious spheres
assisted in enhancing religious and spiritual life all over our
country. During his rule, mosques were built, prayer houses were
renovated, religious colleges were opened, and ancient sites were
reconstructed in order to preserve the Arab and Islamic nature of this
soil. Asad told me that he wants the flag of Islam to fly on high
since to him it is a matter of faith and a path. Asad is proud of
[being] an Arab and of the Islamic faith. He said that Islam is the
revolution in the name of progress, and therefore no one has the right
to be proud of being an Arab while ignoring Islam."(n24)

Kaftaru, however, did not conceal during the interview that he and the
Islamists had no argument regarding their "vision of the last days,"
that is, the ultimate goal; they only differed on how to achieve this
goal. With this, Kaftaru exposed the limits of cooperation between
establishment clerics like himself and the Arab regimes. Scrutiny of
Kaftaru's remarks thus shows that it is in fact he, the authorities'
designated religious leader, who deserves the title of keeper of the
path of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. There is a clear connection
between him and the Brotherhood in its early days in the 1940s and
50s. They share a path of adherence to goals combined with a
willingness to show moderation, flexibility, and patience along the
way to realizing them. Kaftaru said that "manifestations of extremism
are neither wise nor logical, as anyone who hastens the arrival of
something takes the risk of losing it altogether ... Extremism is not
for the good of the homeland or for the good of peace ... The Arab
rulers and those that are not Arab accept Islam gradually, that is,
not all at once but in stages. The radical movements preach extremism,
that is their way. I evaluate their desire to be [the victory of]
Islam, but the question is not what they desire, but what can be
achieved. I personally regard cooperation with the Muslim ruler as the
only way to achieve the goal, as we should understand that these
things will not be accomplished in an hour or even in a day."(n25)

Finally, many of the leaders of the Islamic Brethren who left Syria in
the early 1980s started to come back. Among those are 'Adnan 'Uqla,
who was one of the leaders of the Islamic Revolt in between 1976-1982,
and 'Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda. Those among the movement's leaders who
were left in exile started negotiations with representatives of the
Syrian regime in order to allow them to come back to their houses.

Indeed, in late in February 1997, the Damascus press gave extensive
coverage to a letter of thanks sent to President Asad from the Abu
Ghudda family of Aleppo. In the letter, the family thanked the Syrian
president for his condolences following the death of 'Abd al-Fattah
Abu Ghudda. President Asad's condolences, like the note the bereaved
family sent, were exceptional. 'Abd al-Fattah Abu Ghudda had been a
leader of the "Muslim Brotherhood" movement in Syria, and between the
years 1976 and 1982 and served as its "Inspector-General" (al-Muraqib
al-'Amm). Following the 1963 Ba'th revolution, Abu Ghudda left Syria
for prolonged exile in Saudi Arabia. He continued to fight the Syrian
regime from abroad, and in his role as "Inspector-General" also led
the Islamic revolt against it. After the revolt failed, Abu Ghudda
abandoned his political activity and immersed himself in teaching and
writing. He taught at King 'Abd al-'Aziz University in Jedda and was
known for the dozens of theological works he published.(n26)

In December 1995, Abu Ghudda returned to Syria. He apparently arrived
at an arrangement with the Damascus authorities in whose framework he
was permitted to return to the city of his birth, Aleppo. The
condition was that he busy himself with matters of education and
religion and avoid all political activity. In mid-1996 he returned to
Saudi Arabia -- perhaps because of a decline in his health, or perhaps
out of disappointment and frustration with political circumstances in
Syria that did not allow him and his associates to act freely to
promote their worldview. On February 16, 1997, Abu Ghudda passed
away.(n27)

Upon learning of Abu Ghudda's passing, President Asad was quick to
send his condolences to the bereaved family. An official delegation
that included the minister of the Awqaf, the governor of Aleppo, and
the city's police chief visited the family and delivered the following
message in Asad's name: "Abu Ghudda was a man who inspired respect
during his lifetime, and therefore it is fitting that we preserve and
honor his memory in death as well." President Asad went so far as to
offer the family the use of his personal aircraft to fly the deceased
to Syria for burial. Abu Ghudda was ultimately buried in Madina, near
the grave of the Prophet Muhammad, and Asad gained the gratitude of
the bereaved family.(n28)

It became clear, however, that the regime's conditions for
reconciliation with the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were too
difficult for them to accept. The regime demanded, for example, that
the Brotherhood's leaders repent, confess guilt and express contrition
over the Islamic revolt of 1976-1982, and commit not to renew their
political activity as an organized movement in Syria. Former Minister
of Information Muhammad Salman declared in this context that "anyone
who renounces his past conduct is authorized to return and live a
normal life in Syria and to conduct religious rites. Abu Ghudda
visited me in my office and I told him that we in Syria do not relate
to the Muslim Brotherhood as to a political party but as to
individuals."(n29) The leadership of the Brotherhood rejected these
demands, and the Inspector-General of the movement, Ali Sa'd al-Din
al-Bayanuni, explained that the atmosphere was not yet suitable for
deepening the dialogue. The Brotherhood was ready to bear some of the
responsibility for events of the past, but would not consent to return
to Syria as individuals.(n30)

Nonetheless, the Brotherhood began laying the ideological foundation
for a possible decision to return to Syria and come to terms with the
Ba'th regime. They explained that, "first, Syria did not belong solely
to the Muslim Brotherhood; it was ideologically, politically,
religiously and ethnically heterogeneous. Second, cultural and
economic developments in Syria in the last two decades created new
circumstances that cannot be ignored. Third, normalization with Israel
and the new world order were to be fought, not accepted as natural
developments and, additionally, this struggle should top the Arab list
of priorities. Fourth, there is a need for reconciliation among the
components of the nation in the face of the challenges it currently
faces, thus it was time to turn over a new leaf, and there should be
no returning to the past."(n31)

Already in 1997 it was reported on a new reconciliation initiative
between the Islamic movements and the Syrian regime suggested by
Muhammad Amin Yakan, a cleric from Aleppo. Yakan had served as the
Muslim Brotherhood's inspector-general in the 1960s, but when in the
1970s the movement adopted a policy of violence against the Ba'th
regime, he broke off his connection with it, affiliated himself with
Asad, and gained his protection. In 1998, the regime responding by
making reconciliation conditional on three steps: an expression of
regret by the Brotherhood for the rebellion of 1976-82; the return of
Brotherhood members to Syria as individuals; and a commitment to
refrain from any Muslim Brotherhood activity.(n32) In an attempt to
accede to some of these demands, the inspector-general of the
brotherhood, Sa'd al-Din al-Bayanuni, set up and headed an evaluation
committee (lajnat taqwim) to reexamine the events of the 1976- 82
rebellion. The report submitted by this committee found that some of
the acts carried out by the movement had been mistakes, but laid the
blame for them entirely on 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din, a Brotherhood leader
who had fled to Baghdad after the rebellion and was still operating
under the protection of Saddam Husayn (until the occupation of Iraq by
the U.S.) to bring down the Syrian regime. Retaliating, Sa d al-Din
attacked Bayanuni in a book entitled The Brotherhood Campaign in Syria
1976-1982 (Masirat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin 1976-1982), in which he
defended the Islamic rebellion against the Syrian regime.(n33)

On December 16, 1998 Muhammad Amin Yakan was ambushed and assassinated
by unknown persons over a land dispute between his family and
residents of a village near Aleppo. With his death his initiative came
into an end. Spokesmen for the Brotherhood, while refraining from
directly accusing the Regime for responsibility for the murder, cast
doubt on the official version that a land dispute was the motivation
for the incident and demanded that those behind it be exposed. After
the failure of the mediation attempt, Sa'd al-Din al-Bayanuni began
attacking the Syrian Regime and defined it as sectarian and 'Alawi,
another expression of his disappointment with the lack of progress in
the dialogue his movement held with this regime.(n34)

Bashshar al-Asad's New Era

The rise of Bashshar al-Asad to rule in Syria in June 2000 ostensibly
heralded the turning over of a new leaf in relations between the
Regime and the Islamic Movement in that country. As mentioned before,
Bashshar refrained from opening his inaugural address with the
"Bismiallah." The image arising from his speeches and from the
interviews Bashshar granted over the past few years is one of a person
having a totally secular view lacking any Islamic-religious nostalgia.
One also recalls in this connection the statement by Dr. Edmund
Schulenburg, the doctor with whom Bashshar trained while specializing
in ophthalmology in London, that Bashshar liked to drink wine.(n35)

Nevertheless, one of Bashshar's first steps after taking office was
the repeal of the prohibition issued by Hafiz al-Asad in early 1982
against schoolgirls in institutions of learning wearing the
headscarves. Three years later, in June 2003, it was reported from
Damascus that the Regime had promulgated a decree permitting soldiers
in compulsory service to pray in the military camps despite the fact
that policy requiring the dismissal of anyone suspected of religious
inclinations had remained unchanged.(n36) Bashshar, like his father,
promoted himself as a leader faithful to Islam, acting on its behalf
and in keeping with it. Already in July 1999 and again in November
2000 his pilgrimage to Mecca, not during the Hajj season ('Umra)
received broad coverage.(n37) The Syrian media regularly reported on
his participation in religious holiday prayers in mosques all over
Syria. Special attention was devoted to the services on the last
Friday of the month of Raman in which Bashshar participated in
December 2002, in the 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab Mosque in the city of Hama.
This city had been the focal point of the Islamic rebellion against
his father's regime in the early 1980s.(n38)

During his first year in power, Bashshar also allowed political and
other exiles to return to Syria. Already in July 2000, Bashshar
promulgated a decree allowing those who had lived outside Syria for
more than a decade to exchange their compulsory military service for
payments of ransom.(n39) In April 2001, he ordered that passports
valid for one year be issued to all Syrians residing abroad, allowing
them to return to Syria to settle their affairs with legal
authorities. While this decree was designed to allow wealthy Syrians
to return to Syria and invest their money in the country, it was
interpreted as a gesture to the Muslim Brotherhood, since it allowed
them to return to Syria as individuals. In retrospect it became clear
that only a few took advantage of these arrangements making it
possible for them to return to Syria. Many of those who approached
Syrian embassies all over world encountered bureaucratic red tape and
demands for bribes by the embassy employees.(n40)

The Muslim Brotherhood Movement exploited Hafiz Asad's death in its
effort to try and make a new beginning in its relations with the
regime in Damascus. The Movement's Inspector General, Sa'd al-Din
al-Bayanuni, stated that despite his objection to the manner in which
Bashshar had risen to power, he was prepared to extend his hand to him
in the name of the joint struggle to move Syrian society forward, but
only on condition that Bashshar indeed made a new beginning, released
political prisoners and granted political freedom and pluralism.
Bayanuni added that " Bashshar has come into the weighty inheritance
of decades of totalitarian rule, and that he is does not bear
responsibility for what happened in the past in Hama any other place,
but only for what happens after he is sworn in [to office]." He
demanded that Bashshar "Allow us to express ourselves. 5,000 of our
people have been released in the past decade, but 4,500 of our people
are in prison and almost 5,000 more are in exile, and they, together
with their families number in the tens of thousands."(n41)

The need for the Muslim Brotherhood to make its peace with Bashshar
became acute because its leaders, who had been in exile for many
years, became irrelevant in present-day Syrian realities. Moreover,
the authorities in Jordan, out of which the Movement operated in the
past several years, took a number of steps that severely limited its
activities, out of a desire to improve Jordan's relations with Syria.
Already in February 2000, Jordan closed down the Brotherhood's
political bureau as well as its information office and banned its
convening its Shra Council in Amman; it was forced to convene in
Baghdad.(n42) Incidentally, the convening of the Council in Baghdad
brought about the initiation of a dialogue between the Bayanuni
faction, considered to be the more moderate one, and the Baghdad-based
'Adnan Sa'd al-Din faction considered to be the radical one. After the
rise of Bashshar to the presidency, the Jordanians requested that
Bayanuni, himself, leave Amman where he had been residing in recent
years, and he was forced to relocate the focus of his activity to
London.(n43)

The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood also tried to exploit this new
atmosphere of openness and dialogue created, even for a short time,
with the rise to power of Bashshar al-Asad. They hoped that under the
aegis of this new atmosphere, which some of them undoubtedly viewed as
a sign of Bashshar 's weakness, lack of experience and immaturity, the
Muslim Brotherhood could establish a new status for itself in Syria.
The Brotherhood could not ignore the challenge to the Regime voiced by
Syrian intellectuals as well as the renewed activities in Syria of
various opposition elements. For example, forums of intellectuals and
public figures sprang up all over Syria, in which serious criticism of
the regime and calls for basic changes in Syrian realities were
voiced. The fact that the voices of the Muslim Brotherhood or its
supporters were not heard inside Syria bore witness more than anything
else to how irrelevant they had become in Syria. That apparently was
the reason for the urgency with which they had to make themselves heard.

On May 3rd, 2001 the Muslim Brotherhood movement published the draft
of the "Covenant of National Honor for Political Activity" (Mithaq
Sharaf Watani Lil-'Amal al-Siyasi). The publication of the draft by
the movement came probably to remind everyone of its existence, and
even to establish a basis for joint activity with other opposition
groups in Syria. It may also have been designed at establishing a
dialogue with the Syrian regime itself, now its founder Hafiz al-Asad
had passed away. The draft stated that its aim was to "arouse a debate
that would allow for the formulation of an agreed covenant of national
honor to serve as the basis for political activity in Syria in this
sensitive and problematic period and in view of the political changes
in the international and domestic arenas ... After all, the time has
passed when a single party claimed (ownership of the Homeland). From
now on, each political group should be able to have its place on the
national map in keeping with its relative strength as expressed in
clean and democratic elections." In the draft document published in
London, the Muslim Brotherhood expressed its commitment to maintain
democratic political activity and even voiced strong condemnation of
the use of violence. The Brotherhood did, however, state that "any
dialogue must be based on a broad national consensus regarding the
basic principles on which the existence of the nation, its power and
its uniqueness is based."(n44)

As expected, the reaction of the regime to the Covenant was of total
rejection. Senior Syrian officials explained that "the Covenant
represented the attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to extricate itself
from the crisis in which it finds itself during the last decade by
adopting a new identity through which it wished to regain a role in
Syrian political life." They added that: "Anyone who is familiar with
the organizational and ideological structure of that group will not be
deluded by that Covenant. The Brotherhood is reminiscent of a person
who holds a bloody sword in hand while at the same time talks about
co-existence. This is a terrorist organization ... The Muslim
Brotherhood believes that a political and organizational vacuum exists
in Syria and that the opportunity has been created to return and fill
that vacuum ..."(n45)

The Muslim Brotherhood's hope of turning over a new leaf in its
relations with the Syrian Ba'th regime with the rise to power of
Bashshar al-Asad proved futile in view of the regime's strict position
and lack of any readiness for compromise in its relations with the
organization. On 23rd-25th August 2002, the Brotherhood held a
conference in London designed to draw up an agreed formula for the
"National Covenant". They invited people from the entire political
spectrum from both inside and outside Syria. However response to the
invitation was insignificant, and most of those who did participate
were people close to the Muslim Brotherhood, or at least those who had
not returned to Syria in recent years with the permission of the
authorities. In any event the Brotherhood's attempt to get onto the
reform bandwagon reflected the inherent danger to the regime in the
policy of openness that it encouraged. This danger was focused on the
feeling extant both inside and outside Syria that the regime was
projecting weakness and the feeling that it could even be challenged.(n46)

The Muslim Brotherhood's hopes to turn over a new leaf in its
relations with the Ba'th regime in Syria in the wake of Bashshar
al-Asad's rise to power were dashed by the Regime's harsh attitude and
lack of readiness for any compromise or contact with it. The Regime's
adherence to a stiff and even hostile line regarding the Brotherhood
was undoubtedly as sign of its self confidence considering what it
viewed as the long process of the Movement's collapse and thus its
loss of relevancy for the realities in Syria.

The Ba'th Regime -- Defender of Islam

The stiff attitude of the Ba'th Regime towards the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood over the past decades was aided to no small degree by the
closer ties between the latter and the radical Islamic movements in
the Arab world. Indeed, during recent years Damascus has become a site
of pilgrimage for the leaders of radical Islamic groups from all
corners of the Arab world. Among visitors to the Syrian capital were
Hasan Nasrallah, secretary-general of the Hizballah and Husayn
Falallah, the movement's spiritual leader; Hasan Turabi, leader of the
Islamic movement in Sudan; Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, leader of the
Palestinian Hams movement, and Sunni Muslim leaders from Lebanon,
Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan.(n47) Ishaq al-Farhan, leader of the
Jordanian Islamic Action Front, visited Damascus in January 1997,
where he signed a working paper determining a framework for
cooperation between Islamic forces in Jordan and the Ba'th party.(n48)
The Palestinian Islamic movement also made Damascus a center: the
Islamic Jihad movement erected its headquarters in Damascus and Hamas
established its information office in the Syrian capital.(n49)

To an onlooker, the pilgrimage to Damascus seemed unbelievable. In the
past, the Syrian Ba'th regime was seen as the stronghold of secularism
in the Arab world and, to a great extent, it continued to present
itself as such. Its secular outlook was one of the main reasons for
its campaign against the Syrian Islamic movement. The transformation
of Damascus into a lighthouse for Islamic fundamentalist movements of
the Arab world was thus inherent in an alliance of interests that
originated in Syria's being the only Arab state still committed to the
struggle with Israel. In the eyes of these movements, Asad and his
regime remained the last defense against the peril of Western
expansion, especially that of Israel, into the Arab and Muslim
expanse. In addition, it bears note in this context that the strategic
pact between Damascus and Teheran also pushed Islamic circles
throughout the Arab world to view the Syrian regime favorably.(n50)

The alliance between the Islamist forces in the Arab world and the
Ba'th Regime was, of course, a harsh blow to the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood, which had in the past had bases and strongholds in Iraq,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan and even in Egypt, aided by the regimes but
also by the Islamic activists in those countries. Indeed, it appeared
that the Syrian Islamic Movement outside Syria borders was slowly
dying out. For example, it was reported from Amman in mid-1998 that at
the Muslim Brotherhood Conference initiated by members of the Syrian
movement with the aim of garnering support for their struggle against
the Ba'th Regime, it was severely criticized, and one of the Jordanian
participants in the conference spoke out accusingly against them
saying that: "Syria is the only Arab state standing up to Israel
granting support to every opposition to the Zionist occupation.
Therefore, it is impossible for an Arab or a Muslim to attack it and
try to harm it and its leadership."(n51)

Following the election of Bashshar to the presidency, these movements
called on Bashshar to turn over a new leaf in his relations with the
Islamic movements in his country. "The countries of Greater Syria
(Bilad al-Sham) comprise one of the arenas of Islamic activity, and
have also played a historic role as a barrier in defending the nation
against foreign invasion ... Misunderstandings increased in the 1980s
at the time of great distress, but we hope that your era will be a new
era, and therefore a new leaf must be turned and Law No. 49 (which
sets the death penalty for membership in the Muslim Brotherhood) must
be repealed."(n52) Among the signatories to the appeal were members of
Islamic movements in Tunisia, Iraq, Algeria and Lebanon. Even more
biting and mincing no words was the Secretary General of the Islamic
Action Movement in Jordan, 'Abd al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, who called on
Bashshar to "Put an end to that policy of discrimination and
repression that has characterized the Syrian Regime regarding the
Muslim Brotherhood since the early 1980s. 'Arabaiyyat's movement,
which has been known since the mid-1990s for its efforts to grow
closer to the Syrian regime, seems to have decreased its enthusiasm
for that regime, and has also decided not to participate in the
delegation of Jordanian opposition parties that went to Damascus to
congratulate Bashshar al-Asad on his rise to rule.(n53)

This bore witness to the interest-guided alliance between the Ba'th
Regime and the fundamentalist movements in the Arab world, an alliance
which serves these movements in their efforts to promote their own
political interests, and at the same time serves the Syrian Regime in
its efforts to maintain political stability in Syria and promote the
Regime's status at home and abroad. However, it appears that in the
moment of truth the Syrian Regime is liable to discover that the
support from the Islamic movements could prove somewhat shaky and that
despite the benefits of this alliance, it does not lack in
liabilities. Indeed, one of the results of this alliance with the
radical movements in the Arab world was Syria's involvement --
sometimes without wishing to and thus without the knowledge of its
authorities -- in acts of terrorism by these movements in various Arab
states.

Indeed, following the September 11th attacks in New York and
Washington, it became known that some of al-Qa'ida activists were of
Syrian origin or lived in Syria for some years. The Syrian Regime was
ready to fully cooperate with the American war against Usama Bin
Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization and provided intelligence information
which, according to American sources, saved American lives. After
al-Qa'ida attacks in Istanbul in November 2003, the Syrians arrested
and deported to Turkey, at the request of the Turkish authorities, 22
Turks who studied in the Abi-Nur religious center in Damascus for
their possible involvement in these attacks. Syrian authorities also
announced that they were considering not allowing non-Syrians to come
and study in the religious centers in the country in the future.(n54)

Islam in Syria -- A View to the Future

The failure of the Islamic Rebellion in Syria in the early 1980s bears
witness to several of the limitations and even basic weaknesses of
political Islam in the Arab world today. This failure has its roots
first and foremost in the failure of radical religious circles to
break out of the traditional circle of support for them towards other
sectors of the population, first of all towards many of the clerics
themselves, some of whom opposed the Islamic Rebellion. Another
objective should have been the "Holy Trinity" of intellectuals, the
urban middle class (mainly businesspersons), and army officers. These
groups and of course the rural Sunni population remained the Ba'th
Regime's staunch supporters. Moreover, it would appear that the
difficulties presented by the structure and character of Syrian
society to these radical elements did not decrease with the passage of
time. The multi-ethnic nature and, moreover, the increasing weight of
the minority sects in the apparatuses in Syrian life will continue to
present a stumbling block before attempts by religious circles to test
their strength and challenge the political and social order in the
country.

This begs the question of whether relations between religion and the
state as they have been determined at the end of the long path
traveled by both religious circles and the Ba'th Regime have really
reached the end of that path. Ostensibly, they have, since it would
appear that the Syrian Regime has succeeded in finding the proper
formula fitted to the realities in Syria today allowing it grapple
intelligently with state-religion relations without really
backtracking from its basic conception of these relations while not
pushing religious circles to the wall turning them willy-nilly into
enemies. The concept of an "Islamic State," and in Syrian terms -- an
ethnic-Alawite secular rule dressed in Islamic symbols and cooperation
to the point of an alliance -- grants the Regime a sense of
convenience and freedom of political action which it had never known
in the past.

Nevertheless, despite these facts, which have ostensibly rendered the
renewal of radical Islam impossible, to say nothing of its gaining
control over Syria, one cannot ignore the socioeconomic processes that
this country has undergone in the past several decades that have
contributed to the changing face of Syrian society. As is known, the
Ba'th Regime's support base is in the rural population whether Sunni
or members of minority groups. In the past, the Regime succeeded in
integrating this population in Syria's various apparatuses, mainly in
the security-military and the political apparatuses. This integration
granted the rural population a means of progress and social mobility,
which they had never known in the past. Members of the population of
rural areas and the periphery repaid the Regime by lending it their
support in difficult times. For example, during the Islamic Rebellion,
there was almost complete tranquility in the rural areas, including
among the Sunnis. However, the accelerated process of urbanization in
Syria in the past several years has threatened to turn things around
since the masses of immigrants from the rural areas into the towns are
no longer committed to the Ba'th Regime. On the contrary, because of
the difficulties they have encountered in integrating into life in the
large towns, poverty, hardship and misery has aroused in them a sense
of being neglected by the establishment, and thus the Regime
controlling it. This has resulted in a return to religion.(n55)

Thus it is clear that the concept of "secularism" that had been the
guiding light of the Syrian Regime for many years is now facing
bankruptcy, or at least irrelevancy in everything regarding the
man-on-the-street in Syria. It appears that Syria reflects a trend in
the Arab world, mainly the Islamization of the daily life of the
individual and of society. Political Islam whose aim was to bring down
Arab regimes has totally failed, but the fact remains that the
populations in most of the Arab world feel closer to Islam than they
did in the past.

At this stage, it seems that the Syrian Regime has succeeded in
dealing with the process of Islamization that Syrian society is
undergoing because of its readiness to don the cloak of and cooperate
with religious circles just so that they do not challenge it and do
grant it legitimacy. This was borne out in the spring of 2003, in the
Regime's unprecedented willingness to allow soldiers to pray while on
army bases.(n56) Of course the question is: will this approach allow
for long term coexistence between the Ba'th Regime and Islamic
circles, hungry for power and influence, energetically trying to grant
an Islamic tinge to the lives of the individuals, the society and the
state? The latter have apparently not said the last word, and in any
future crisis that may break out in Syria, for example against a
socioeconomic backdrop, they might once more fulfill an important
function since they already enjoy increasing power and status within
important sectors of the population. Also worthy of mention is the
fact that the United States' conquest of Iraq has the potential of
weakening the Syrian Regime, the only remaining Ba'th Regime in the
Arab world, and this may potentially strengthen Islamic forces even in
the long term.

Indeed, Syrian spokesmen have over the past several years renewed
their warning against the wave of Islamism that is apparently waiting
for the right moment or might exploit the relative political openness
in Syria following the rise of Bashshar to the presidency and turn
Syria into another Algeria, as explained by a Syrian intellectual:
"The young in Syria who have been exposed to the empty slogans of the
Ba'th Party, feel lost and without a path, and this pushes them into
the arms of Fundamentalist Islam."(n57) But for this reason the regime
campaign against reformists in Syria in spring 2001 was supported by
many as explained by Muhammad Aziz Shukri of the University of
Damascus: "The problem is that the leaders of the Reformist Camp want
to achieve everything all at once, but the sudden announcement of
elections would create a confrontation between the Ba'th Party and
Islamic circles in Syria, and one must ask what the results would be
and what would happen afterwards? I don't want to jump from a reality
in which we find ourselves today to the kind of "rotten" situation
existing in Algeria, in which everyone is trapped between the army and
the Islamic circles and no one knows who is killing whom and why."(n58)

Syrian political sources frankly explained that: "The decision by the
Authorities to end the Damascus Spring (the holding of intellectual
forums) in early 2001 was not because of fear of these forums, after
all, most of the activists in them were from the left-wing Marxist
stream or were liberals, and in any event they were inconsequential as
compared to the potential inherent in the religious stream. Thus, the
fear was that the religious stream would exploit what was perceived as
a weakness on the part of the Regime in order to renew its activities
(in the guise of political or cultural reforms) under various names.
This is a phenomenon that must be carefully monitored, since opening
the door wide to all of the forces existing in Syria might provide the
opportunity that radical Islam was waiting for."(n59) Indeed, Syria
was the only country in the Arab world that did not broadcast Usama
Bin Laden's videotapes on television, in case anyone in the state
might mistakenly adopt his path.(n60)

Indeed, on April 2004, for the first time after more then twenty
years, Syrian radical Islamists who returned from Iraq after fighting
there the Americans, attacked a UN building in Damascus. Some members
of the terrorist group that carried out the attack were killed in the
incident, and others were arrested. But the question remained were
there other local Islamist groups to be found in Syria like that one.(n61)

In sum, the Ba'th Regime in Syria as well as Islamic circles in that
country have mounted a new path, a middle path designed to reach
compromise and create a bridge between Islam and the state. This path
fits in with the realities in Syria beginning in the 1990s, and has
within it the possibility for Islamic circles to regain some of the
practices that allowed their political activities in the years
immediately following independence; and for the regime the return to
traditional Islamic patterns of relations between religion and state.
This new path symbolizes the end of a chapter in relations between the
Islamic movement and the Ba'th Regime as well as relations between
state and religion in Syria, but this chapter, especially in the way
it has ended, it is not the last in the saga.

Endnotes

---(n1.) See Tishrin (Damascus), July 18, 2000; see also al-Sharq
al-Awsat (London), July 19, 2000.
---(n2.) Al-Hayat (London), December 25, 2000; al-Safir (Beirut), 29
December 29, 2000.
---(n3.) See Patrick Selae, Asad of Syria: the Struggle for the Middle
East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 332-338; Umar F. 'Abdallah, The
Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), 189. See also
an interview by the author with Syrian official, Washington, June 23,
1996.
---(n4.) Sere Jaysh al-Sha'b (Damascus), April 25, 1967.
---(n5.) Jaysh al-Sah'b, 9 May 1967; see also R. Damascus, May 7, 1967
(MER, Middle East Record -- 1967 (Jerusalem, 1971), 159.
---(n6.) For more on 'Aflaq's thought, see Sylvia G. Haim (ed.) Arab
Nationalism, An Anthology (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1976), 61-65; Salem N. Babikian, "A partial Reconstruction of Michel
'Aflaq Thought," The Muslim World, Vol. 67 (1977), 280-294; Tarif
Khalidi, "A Critical Study of the Political Ideas of Michel 'Aflaq,"
Middle East Forum, Vol. XLII, No. 2 (1966), 55-68; Gordon H. Torrey,
"The Neo-Ba'th -- Ideology and Practice,