09-11-2008, 07:41 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>The idea of India </b>
Pioneer.com
Rekha Chakravarthi
We need vision to emerge as a powerful nation
On September 6, 2008, sixteen years after the 1992 decision to adopt full-scope safeguards, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to lift the embargo it had placed on India by granting a waiver to conduct nuclear trade with a country that is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The waiver is described as significant because India can now engage in high-tech nuclear commerce while its nuclear weapons programme remains unaffected -- a right that is enjoyed only by the P-5.
The decision by the NSG is being hailed as the end of the 'nuclear isolation' faced by India since Pokhran I. It is historic because India chose to climb its way up the world ladder as a player that objected to the nuclear framework it considered discriminatory, but objected honourably and strove to succeed without breaking the rules of the game. While there is celebration all around, the real work starts now.
In an anarchic international system, nothing succeeds like staying successful. The NSG waiver is a diplomatic success; it is, however, the time to evaluate how India has performed on this deal domestically. One cannot refute that no other foreign policy issue has been debated more vociferously, at all levels, as this one; yet it leaves our decision-making skills on foreign policy exposed. A good player is one that not only aims to be a global power or believes in its ability to lead, but also knows what kind of power it seeks in the emerging world order and what it wants to do with that power. More than anything else, the nuclear deal offers important lessons in this direction.
It is in India's interest to calculate its gains beyond immediate benefits. Yes, the nuclear deal will enable us to access fuel for our reactors, and thereby contribute to the energy mix that India is crucially short of. <b>But, is that it? Why did the United States offer this deal to India? Is it because of India's impeccable non-proliferation record, American commercial interests, or to contain China? The answer lies in all of these, but above all, it reflects a long-term foreign policy about how America sees itself and its national interests in the coming decades. What we need is a vision, an idea of what India is and what India will be. </b>
One of the many steps in that direction is to make a fresh beginning on how we are going to conduct ourselves vis-Ã -vis foreign policy matters. We begin with China. If India considers China's rise as anything but peaceful, then why should anyone see India's rise as benign? We realise that we are cooperating and competing with China; we understand that we are an emerging power, so can we start interacting with China like two powers ought to? India should look beyond the boundary dispute with China and its apathy to support India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The world has come around to acknowledge our position as the emerging power. In time, the world will endorse our bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC and get us into the G-8, too.
However, more power means more responsibility and India will definitely not be given a free ride to the global power club. India will be expected to take positions on international issues such as Iran, for example. India has to know what it wants with respect to Iran -- a nuclear Iran is definitely not in India's interest and it cannot afford to camouflage its position on Iran. Here is where diplomacy comes in. Voting against Iran does not mean the end of ties with Iran just as China's voting against India would not have meant the end of the India-China relationship. India has to build on its diplomatic expertise to successfully play both sides.
On the domestic front, the Government should take foreign policy matters to the common man. The Government played the energy security card to explain the importance of the nuclear deal, but in the end it placed greater reliance on the numbers game in Parliament. It is the Government's business to explain to its people the importance of every domestic and foreign policy issue and how these policies contribute to the 'idea of India'. The claimed success at Vienna by securing the NSG waiver is only the first step in realising this idea.
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Pioneer.com
Rekha Chakravarthi
We need vision to emerge as a powerful nation
On September 6, 2008, sixteen years after the 1992 decision to adopt full-scope safeguards, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decided to lift the embargo it had placed on India by granting a waiver to conduct nuclear trade with a country that is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The waiver is described as significant because India can now engage in high-tech nuclear commerce while its nuclear weapons programme remains unaffected -- a right that is enjoyed only by the P-5.
The decision by the NSG is being hailed as the end of the 'nuclear isolation' faced by India since Pokhran I. It is historic because India chose to climb its way up the world ladder as a player that objected to the nuclear framework it considered discriminatory, but objected honourably and strove to succeed without breaking the rules of the game. While there is celebration all around, the real work starts now.
In an anarchic international system, nothing succeeds like staying successful. The NSG waiver is a diplomatic success; it is, however, the time to evaluate how India has performed on this deal domestically. One cannot refute that no other foreign policy issue has been debated more vociferously, at all levels, as this one; yet it leaves our decision-making skills on foreign policy exposed. A good player is one that not only aims to be a global power or believes in its ability to lead, but also knows what kind of power it seeks in the emerging world order and what it wants to do with that power. More than anything else, the nuclear deal offers important lessons in this direction.
It is in India's interest to calculate its gains beyond immediate benefits. Yes, the nuclear deal will enable us to access fuel for our reactors, and thereby contribute to the energy mix that India is crucially short of. <b>But, is that it? Why did the United States offer this deal to India? Is it because of India's impeccable non-proliferation record, American commercial interests, or to contain China? The answer lies in all of these, but above all, it reflects a long-term foreign policy about how America sees itself and its national interests in the coming decades. What we need is a vision, an idea of what India is and what India will be. </b>
One of the many steps in that direction is to make a fresh beginning on how we are going to conduct ourselves vis-Ã -vis foreign policy matters. We begin with China. If India considers China's rise as anything but peaceful, then why should anyone see India's rise as benign? We realise that we are cooperating and competing with China; we understand that we are an emerging power, so can we start interacting with China like two powers ought to? India should look beyond the boundary dispute with China and its apathy to support India's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The world has come around to acknowledge our position as the emerging power. In time, the world will endorse our bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC and get us into the G-8, too.
However, more power means more responsibility and India will definitely not be given a free ride to the global power club. India will be expected to take positions on international issues such as Iran, for example. India has to know what it wants with respect to Iran -- a nuclear Iran is definitely not in India's interest and it cannot afford to camouflage its position on Iran. Here is where diplomacy comes in. Voting against Iran does not mean the end of ties with Iran just as China's voting against India would not have meant the end of the India-China relationship. India has to build on its diplomatic expertise to successfully play both sides.
On the domestic front, the Government should take foreign policy matters to the common man. The Government played the energy security card to explain the importance of the nuclear deal, but in the end it placed greater reliance on the numbers game in Parliament. It is the Government's business to explain to its people the importance of every domestic and foreign policy issue and how these policies contribute to the 'idea of India'. The claimed success at Vienna by securing the NSG waiver is only the first step in realising this idea.
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