07-30-2004, 03:53 AM
The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan
Seizaburo Sato
(Professor of Political Science, Tokyo University)
Images of the world system in the post-Cold War era The most salient feature of relations between the world's nations during the second half of the twentieth century was the Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocs. While some countries avoided joining either camp and maintained a neutral posture, none of them, with the exception of China after the Sino-Soviet rift, was a power capable of exercising major influence internationally. Besides, even countries that tried to remain neutral in terms of the East-West confrontation were nevertheless drawn, if passively, into the magnetic field of the Cold War. In this respect even China was no exception. After World War II, a number of conflicts arose, most of them not caused directly by the Cold War but intrinsic to the structural framework of East-West confrontation. It is only natural, therefore, in these days when the Cold War has come to an end following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, that most scholars have tried to understand the future landscape of the world from a "post-Cold War" viewpoint. Among these attempts, two that are especially noteworthy and that have attracted the attention of the world's intellectual community are Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992) and Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Particularly interesting is the fact that these books stand in stark contrast in terms of the authors' standpoints when it comes to their understanding of liberal democracy, and of Western civilization in general. Fukuyama's thesis is that liberal democracy has finally overcome all other ideologies, literally putting an end to history seen as a series of confrontations between ideologies. This does not mean, however, that Fukuyama welcomes without qualification the West's victory in the Cold War. He is not so optimistic about the world that will come after the "end of history," as indicated by his use in the title of the expression "the Last Man," an expression used by the Western philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, who was among the first to lose faith in the future of the Western "Modern Age." Fukuyama's proposition is that liberal democracy, which first developed in the cradle of Western civilization, is a universally acceptable concept, and that the world is now moving in a fundamental way toward embracing it. Huntington, in contrast, argues that it is not only wrong, but also conceited and dangerous, to think that Western civilization has a universalist nature. His new book has more than 300 pages of text alone, and, frankly speaking, the lack of consistency in this author's analysis makes it difficult to follow his train of thought. The essence of Huntington's contention is that world politics is entering a new phase in which the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. During the several hundred years leading up to World War I, confrontation between nation-states within the Western civilization was the dominant type of conflict in the world. In the twentieth century, confrontation between ideologies came to the fore. Now, in the post-Cold War era, the identities and loyalties of the people of the world are shifting to a focus on civilization, defined as the "broadest cultural entity." As a result, the foundations of world order have begun to change. For the first time in the history of mankind, a new world system of multipolar and multi-civilizational global politics is emerging, each civilization with its own member countries clustered around a core state functioning as an independent pole. In this context, Western civilization is just one of a number of major civilizations, and since mature civilizations tend strongly to reject the influence of other civilizations, it is not likely to become universal. Western countries should, therefore, suspend their fruitless and dangerous efforts to spread their civilization to the rest of the world, and should join forces to defend themselves against the challenges posed by other civilizations. With respect to any conflicts that arise within each civilizational sphere, the best thing for the West to do would be to leave the management and control of problems to its core state. According to Huntington, there exist at present six major civilizational groups: Western civilization built upon Catholicism and Protestantism (Western Europe and North America); the civilization built upon the Orthodox Church (Russia and Eastern Europe); the Islamic civilization; the Hindu civilization; the Chinese civilization; and the Japanese civilization. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa exist as "candidates for civilization," with the implication that they have the potential to become distinct civilizations of their own. Five of these have their respective core state or states: for Western civilization it is the European Union (EU) and the United States; for the Orthodox civilization it is Russia; for the Hindu civilization, India; for the Chinese civilization, China; and for the Japanese civilization, Japan. There is no such core state for the Islamic civilization, nor for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Huntington regards the Chinese and the Islamic civilizations as presenting the most dangerous challenges to Western civilization. He goes on to suggest that when China becomes a powerful state, Chinese civilization will constitute a threat to the West, especially if Western countries decide to get involved in an intra-civilizational conflict, such as a dispute between Vietnam and China. Similarly, Islamic civilization may pose a threat if intra-civilizational conflicts continue to deepen and there is no core state to play an effective role as mediator. Huntington is not only inaccurate or wrong in some of the historical facts he presents in his analysis, but his thesis has the potential to be extremely dangerous if taken as a prescription for making policy. If the leadership of a major power--particularly of the United States, the only remaining superpower--were to accept this world-view and systematically adopt and implement policies based upon it, countries belonging to other civilizational spheres would be forced to take counter-measures, and this would in turn cause a series of interactions that would turn Huntington's propositions into self-fulfilled reality. As far as I can see, judging by the number of largely critical reactions from around the world, including from the United States and Western Europe, it seems quite unlikely that Huntington's propositions will be adopted as guidelines by the world's policymakers.1
Classic civilizations and their interactions For Huntington, civilization and culture are linked: both involve "the overall way of life of a people." Civilization is "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity . . . defined by . . . language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people."2 With respect to both culture and civilization, there are as many divergent definitions as there are cultural anthropologists and cultural sociologists, and Huntington's definition is nothing beyond what is accepted as common sense by the academic community, and largely within the limits of what is generally considered acceptable. The six major civilizations, as depicted by Huntington, are based on what have been termed the "classic civilizations," and, with two exceptions, all are associated with a major world religion. Over the period from roughly the sixth century BC to the sixth century AD, long after the introduction of agriculture caused revolutionary changes in the organization of human communities, in parts of the Eurasian continent where contacts between diverse cultures had been especially intense emerged the great religions--Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Islam. Each of these was differentiated from the tribal religions of the past by a vastly superior universality and transcendence, and each served as a force to integrate various peoples living in vast geographical regions through common values and social orders. The classic empires arose when these great religions were harnessed in the service of specific political authorities of the times. By the same token, it was through becoming entwined with secular political authority that the capacity of the great religions to survive was greatly enhanced. The pre-modern empires which were not closely combined with great religions collapsed relatively easily, as was the case with the Yuan dynasty of China, while major religions which lost the protection of secular authorities also tended to wane, as did Zoroastrianism in Persia. This is also why Buddhism, which has the longest history among the great religions and at one time had an established position in both India and China, lost ground in both countries, only surviving until today in regions such as Japan, the Indochinese peninsula, Tibet, Mongolia, Bhutan, Thailand, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, all in the peripheries of the Chinese and Indian civilizations. Neo-Confucianism and Hinduism developed intimate ties with the ruling authorities in China and India respectively, and in the central parts of both these civilizational spheres Buddhism lost the political protection it needed to survive. Hinduism, while not as transcendent or universal in nature as other great religions, nevertheless had a vast capacity to tolerate alien elements, and thus proved capable of integrating different cultures and producing a unified lifestyle and social order. The exceptions among the existing six major civilizational groups identified by Huntington were Japan and Western Europe (after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire), for in neither was religion entwined with political authority in the same way as in other pre-modern civilizations. Outside the Eurasian continent there have been some indications of cultural civilizations germinating in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, but these incipient civilizations were too isolated from the rest of the world to develop a sufficient degree of universality. One serious fault of Huntington's analysis is that he ignores the possibility that while different civilizations that come into contact may clash with each other, they can also learn from each other, and may thereby revitalize themselves. Even in the case of encounters between the classic civilizations of the pre-modern era, there have been divergent outcomes and different consequences for history depending on the levels of maturity of the cultures in question as well as the intensity of the encounters. Generally speaking, conflicts based on cultural encounters can be grouped into three categories. The first type of conflict is when an incipient culture comes in contact with a mature classic civilization: the incipient culture will either be fully absorbed or be wiped out by the overwhelming superiority of the mature civilization. In either case, rapid extinction is the rule. In contrast, the second type of conflict covers encounters between a mature classic civilization and another culture which has already reached a considerable level of development of its own. While the former remain unchanged, the latter are not infrequently stimulated by the former and launch a spectacular process of change. Especially when such encounters are not accompanied by military conquest, so the intensity of the encounter remains relatively low, it is quite likely to spur the development of new features in that civilization that are quite different from what prevailed formerly. The rise of the Japanese civilization, which is known for its deeply entrenched indigenous culture, is a typical case in point. As an island nation, divided from the Eurasian continent by the Japan Sea, Japan was able to nurture and develop its own unique culture, absorbing elements of Chinese civilization over an extended period of time. In the case of China, neither the resurgence of Confucianism as orthodox learning, nor the literary exaltations of the Tang and Sung cultural renaissance would have been possible without the external influence of the mature Indian and Hellenistic civilizations on the younger Chinese civilization. In the West, the Renaissance, which was the initial spark for the development of modern Western civilization, would not have occurred had it not been for the West's contact with Islamic civilization. The third category covers contact between mature classic civilizations; ordinarily this has resulted in either deadly confrontation or mutual repulsion. A typical example of the former is the encounter between Islamic civilization as represented by the Ottoman Empire and Western Christian civilization rallying around Catholicism. Examples of mutual repulsion include the relationships between the post-Sung Chinese civilization and the Indian civilization, and the various contacts between Western civilization and Asian civilizations--with China during the Ming and Qing dynasties, with Korea during the Yi dynasty, and with Japan during the Tokugawa period. Thus, it cannot be said that encounters between different cultures inevitably result in a head-on clash.
Classic civilization and modern industrial civilization Another of Huntington's failures is that his definition of civilization does not take into account the existence of major differences of substance and quality between pre-modern classic civilizations and modern industrial civilizations. Huntington further confuses the issue by interpreting modern industrial civilization within the framework of the classic civilization, equating it with Western civilization as a classic civilization, and limiting the concept of civilizational encounter solely to encounters between modern industrial civilizations and pre-modern classic civilizations. This confusion is closely related to the fact that he grossly overestimates the meaning of the end of the Cold War, and in so doing, loses sight of the more fundamental changes that lay behind this historic event. Huntington asserts that such institutions as a democratic political system, checks and balances on power, and the rule of law are all products, as well as components, of Western civilization. It is true that these were first articulated in Western Europe, but today many of these values and institutions have taken root in a number of non-Western regions of the world, while many countries included in the Western bloc have not, or not until recently, incorporated these "fruits of Western civilization" into their societies. These concepts should be seen rather as the products of modern industrial civilization, not of Western civilization as a classic civilization. It might also be noted here that, if the birthplace of concepts or ideas is the issue, it should be remembered that Christianity was not born in the West, nor was Classical Greek civilization of Western origin. Ever since the emergence of pre-modern empires, human beings (at least those inhabiting the Eurasian Continent) have lived inside, or on the peripheries of, one or another kind of imperial order. But in the West, by the end of the seventeenth century an entirely new political system composed of sovereign states had emerged. As the people's sense of identity with and loyalty to the sovereign state increased, these evolved into nation-states. The ideology of the nation-state (or, as it is called, nationalism) found its most eloquent expression in the French Revolution, and was subsequently spread across Europe by the Napoleonic Wars. The emergence of sovereign states and later nation-states prompted the global expansion of the Western world. This expansion was greatly stimulated by the Industrial Revolution, which began in England toward the end of the eighteenth century, roughly contemporaneous with the French Revolution. Industrialization markedly extended man's capacity to systematically control his environment, and in particular enhanced his ability to move himself and his supplies around the world, with the result that the world seemed smaller than ever before. But industrialization also caused gaps in national strength, between those countries which had succeeded in industrializing and those others which had not, that gradually widened. Modern industrial civilization surpasses the classic civilizations in universality, and the contrasts between them in thinking and behavior patterns are great. The fundamental role of the mature classic civilization was to maintain and preserve the established ways of life, from thinking patterns to social order. The caste system erected by the Hindu civilization has survived for several thousand years, and the Chinese family system persisted from the days of the Tang dynasty up till when the communist government was established in China. These are two outstanding examples of the capability of the classic civilizations to preserve traditional forms. In contrast, modern industrial civilization is characterized by constant change, and its driving force has been the desire to improve man's ability to control his environment. Thus when it comes to the clash of civilizations, the most violent conflicts are those between a classic civilization and a modern industrial civilization, as was the case with the Opium Wars. In this sense, and contrary to Huntington's assertion, it was during the period often called the "Age of Imperialism," from the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth century, that the clash of civilizations reached its highest peak. Whatever the level of violence, the outcome of a clash between a modern industrial civilization and a classic civilization is clear from the beginning. As a result, most regions within the sphere of classic civilizations where the process of industrialization could not be launched soon enough fell victim to the drive by the Western powers (as well as the late industrializing states like Russia and Japan) for colonization. For most people, modern industrial civilization possesses irresistible attractions at several levels, and in that sense can be very fairly called a universal civilization. In the non-Western regions which faced the threat of Western colonial aggression, there naturally arose a nationalist response against the inroads of the alien intruders. And, since it was obvious that the failure to industrialize would leave the countries of these regions with no option but to remain weak and succumb to colonization, it became the goal of all active nationalists to emulate the achievements of industrial civilization. Japan, which pursued the proclaimed national goal of "Wealthy Nation, Strong Army" from the beginning of the Meiji period (1868â1912), was the first case of successful industrialization and formation of a nation-state in a non-Western region. The tide of industrialization that originated in the West spread worldwide, and along with it the flame of nationalism burned bright. In addition, the affluent consumer lifestyle which developed in countries that had industrialized successfully naturally became a subject of envy among the peoples of poorer countries. This is exactly the reason why the success of a country in launching sustainable economic development became the commonly accepted criterion of political legitimacy not only among developed countries but also among developing countries. Modern industrial civilization is built upon faith in man's rational capacity, and aims at improving his ability to control the environment. Therefore, its character is fundamentally secular, lacking an ideology of its own to give spiritual meaning to life. This is the reason why the values nurtured under the classic civilizations still live on tenaciously, even if in fragmented forms. They continue to function as the fundamental framework of thought in the modern world despite the fact that industrial civilization prevails everywhere and relentlessly continues to encroach upon the established forms of classic civilization. The revival of religion that we are witnessing today in North America, East Asia and the sphere of the Orthodox civilization (although not to any great extent in Western Europe) can also be plausibly explained in the same context. With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why Huntington, who lives in America where there is an especially visible revival of evangelical Protestantism, chose to use a definition of civilization that is modeled on the classic civilizations, and why he includes modern industrial civilization with classic Western civilization.
The post-Cold War world It is this writer's contention that the world order of the twenty-first century should be discussed and understood in terms of the fundamental features of modernization, such as industrialization and nationalism, rather than in terms of the framework of the "post-Cold War" era. From this viewpoint, Akihiko Tanaka's Atarashii Chusei [New Middle Ages] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1996) presents a much more persuasive and insightful perspective than the treatises of either Fukuyama or Huntington. In this book, Tanaka groups the countries of the world into three "spheres," and analyzes the interrelationships among them. The first sphere, or Neo-Medieval Sphere, consists of the countries in which industrialization has already given rise to affluent societies with "thinning" national borders (basically the OECD member countries). The second sphere, or Modern Sphere, comprises those countries that have embarked on the road to modernization but in which nationalism is still a potent force and which still live in the world of power politics of the nineteenth century (most of the developing countries and the countries of the former Soviet sphere of influence). The third sphere, or Chaotic Sphere, is made up of all other countries, which have failed to become nation-states and remain to a greater or lesser degree in a chaotic condition (for example, sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the former Soviet camp). But Tanaka's use of the expression "New Middle Ages," which ignores salient features of the characteristics of the modern industrial civilization, cannot be the appropriate nomenclature with which to describe relationships among the affluent democracies of our times, since the name carries with it an inescapable image of the strife-ridden and stagnant centuries of Europe during the Middle Ages. What Huntington calls the "clash of civilizations" is in fact neither a clash between classic civilizations, nor between classic civilization and modern civilization. The conflicts that exist have, rather, arisen as a result of the diffusion worldwide of industrial civilization, and can be divided into three types. The first type of conflict is competition between institutions that are characteristic of most industrialized societies but which have taken divergent forms in different societies, due partly to having different social foundations formed by diverse cultural heritages long before industrialization, and partly also to differences in the timing of industrialization. As a result of the collapse of communism, in terms of economic and political systems, the market economy, taken in a broad sense, and liberal democracy have established themselves as the only feasible models for modernization. However, in practice there are wide variations between market economies and between systems of liberal democracy, and none can claim absolute superiority. Obviously there are no grounds for placing the American model of market economy and democracy ahead of all others. These institutional differences, however, are differences that exist within the common framework of modern industrial civilization, and as such cannot be considered to represent a clash between civilizations. While it may be exceedingly difficult for a process of mutual learning to occur when one mature classic civilization encounters another, it is quite possible that it will occur as a result of contacts between industrial societies with divergent institutions, and through such encounters, these societies may find they undergo economic or political revitalization, or both. To begin with, since modern industrial civilization is characterized by constant technological innovation, it cannot be expected to develop the same entrenched tendencies to preserve established ways of life that the mature classic civilizations exhibited. The positive results such a process of mutual learning can yield has been demonstrated most widely in relation to methods of quality control in factories--methods first developed in the United States were introduced into Japan, where they underwent considerable development and improvement, and were eventually re-exported back to the United States, where they contributed to improving the productivity of American manufacturers. Huntington errs when he presents institutional differences among the industrial nations as representing inter-civilizational confrontation, and thereby intentionally seals off the possibility that a society may become revitalized through mutual learning. It is still fresh in this writer's memory that until several years ago, Huntington was asserting forcefully that the worst threat to America in the post-Cold War era was Japanese economic power. Fortunately or not, his opinion has shifted, and today he sees the worst enemies as being China and the Islamic world. In the book now under review, Huntington emphasizes the need to develop links between Japan and the West, civilizations that are very different. Such a willful shift in the designation of principal enemies within such a short time span is concrete evidence of the extent of Huntington's confusion in defining what he means by "the clash of civilizations." Further, by regarding institutional differences as the cause of unavoidable conflict, Huntington's theory, if taken as a guide to policy-making, has the potential to become dangerously self-fulfilling, as pointed out earlier. There has been enough experience in US-Japan bilateral relations of exaggerated confrontation over economic and trade issues to give evidence of what could happen. The second type of conflict should be termed "confrontation" rather than "competition," and describes what occurs between "second sphere" states (as defined by Tanaka) that are in the process of achieving economic takeoff toward industrialization but which have not yet established well-developed political and economic systems of their own, and "first sphere" states, the developed democracies. This type of confrontation often involves trade friction caused by the inroads these newly industrializing countries, in their relentless efforts to catch up, have made into the manufacturing sectors of older economies that are built on standardized technologies, economic policy friction over how far and how fast economic liberalization should proceed, and ideological confrontation with respect to human rights and democratization. The leaders of China, Malaysia, and Singapore have been emphasizing "Asian values" and "Asia's own way of modernization," partly in protest against the West's criticism of these countries' human rights practices and Western demands for increased market access. In doing so, they are not expressing a position against modernization per se, nor are they confidently exalting the superiority of their "Asian values" or "Asia's own way of modernization." Rather, their real motives lie in these leaders' awareness of the weakness of their own countries' competitive position vis-a-vis the developed countries and of the need to provide protection for their home industries, and their fear that chaos may ensue if the traditional social order is swept away by the tides of modernization. In addition, although some Asian countries that are enjoying robust economic development have acquired a degree of confidence based on their achievements, at the same time they are especially sensitive to Western demands on human rights issues and economic liberalization because their memories of living under colonial rule are still fresh. This mechanism of confrontation and the thinking behind its manifestations are not essentially different from when Germany and Japan, both countries that modernized late and suffered severely during the Great Depression, used ideas and slogans such as "the superiority of the Aryan race" and "Liberate Asia from the White Man's Yoke" in their confrontation with the developed countries led by the United States and Great Britain. The Asian leaders who employ this strategy resemble Huntington in that they interpret (or pretend to interpret) confrontations caused by differences in stages of development toward modernization as inter-civilizational confrontation. Of course, there is one major difference between the Nazi Germany and militarist Japan of yesteryear and the East and Southeast Asian countries of today, in that there is hardly any possibility that another war on the scale of this century's two world wars will break out between the developed countries and these rapidly developing Asian nations. The third type of conflict is also better seen as a kind of confrontation rather than as competition. It takes the form of outbursts of radical criticisms against the affluent developed nations by disgruntled countries and regions that are unable to launch successful industrialization. To use the divisions proposed by Akihiko Tanaka, it is a confrontation between less developed members of the Modern Sphere who join forces with countries and regions of the Chaotic Sphere on the one hand, and the countries of the Neo-Medieval Sphere on the other. It is conceivable that this kind of radical movement could also be directed against some countries of the Modern and Chaotic Spheres against others of the same spheres, or by classes or tribes against more fortunate classes or different tribes within their own societies, but this aspect is outside the scope of the present analysis. Such radicalism often takes the form of religious fundamentalism of one kind or another, and is therefore liable to be mistaken for confrontation between classic and modern civilizations. It is perhaps due to this confusion in appearances that Huntington presents Islamic civilization, along with Chinese civilization, as posing the greatest threats to Western civilization. What stands out is that radical outbursts of anti-Western or anti-modern ideological movements do not occur unless the countries concerned do themselves have ambitions to develop a modern industrial civilization and are taking steps in that direction. Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, are both predominantly Islamic but are successfully industrializing. There are no visible signs of the emergence of a politically radical religious fundamentalism in these countries, in spite of the fact that they have running political and economic disputes with the developed countries. In the opinion of this writer, the so-called "Islamic Threat" will disappear naturally if the countries of the Islamic world succeed in the process of industrialization. This raises a question: Will Islamic civilization prove to be compatible with modern industrial civilization? It should be noted that launching an economic takeoff into industrialization has become easier in today's world, where investment and trading activities across national borders are reaching astounding levels, and where, moreover, with the era of colonialism behind us, there is no longer any fear of encroachment upon state sovereignty resulting from the influx of foreign capital. Granted there are some preconditions necessary for industrialization to be successful, such as the maintenance of domestic law and order to allow the market mechanism to function well, as well as the establishment of some basic economic rules, but there is no evidence to suggest that having the background of a particular classic civilization would render any society intrinsically unsuited to industrialization. At one time in the past, the Protestant work ethic was viewed as one cultural prerequisite for industrialization, but it should be remembered that although England, where the Industrial Revolution began, was predominantly Protestant, many of the other countries of Europe were in the nineteenth century predominantly Catholic, and this did not at all hinder industrialization. Japan's remarkable economic growth used to be explained by the reasoning that, among the Asian countries, the Japanese culture was exceptionally akin to that of the West. However, as neighboring countries like South Korea and Taiwan, which fall broadly into the sphere of Chinese civilization, have successively achieved astounding economic growth, Confucian civilization has been added to the list of the classic civilizations compatible with industrialization. Among Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines is largely Catholic, while Malaysia and Indonesia are predominantly Islamic, and Thailand is Hinayana Buddhist. Those scholars who have regarded Confucian civilization as the only one outside Western civilization that is compatible with industrialization have more often than not tried to explain the successful industrialization of these countries as a result of the contribution of overseas Chinese within the population. Indeed, the economic influence of the overseas Chinese should not be underestimated, but with the single exception of Singapore (whose population is 75.9 percent Chinese), it is plain that these Asian countries would not have been able to develop their national economies by relying solely on the small segment of their populations comprised of resident Chinese. It seems quite likely that both Malaysia and Indonesia will follow in Turkey's footsteps to become some of the first representatives of the Islamic civilization not totally dependent on oil and gas to succeed in fully-fledged industrialization. India will surely also provide further proof that the cultural characteristics of a specific classic civilization do not necessarily place serious constraints on industrialization. While the remnants of the traditional caste system still have a strong influence, India is now turning away from its former protectionist economic policies aimed at import substitution and embracing a new approach, appearing ready to implement an open-door economic policy aimed at export-driven economic growth. It is true that Islamic civilization as manifested in Middle Eastern countries has a much more constrained attitude toward the people's lifestyle and the organization of social order in general than in Indonesia or Malaysia, and for this reason industrialization may perhaps take longer to achieve. However, this does not mean that Islamic civilization is in fundamental conflict with industrialization per se. Every classic civilization has some aspects which conflict with aspects of modern industrial civilization, and each faces the threat of disintegration caused by the relentless progress of industrialization.
The clash of civilizations internalized Huntington asserts that, during the nineteenth century, confrontation among the major powers of Western civilization was centered on conflict between nation-states. He depicts the situation after the end of the Cold War as one in which a multipolar and multi-civilizational world is emerging for the first time in the history of mankind. But if, as Huntington also asserts, Russia did not belong to the sphere of Western civilization, but instead constituted the core state of the Orthodox civilization, then major wars of the nineteenth century such as the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War included among the belligerents some of the principal powers identified with different classic civilizations, and cannot therefore, by definition, be described simply as conflicts between nation-states that belong to the Western world. Furthermore, if we are to use Huntington's criteria for membership of the Western civilization--that a nation was fundamentally a democracy with mechanisms for effectively controlling the exercise of power--then Germany cannot be said to have become a full member until after World War II. Of course Japan, which does not belong to Western civilization, was a principal participant in World War II. This highlights the fact that confrontation between major powers from different civilizational backgrounds has never been purely a post-Cold War phenomenon. And, as has already been pointed out, the most violent clashes between civilizations manifested themselves when modern industrial civilization, which developed first in the West, came into direct contact with the pre-modern classic civilizations of the non-Western world. For all the reasons given in the foregoing pages, it is the opinion of this author that Huntington's assertion that the post-Cold War world will be the stage for confrontations among civilizations is a concept fundamentally in error. This does not mean, however, that the "End of History" has arrived, as Francis Fukuyama asserts, nor that "the clash of civilizations" has disappeared forever. The most serious type of inter-civilizational clash manifests itself today in the form of an identity crisis deep inside an individual's own mind. Huntington claims that over the last century ordinary people have shifted away from their identification with and loyalty to the nation-state, first toward various ideologies, and now toward particular civilizations, but the situation is not as simple as it appears on the surface. Modern industrial civilization, which is characterized by anthropocentricism, an overblown expectation that mankind will apply its rational abilities in dealing with the world, and a denial of spiritual matters, cannot give positive meaning to life, nor can it fully quench man's spiritual thirst. No new religious system totally different from the classic major religions has been established; instead, a variety of new religious movements, including many cult groups, merely recycle the framework of the classic religions, or parts of their teachings. In this sense, it could be said that a peaceful and stable spiritual life cannot be achieved by those living within modern industrial civilization. However, for the citizens of the contemporary world who have already tasted the enticing advantages of industrial civilization, it is no longer possible to go back to the world of the pre-modern classic civilization. Even devoted environmentalists, who express their concern over how mankind is causing the extinction of many species, do not oppose the extinction of micro-organisms such as those that cause the bubonic plague and cholera and that are harmful to man, nor do most of them want to go back to the enforced self-sufficiency of the pre-industrial era and a way of living that lacks electricity, city gas, railroads, and automobiles. At the same time, no matter how easy and commonplace it becomes to move and act across national borders, it will remain impossible for most people to transcend linguistic and cultural differences, or freely move their place of abode. On the contrary, the more frequent one's direct contact with different cultures, the more aware one becomes of one's own cultural identity. Yet, as part of the same process, the progress of modernization will destroy the established forms of individual cultures and hollow them out. That in the contemporary world mankind can neither live happily within modern civilization nor return to pre-modern culture, and is therefore destined to suffer from ever-more ambiguous problems of identity, is the essence of inter-civilizational clash. It has become minutely subdivided, internalized, and fallen into a state where there is no resolution in sight. That Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man ends on a pessimistic note is no accident. On the other hand, Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations appears superficial, even optimistic, despite its negative predictions about the future of world politics, because it fails to recognize this most fundamental inter-civilizational conflict.
Notes
1. Among the critical reactions to Huntington's treatise, the following papers are of especially excellent quality and have been of great assistance to me. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March-April 1997), pp. 162-3; Donald J. Puchala, "International Encounters of Another Kind," Global Society, January 1997; and Stephen M. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeyman," Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 177-89.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 43.
The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan
Seizaburo Sato
http://www.sbpark.com/inn60.html
Seizaburo Sato
(Professor of Political Science, Tokyo University)
Images of the world system in the post-Cold War era The most salient feature of relations between the world's nations during the second half of the twentieth century was the Cold War between the Eastern and Western blocs. While some countries avoided joining either camp and maintained a neutral posture, none of them, with the exception of China after the Sino-Soviet rift, was a power capable of exercising major influence internationally. Besides, even countries that tried to remain neutral in terms of the East-West confrontation were nevertheless drawn, if passively, into the magnetic field of the Cold War. In this respect even China was no exception. After World War II, a number of conflicts arose, most of them not caused directly by the Cold War but intrinsic to the structural framework of East-West confrontation. It is only natural, therefore, in these days when the Cold War has come to an end following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, that most scholars have tried to understand the future landscape of the world from a "post-Cold War" viewpoint. Among these attempts, two that are especially noteworthy and that have attracted the attention of the world's intellectual community are Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992) and Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Particularly interesting is the fact that these books stand in stark contrast in terms of the authors' standpoints when it comes to their understanding of liberal democracy, and of Western civilization in general. Fukuyama's thesis is that liberal democracy has finally overcome all other ideologies, literally putting an end to history seen as a series of confrontations between ideologies. This does not mean, however, that Fukuyama welcomes without qualification the West's victory in the Cold War. He is not so optimistic about the world that will come after the "end of history," as indicated by his use in the title of the expression "the Last Man," an expression used by the Western philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, who was among the first to lose faith in the future of the Western "Modern Age." Fukuyama's proposition is that liberal democracy, which first developed in the cradle of Western civilization, is a universally acceptable concept, and that the world is now moving in a fundamental way toward embracing it. Huntington, in contrast, argues that it is not only wrong, but also conceited and dangerous, to think that Western civilization has a universalist nature. His new book has more than 300 pages of text alone, and, frankly speaking, the lack of consistency in this author's analysis makes it difficult to follow his train of thought. The essence of Huntington's contention is that world politics is entering a new phase in which the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. During the several hundred years leading up to World War I, confrontation between nation-states within the Western civilization was the dominant type of conflict in the world. In the twentieth century, confrontation between ideologies came to the fore. Now, in the post-Cold War era, the identities and loyalties of the people of the world are shifting to a focus on civilization, defined as the "broadest cultural entity." As a result, the foundations of world order have begun to change. For the first time in the history of mankind, a new world system of multipolar and multi-civilizational global politics is emerging, each civilization with its own member countries clustered around a core state functioning as an independent pole. In this context, Western civilization is just one of a number of major civilizations, and since mature civilizations tend strongly to reject the influence of other civilizations, it is not likely to become universal. Western countries should, therefore, suspend their fruitless and dangerous efforts to spread their civilization to the rest of the world, and should join forces to defend themselves against the challenges posed by other civilizations. With respect to any conflicts that arise within each civilizational sphere, the best thing for the West to do would be to leave the management and control of problems to its core state. According to Huntington, there exist at present six major civilizational groups: Western civilization built upon Catholicism and Protestantism (Western Europe and North America); the civilization built upon the Orthodox Church (Russia and Eastern Europe); the Islamic civilization; the Hindu civilization; the Chinese civilization; and the Japanese civilization. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa exist as "candidates for civilization," with the implication that they have the potential to become distinct civilizations of their own. Five of these have their respective core state or states: for Western civilization it is the European Union (EU) and the United States; for the Orthodox civilization it is Russia; for the Hindu civilization, India; for the Chinese civilization, China; and for the Japanese civilization, Japan. There is no such core state for the Islamic civilization, nor for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. Huntington regards the Chinese and the Islamic civilizations as presenting the most dangerous challenges to Western civilization. He goes on to suggest that when China becomes a powerful state, Chinese civilization will constitute a threat to the West, especially if Western countries decide to get involved in an intra-civilizational conflict, such as a dispute between Vietnam and China. Similarly, Islamic civilization may pose a threat if intra-civilizational conflicts continue to deepen and there is no core state to play an effective role as mediator. Huntington is not only inaccurate or wrong in some of the historical facts he presents in his analysis, but his thesis has the potential to be extremely dangerous if taken as a prescription for making policy. If the leadership of a major power--particularly of the United States, the only remaining superpower--were to accept this world-view and systematically adopt and implement policies based upon it, countries belonging to other civilizational spheres would be forced to take counter-measures, and this would in turn cause a series of interactions that would turn Huntington's propositions into self-fulfilled reality. As far as I can see, judging by the number of largely critical reactions from around the world, including from the United States and Western Europe, it seems quite unlikely that Huntington's propositions will be adopted as guidelines by the world's policymakers.1
Classic civilizations and their interactions For Huntington, civilization and culture are linked: both involve "the overall way of life of a people." Civilization is "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity . . . defined by . . . language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people."2 With respect to both culture and civilization, there are as many divergent definitions as there are cultural anthropologists and cultural sociologists, and Huntington's definition is nothing beyond what is accepted as common sense by the academic community, and largely within the limits of what is generally considered acceptable. The six major civilizations, as depicted by Huntington, are based on what have been termed the "classic civilizations," and, with two exceptions, all are associated with a major world religion. Over the period from roughly the sixth century BC to the sixth century AD, long after the introduction of agriculture caused revolutionary changes in the organization of human communities, in parts of the Eurasian continent where contacts between diverse cultures had been especially intense emerged the great religions--Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Islam. Each of these was differentiated from the tribal religions of the past by a vastly superior universality and transcendence, and each served as a force to integrate various peoples living in vast geographical regions through common values and social orders. The classic empires arose when these great religions were harnessed in the service of specific political authorities of the times. By the same token, it was through becoming entwined with secular political authority that the capacity of the great religions to survive was greatly enhanced. The pre-modern empires which were not closely combined with great religions collapsed relatively easily, as was the case with the Yuan dynasty of China, while major religions which lost the protection of secular authorities also tended to wane, as did Zoroastrianism in Persia. This is also why Buddhism, which has the longest history among the great religions and at one time had an established position in both India and China, lost ground in both countries, only surviving until today in regions such as Japan, the Indochinese peninsula, Tibet, Mongolia, Bhutan, Thailand, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, all in the peripheries of the Chinese and Indian civilizations. Neo-Confucianism and Hinduism developed intimate ties with the ruling authorities in China and India respectively, and in the central parts of both these civilizational spheres Buddhism lost the political protection it needed to survive. Hinduism, while not as transcendent or universal in nature as other great religions, nevertheless had a vast capacity to tolerate alien elements, and thus proved capable of integrating different cultures and producing a unified lifestyle and social order. The exceptions among the existing six major civilizational groups identified by Huntington were Japan and Western Europe (after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire), for in neither was religion entwined with political authority in the same way as in other pre-modern civilizations. Outside the Eurasian continent there have been some indications of cultural civilizations germinating in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, but these incipient civilizations were too isolated from the rest of the world to develop a sufficient degree of universality. One serious fault of Huntington's analysis is that he ignores the possibility that while different civilizations that come into contact may clash with each other, they can also learn from each other, and may thereby revitalize themselves. Even in the case of encounters between the classic civilizations of the pre-modern era, there have been divergent outcomes and different consequences for history depending on the levels of maturity of the cultures in question as well as the intensity of the encounters. Generally speaking, conflicts based on cultural encounters can be grouped into three categories. The first type of conflict is when an incipient culture comes in contact with a mature classic civilization: the incipient culture will either be fully absorbed or be wiped out by the overwhelming superiority of the mature civilization. In either case, rapid extinction is the rule. In contrast, the second type of conflict covers encounters between a mature classic civilization and another culture which has already reached a considerable level of development of its own. While the former remain unchanged, the latter are not infrequently stimulated by the former and launch a spectacular process of change. Especially when such encounters are not accompanied by military conquest, so the intensity of the encounter remains relatively low, it is quite likely to spur the development of new features in that civilization that are quite different from what prevailed formerly. The rise of the Japanese civilization, which is known for its deeply entrenched indigenous culture, is a typical case in point. As an island nation, divided from the Eurasian continent by the Japan Sea, Japan was able to nurture and develop its own unique culture, absorbing elements of Chinese civilization over an extended period of time. In the case of China, neither the resurgence of Confucianism as orthodox learning, nor the literary exaltations of the Tang and Sung cultural renaissance would have been possible without the external influence of the mature Indian and Hellenistic civilizations on the younger Chinese civilization. In the West, the Renaissance, which was the initial spark for the development of modern Western civilization, would not have occurred had it not been for the West's contact with Islamic civilization. The third category covers contact between mature classic civilizations; ordinarily this has resulted in either deadly confrontation or mutual repulsion. A typical example of the former is the encounter between Islamic civilization as represented by the Ottoman Empire and Western Christian civilization rallying around Catholicism. Examples of mutual repulsion include the relationships between the post-Sung Chinese civilization and the Indian civilization, and the various contacts between Western civilization and Asian civilizations--with China during the Ming and Qing dynasties, with Korea during the Yi dynasty, and with Japan during the Tokugawa period. Thus, it cannot be said that encounters between different cultures inevitably result in a head-on clash.
Classic civilization and modern industrial civilization Another of Huntington's failures is that his definition of civilization does not take into account the existence of major differences of substance and quality between pre-modern classic civilizations and modern industrial civilizations. Huntington further confuses the issue by interpreting modern industrial civilization within the framework of the classic civilization, equating it with Western civilization as a classic civilization, and limiting the concept of civilizational encounter solely to encounters between modern industrial civilizations and pre-modern classic civilizations. This confusion is closely related to the fact that he grossly overestimates the meaning of the end of the Cold War, and in so doing, loses sight of the more fundamental changes that lay behind this historic event. Huntington asserts that such institutions as a democratic political system, checks and balances on power, and the rule of law are all products, as well as components, of Western civilization. It is true that these were first articulated in Western Europe, but today many of these values and institutions have taken root in a number of non-Western regions of the world, while many countries included in the Western bloc have not, or not until recently, incorporated these "fruits of Western civilization" into their societies. These concepts should be seen rather as the products of modern industrial civilization, not of Western civilization as a classic civilization. It might also be noted here that, if the birthplace of concepts or ideas is the issue, it should be remembered that Christianity was not born in the West, nor was Classical Greek civilization of Western origin. Ever since the emergence of pre-modern empires, human beings (at least those inhabiting the Eurasian Continent) have lived inside, or on the peripheries of, one or another kind of imperial order. But in the West, by the end of the seventeenth century an entirely new political system composed of sovereign states had emerged. As the people's sense of identity with and loyalty to the sovereign state increased, these evolved into nation-states. The ideology of the nation-state (or, as it is called, nationalism) found its most eloquent expression in the French Revolution, and was subsequently spread across Europe by the Napoleonic Wars. The emergence of sovereign states and later nation-states prompted the global expansion of the Western world. This expansion was greatly stimulated by the Industrial Revolution, which began in England toward the end of the eighteenth century, roughly contemporaneous with the French Revolution. Industrialization markedly extended man's capacity to systematically control his environment, and in particular enhanced his ability to move himself and his supplies around the world, with the result that the world seemed smaller than ever before. But industrialization also caused gaps in national strength, between those countries which had succeeded in industrializing and those others which had not, that gradually widened. Modern industrial civilization surpasses the classic civilizations in universality, and the contrasts between them in thinking and behavior patterns are great. The fundamental role of the mature classic civilization was to maintain and preserve the established ways of life, from thinking patterns to social order. The caste system erected by the Hindu civilization has survived for several thousand years, and the Chinese family system persisted from the days of the Tang dynasty up till when the communist government was established in China. These are two outstanding examples of the capability of the classic civilizations to preserve traditional forms. In contrast, modern industrial civilization is characterized by constant change, and its driving force has been the desire to improve man's ability to control his environment. Thus when it comes to the clash of civilizations, the most violent conflicts are those between a classic civilization and a modern industrial civilization, as was the case with the Opium Wars. In this sense, and contrary to Huntington's assertion, it was during the period often called the "Age of Imperialism," from the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth century, that the clash of civilizations reached its highest peak. Whatever the level of violence, the outcome of a clash between a modern industrial civilization and a classic civilization is clear from the beginning. As a result, most regions within the sphere of classic civilizations where the process of industrialization could not be launched soon enough fell victim to the drive by the Western powers (as well as the late industrializing states like Russia and Japan) for colonization. For most people, modern industrial civilization possesses irresistible attractions at several levels, and in that sense can be very fairly called a universal civilization. In the non-Western regions which faced the threat of Western colonial aggression, there naturally arose a nationalist response against the inroads of the alien intruders. And, since it was obvious that the failure to industrialize would leave the countries of these regions with no option but to remain weak and succumb to colonization, it became the goal of all active nationalists to emulate the achievements of industrial civilization. Japan, which pursued the proclaimed national goal of "Wealthy Nation, Strong Army" from the beginning of the Meiji period (1868â1912), was the first case of successful industrialization and formation of a nation-state in a non-Western region. The tide of industrialization that originated in the West spread worldwide, and along with it the flame of nationalism burned bright. In addition, the affluent consumer lifestyle which developed in countries that had industrialized successfully naturally became a subject of envy among the peoples of poorer countries. This is exactly the reason why the success of a country in launching sustainable economic development became the commonly accepted criterion of political legitimacy not only among developed countries but also among developing countries. Modern industrial civilization is built upon faith in man's rational capacity, and aims at improving his ability to control the environment. Therefore, its character is fundamentally secular, lacking an ideology of its own to give spiritual meaning to life. This is the reason why the values nurtured under the classic civilizations still live on tenaciously, even if in fragmented forms. They continue to function as the fundamental framework of thought in the modern world despite the fact that industrial civilization prevails everywhere and relentlessly continues to encroach upon the established forms of classic civilization. The revival of religion that we are witnessing today in North America, East Asia and the sphere of the Orthodox civilization (although not to any great extent in Western Europe) can also be plausibly explained in the same context. With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why Huntington, who lives in America where there is an especially visible revival of evangelical Protestantism, chose to use a definition of civilization that is modeled on the classic civilizations, and why he includes modern industrial civilization with classic Western civilization.
The post-Cold War world It is this writer's contention that the world order of the twenty-first century should be discussed and understood in terms of the fundamental features of modernization, such as industrialization and nationalism, rather than in terms of the framework of the "post-Cold War" era. From this viewpoint, Akihiko Tanaka's Atarashii Chusei [New Middle Ages] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1996) presents a much more persuasive and insightful perspective than the treatises of either Fukuyama or Huntington. In this book, Tanaka groups the countries of the world into three "spheres," and analyzes the interrelationships among them. The first sphere, or Neo-Medieval Sphere, consists of the countries in which industrialization has already given rise to affluent societies with "thinning" national borders (basically the OECD member countries). The second sphere, or Modern Sphere, comprises those countries that have embarked on the road to modernization but in which nationalism is still a potent force and which still live in the world of power politics of the nineteenth century (most of the developing countries and the countries of the former Soviet sphere of influence). The third sphere, or Chaotic Sphere, is made up of all other countries, which have failed to become nation-states and remain to a greater or lesser degree in a chaotic condition (for example, sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the former Soviet camp). But Tanaka's use of the expression "New Middle Ages," which ignores salient features of the characteristics of the modern industrial civilization, cannot be the appropriate nomenclature with which to describe relationships among the affluent democracies of our times, since the name carries with it an inescapable image of the strife-ridden and stagnant centuries of Europe during the Middle Ages. What Huntington calls the "clash of civilizations" is in fact neither a clash between classic civilizations, nor between classic civilization and modern civilization. The conflicts that exist have, rather, arisen as a result of the diffusion worldwide of industrial civilization, and can be divided into three types. The first type of conflict is competition between institutions that are characteristic of most industrialized societies but which have taken divergent forms in different societies, due partly to having different social foundations formed by diverse cultural heritages long before industrialization, and partly also to differences in the timing of industrialization. As a result of the collapse of communism, in terms of economic and political systems, the market economy, taken in a broad sense, and liberal democracy have established themselves as the only feasible models for modernization. However, in practice there are wide variations between market economies and between systems of liberal democracy, and none can claim absolute superiority. Obviously there are no grounds for placing the American model of market economy and democracy ahead of all others. These institutional differences, however, are differences that exist within the common framework of modern industrial civilization, and as such cannot be considered to represent a clash between civilizations. While it may be exceedingly difficult for a process of mutual learning to occur when one mature classic civilization encounters another, it is quite possible that it will occur as a result of contacts between industrial societies with divergent institutions, and through such encounters, these societies may find they undergo economic or political revitalization, or both. To begin with, since modern industrial civilization is characterized by constant technological innovation, it cannot be expected to develop the same entrenched tendencies to preserve established ways of life that the mature classic civilizations exhibited. The positive results such a process of mutual learning can yield has been demonstrated most widely in relation to methods of quality control in factories--methods first developed in the United States were introduced into Japan, where they underwent considerable development and improvement, and were eventually re-exported back to the United States, where they contributed to improving the productivity of American manufacturers. Huntington errs when he presents institutional differences among the industrial nations as representing inter-civilizational confrontation, and thereby intentionally seals off the possibility that a society may become revitalized through mutual learning. It is still fresh in this writer's memory that until several years ago, Huntington was asserting forcefully that the worst threat to America in the post-Cold War era was Japanese economic power. Fortunately or not, his opinion has shifted, and today he sees the worst enemies as being China and the Islamic world. In the book now under review, Huntington emphasizes the need to develop links between Japan and the West, civilizations that are very different. Such a willful shift in the designation of principal enemies within such a short time span is concrete evidence of the extent of Huntington's confusion in defining what he means by "the clash of civilizations." Further, by regarding institutional differences as the cause of unavoidable conflict, Huntington's theory, if taken as a guide to policy-making, has the potential to become dangerously self-fulfilling, as pointed out earlier. There has been enough experience in US-Japan bilateral relations of exaggerated confrontation over economic and trade issues to give evidence of what could happen. The second type of conflict should be termed "confrontation" rather than "competition," and describes what occurs between "second sphere" states (as defined by Tanaka) that are in the process of achieving economic takeoff toward industrialization but which have not yet established well-developed political and economic systems of their own, and "first sphere" states, the developed democracies. This type of confrontation often involves trade friction caused by the inroads these newly industrializing countries, in their relentless efforts to catch up, have made into the manufacturing sectors of older economies that are built on standardized technologies, economic policy friction over how far and how fast economic liberalization should proceed, and ideological confrontation with respect to human rights and democratization. The leaders of China, Malaysia, and Singapore have been emphasizing "Asian values" and "Asia's own way of modernization," partly in protest against the West's criticism of these countries' human rights practices and Western demands for increased market access. In doing so, they are not expressing a position against modernization per se, nor are they confidently exalting the superiority of their "Asian values" or "Asia's own way of modernization." Rather, their real motives lie in these leaders' awareness of the weakness of their own countries' competitive position vis-a-vis the developed countries and of the need to provide protection for their home industries, and their fear that chaos may ensue if the traditional social order is swept away by the tides of modernization. In addition, although some Asian countries that are enjoying robust economic development have acquired a degree of confidence based on their achievements, at the same time they are especially sensitive to Western demands on human rights issues and economic liberalization because their memories of living under colonial rule are still fresh. This mechanism of confrontation and the thinking behind its manifestations are not essentially different from when Germany and Japan, both countries that modernized late and suffered severely during the Great Depression, used ideas and slogans such as "the superiority of the Aryan race" and "Liberate Asia from the White Man's Yoke" in their confrontation with the developed countries led by the United States and Great Britain. The Asian leaders who employ this strategy resemble Huntington in that they interpret (or pretend to interpret) confrontations caused by differences in stages of development toward modernization as inter-civilizational confrontation. Of course, there is one major difference between the Nazi Germany and militarist Japan of yesteryear and the East and Southeast Asian countries of today, in that there is hardly any possibility that another war on the scale of this century's two world wars will break out between the developed countries and these rapidly developing Asian nations. The third type of conflict is also better seen as a kind of confrontation rather than as competition. It takes the form of outbursts of radical criticisms against the affluent developed nations by disgruntled countries and regions that are unable to launch successful industrialization. To use the divisions proposed by Akihiko Tanaka, it is a confrontation between less developed members of the Modern Sphere who join forces with countries and regions of the Chaotic Sphere on the one hand, and the countries of the Neo-Medieval Sphere on the other. It is conceivable that this kind of radical movement could also be directed against some countries of the Modern and Chaotic Spheres against others of the same spheres, or by classes or tribes against more fortunate classes or different tribes within their own societies, but this aspect is outside the scope of the present analysis. Such radicalism often takes the form of religious fundamentalism of one kind or another, and is therefore liable to be mistaken for confrontation between classic and modern civilizations. It is perhaps due to this confusion in appearances that Huntington presents Islamic civilization, along with Chinese civilization, as posing the greatest threats to Western civilization. What stands out is that radical outbursts of anti-Western or anti-modern ideological movements do not occur unless the countries concerned do themselves have ambitions to develop a modern industrial civilization and are taking steps in that direction. Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, are both predominantly Islamic but are successfully industrializing. There are no visible signs of the emergence of a politically radical religious fundamentalism in these countries, in spite of the fact that they have running political and economic disputes with the developed countries. In the opinion of this writer, the so-called "Islamic Threat" will disappear naturally if the countries of the Islamic world succeed in the process of industrialization. This raises a question: Will Islamic civilization prove to be compatible with modern industrial civilization? It should be noted that launching an economic takeoff into industrialization has become easier in today's world, where investment and trading activities across national borders are reaching astounding levels, and where, moreover, with the era of colonialism behind us, there is no longer any fear of encroachment upon state sovereignty resulting from the influx of foreign capital. Granted there are some preconditions necessary for industrialization to be successful, such as the maintenance of domestic law and order to allow the market mechanism to function well, as well as the establishment of some basic economic rules, but there is no evidence to suggest that having the background of a particular classic civilization would render any society intrinsically unsuited to industrialization. At one time in the past, the Protestant work ethic was viewed as one cultural prerequisite for industrialization, but it should be remembered that although England, where the Industrial Revolution began, was predominantly Protestant, many of the other countries of Europe were in the nineteenth century predominantly Catholic, and this did not at all hinder industrialization. Japan's remarkable economic growth used to be explained by the reasoning that, among the Asian countries, the Japanese culture was exceptionally akin to that of the West. However, as neighboring countries like South Korea and Taiwan, which fall broadly into the sphere of Chinese civilization, have successively achieved astounding economic growth, Confucian civilization has been added to the list of the classic civilizations compatible with industrialization. Among Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines is largely Catholic, while Malaysia and Indonesia are predominantly Islamic, and Thailand is Hinayana Buddhist. Those scholars who have regarded Confucian civilization as the only one outside Western civilization that is compatible with industrialization have more often than not tried to explain the successful industrialization of these countries as a result of the contribution of overseas Chinese within the population. Indeed, the economic influence of the overseas Chinese should not be underestimated, but with the single exception of Singapore (whose population is 75.9 percent Chinese), it is plain that these Asian countries would not have been able to develop their national economies by relying solely on the small segment of their populations comprised of resident Chinese. It seems quite likely that both Malaysia and Indonesia will follow in Turkey's footsteps to become some of the first representatives of the Islamic civilization not totally dependent on oil and gas to succeed in fully-fledged industrialization. India will surely also provide further proof that the cultural characteristics of a specific classic civilization do not necessarily place serious constraints on industrialization. While the remnants of the traditional caste system still have a strong influence, India is now turning away from its former protectionist economic policies aimed at import substitution and embracing a new approach, appearing ready to implement an open-door economic policy aimed at export-driven economic growth. It is true that Islamic civilization as manifested in Middle Eastern countries has a much more constrained attitude toward the people's lifestyle and the organization of social order in general than in Indonesia or Malaysia, and for this reason industrialization may perhaps take longer to achieve. However, this does not mean that Islamic civilization is in fundamental conflict with industrialization per se. Every classic civilization has some aspects which conflict with aspects of modern industrial civilization, and each faces the threat of disintegration caused by the relentless progress of industrialization.
The clash of civilizations internalized Huntington asserts that, during the nineteenth century, confrontation among the major powers of Western civilization was centered on conflict between nation-states. He depicts the situation after the end of the Cold War as one in which a multipolar and multi-civilizational world is emerging for the first time in the history of mankind. But if, as Huntington also asserts, Russia did not belong to the sphere of Western civilization, but instead constituted the core state of the Orthodox civilization, then major wars of the nineteenth century such as the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War included among the belligerents some of the principal powers identified with different classic civilizations, and cannot therefore, by definition, be described simply as conflicts between nation-states that belong to the Western world. Furthermore, if we are to use Huntington's criteria for membership of the Western civilization--that a nation was fundamentally a democracy with mechanisms for effectively controlling the exercise of power--then Germany cannot be said to have become a full member until after World War II. Of course Japan, which does not belong to Western civilization, was a principal participant in World War II. This highlights the fact that confrontation between major powers from different civilizational backgrounds has never been purely a post-Cold War phenomenon. And, as has already been pointed out, the most violent clashes between civilizations manifested themselves when modern industrial civilization, which developed first in the West, came into direct contact with the pre-modern classic civilizations of the non-Western world. For all the reasons given in the foregoing pages, it is the opinion of this author that Huntington's assertion that the post-Cold War world will be the stage for confrontations among civilizations is a concept fundamentally in error. This does not mean, however, that the "End of History" has arrived, as Francis Fukuyama asserts, nor that "the clash of civilizations" has disappeared forever. The most serious type of inter-civilizational clash manifests itself today in the form of an identity crisis deep inside an individual's own mind. Huntington claims that over the last century ordinary people have shifted away from their identification with and loyalty to the nation-state, first toward various ideologies, and now toward particular civilizations, but the situation is not as simple as it appears on the surface. Modern industrial civilization, which is characterized by anthropocentricism, an overblown expectation that mankind will apply its rational abilities in dealing with the world, and a denial of spiritual matters, cannot give positive meaning to life, nor can it fully quench man's spiritual thirst. No new religious system totally different from the classic major religions has been established; instead, a variety of new religious movements, including many cult groups, merely recycle the framework of the classic religions, or parts of their teachings. In this sense, it could be said that a peaceful and stable spiritual life cannot be achieved by those living within modern industrial civilization. However, for the citizens of the contemporary world who have already tasted the enticing advantages of industrial civilization, it is no longer possible to go back to the world of the pre-modern classic civilization. Even devoted environmentalists, who express their concern over how mankind is causing the extinction of many species, do not oppose the extinction of micro-organisms such as those that cause the bubonic plague and cholera and that are harmful to man, nor do most of them want to go back to the enforced self-sufficiency of the pre-industrial era and a way of living that lacks electricity, city gas, railroads, and automobiles. At the same time, no matter how easy and commonplace it becomes to move and act across national borders, it will remain impossible for most people to transcend linguistic and cultural differences, or freely move their place of abode. On the contrary, the more frequent one's direct contact with different cultures, the more aware one becomes of one's own cultural identity. Yet, as part of the same process, the progress of modernization will destroy the established forms of individual cultures and hollow them out. That in the contemporary world mankind can neither live happily within modern civilization nor return to pre-modern culture, and is therefore destined to suffer from ever-more ambiguous problems of identity, is the essence of inter-civilizational clash. It has become minutely subdivided, internalized, and fallen into a state where there is no resolution in sight. That Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man ends on a pessimistic note is no accident. On the other hand, Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations appears superficial, even optimistic, despite its negative predictions about the future of world politics, because it fails to recognize this most fundamental inter-civilizational conflict.
Notes
1. Among the critical reactions to Huntington's treatise, the following papers are of especially excellent quality and have been of great assistance to me. John Ikenberry, "Just Like the Rest," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March-April 1997), pp. 162-3; Donald J. Puchala, "International Encounters of Another Kind," Global Society, January 1997; and Stephen M. Walt, "Building Up New Bogeyman," Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 177-89.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), p. 43.
The Clash of Civilizations: A View from Japan
Seizaburo Sato
http://www.sbpark.com/inn60.html