<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Below are excerpts from the Economist Magazine. The Economist is the unofficial voice of the London based Bankers that control a majority of the world's media, natural resources and food supplies. The article reveals that the rise of the EU depends on the collapse of America and the use of Obama as their surrogate, to 'threaten massive nuclear retaliation' against Russia. The article clearly states that the EU intends to re-instate the Czar among other things. Some may say its just a speculative article. I say it is not. It appears to be the official EU blueprint for the next 50 years. In my view, it is obvious that any nation or person who stands in the way of this agenda will be dealt with accordingly. Vibrant nations of America, China, Russia and India, all economically and militarily powerful and Nationalist in nature, seem to be the greatest threats to the EU agenda.
The European Union at 100
Is the best yet to come?
LIKE anybody nearing a 50th birthday, the European Union needs a makeover. But as this special report has suggested, the past two years' talk of a deep crisis is overblown. The union is functioning as well (or as badly) as it did before French and Dutch voters rejected the constitution.
The efforts by the Germans to use their stint in the EU president's chair to resuscitate the constitution may thus be as mistaken as the fatuous logo they have chosen (above). It is possible that an agreement may be reached on a minimalist treaty, but it depends on a string of heroic assumptions: that Mr Sarkozy wins the French presidency; that the Poles can be bullied into accepting institutional change; that some way can be found to buy off Britain; and that almost everybody can avoid referendums. Since at least one of these assumptions is likely to prove wrong, the odds of a successful deal on the constitution seem low.
Rather than harping on institutional reform that may never happen, the EU should concentrate on things it can achieve. That means putting forward sound policies in fields such as the environment; continuing the union's enlargement to take in the western Balkans and, ultimately, Turkey; and doing more work, both in Brussels and in national capitals, to engage citizens in the project. Above all, it means taking advantage of the present recovery to push through economic reforms.
The future of the EU is hard to predict. Over the next decade or so it could undergo a burst of further integration; it could fall apart into opposing camps of those who would go forward and those who would go back; or, perhaps most likely, it could just muddle through. So how might it look in 50 years' time?
A centenary celebration, 2057
The EU is celebrating its 100th birthday with quiet satisfaction. Predictions when it turned 50 that it was doomed to irrelevance in a world dominated by America, China and India proved wide of the mark. A turning-point was the bursting of America's housing bubble and the collapse of the dollar early in the presidency of Barack Obama in 2010. But even more crucial were Germany's and France's efforts later in that decade, under Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy respectively, to push through economic reforms.
These reforms produced a sharp fall in unemployment just as Europe began to enjoy a productivity spurt from the spread of information technology. The eventual result was a growing labour shortage, which was not resolved until the arrival of Turkey and Ukraine as full members in 2025. The accession soon afterwards of the first north African country, Morocco, helped to prolong Europe's boom.
Of course it was not all plain sailing. The great Italian crisis of 2015, when the government of Gianfranco Fini quit the single currency just as David Miliband's Britain was about to join, cast a long shadow. Yet although Italian bondholders took a hit from the subsequent default and Italy's economy was soon overtaken by Spain's, financial markets proved forgiving, and the government of Walter Veltroni managed to rejoin the euro fairly quickly. Since then no country has been tempted to repeat Italy's painful experiment.
The other cause for quiet satisfaction has been the EU's foreign policy. In the dangerous second decade of the century, when Vladimir Putin returned for a third term as Russian president and stood poised to invade Ukraine, it was the EU that pushed the Obama administration to threaten massive nuclear retaliation. The Ukraine crisis became a triumph for the EU foreign minister, Carl Bildt, prompting the decision to go for a further big round of enlargement. It was ironic that, less than a decade later, Russia itself lodged its first formal application for membership.
At the same time politicians in Brussels and Washington, grappling with the blocked Middle East peace process, had a eureka moment. EU membership had worked, eventually, in Cyprus, which was reunified in 2024; why not try it again? So it was that Israel and Palestine became the EU's 49th and 50th members.
The big challenge now is what to do about Russia. Its application has been pending for 15 years. Some say that it is too big, too poor and not European enough to join. But now that the tsar has been symbolically restored, Russia has an impeccably democratic government. A previous tsar saved Europe from Napoleon nearly 250 years ago. It would be apt to mark the anniversary by welcoming Russia back into the European fold.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
The European Union at 100
Is the best yet to come?
LIKE anybody nearing a 50th birthday, the European Union needs a makeover. But as this special report has suggested, the past two years' talk of a deep crisis is overblown. The union is functioning as well (or as badly) as it did before French and Dutch voters rejected the constitution.
The efforts by the Germans to use their stint in the EU president's chair to resuscitate the constitution may thus be as mistaken as the fatuous logo they have chosen (above). It is possible that an agreement may be reached on a minimalist treaty, but it depends on a string of heroic assumptions: that Mr Sarkozy wins the French presidency; that the Poles can be bullied into accepting institutional change; that some way can be found to buy off Britain; and that almost everybody can avoid referendums. Since at least one of these assumptions is likely to prove wrong, the odds of a successful deal on the constitution seem low.
Rather than harping on institutional reform that may never happen, the EU should concentrate on things it can achieve. That means putting forward sound policies in fields such as the environment; continuing the union's enlargement to take in the western Balkans and, ultimately, Turkey; and doing more work, both in Brussels and in national capitals, to engage citizens in the project. Above all, it means taking advantage of the present recovery to push through economic reforms.
The future of the EU is hard to predict. Over the next decade or so it could undergo a burst of further integration; it could fall apart into opposing camps of those who would go forward and those who would go back; or, perhaps most likely, it could just muddle through. So how might it look in 50 years' time?
A centenary celebration, 2057
The EU is celebrating its 100th birthday with quiet satisfaction. Predictions when it turned 50 that it was doomed to irrelevance in a world dominated by America, China and India proved wide of the mark. A turning-point was the bursting of America's housing bubble and the collapse of the dollar early in the presidency of Barack Obama in 2010. But even more crucial were Germany's and France's efforts later in that decade, under Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy respectively, to push through economic reforms.
These reforms produced a sharp fall in unemployment just as Europe began to enjoy a productivity spurt from the spread of information technology. The eventual result was a growing labour shortage, which was not resolved until the arrival of Turkey and Ukraine as full members in 2025. The accession soon afterwards of the first north African country, Morocco, helped to prolong Europe's boom.
Of course it was not all plain sailing. The great Italian crisis of 2015, when the government of Gianfranco Fini quit the single currency just as David Miliband's Britain was about to join, cast a long shadow. Yet although Italian bondholders took a hit from the subsequent default and Italy's economy was soon overtaken by Spain's, financial markets proved forgiving, and the government of Walter Veltroni managed to rejoin the euro fairly quickly. Since then no country has been tempted to repeat Italy's painful experiment.
The other cause for quiet satisfaction has been the EU's foreign policy. In the dangerous second decade of the century, when Vladimir Putin returned for a third term as Russian president and stood poised to invade Ukraine, it was the EU that pushed the Obama administration to threaten massive nuclear retaliation. The Ukraine crisis became a triumph for the EU foreign minister, Carl Bildt, prompting the decision to go for a further big round of enlargement. It was ironic that, less than a decade later, Russia itself lodged its first formal application for membership.
At the same time politicians in Brussels and Washington, grappling with the blocked Middle East peace process, had a eureka moment. EU membership had worked, eventually, in Cyprus, which was reunified in 2024; why not try it again? So it was that Israel and Palestine became the EU's 49th and 50th members.
The big challenge now is what to do about Russia. Its application has been pending for 15 years. Some say that it is too big, too poor and not European enough to join. But now that the tsar has been symbolically restored, Russia has an impeccably democratic government. A previous tsar saved Europe from Napoleon nearly 250 years ago. It would be apt to mark the anniversary by welcoming Russia back into the European fold.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->