07-24-2004, 04:07 PM
The only good Rabid Dog is a DEAD one, destroy TSP Army.
Nuclear nightmare -- Israel has threatened attack if Pakistan does not denuke, and we cannot remain silent any longer
23 July 2004: Soon after Israel bombed Iraqâs Osirak reactor, it asked India for landing permission or refueling facility for its warplanes to blow up Pakistanâs Kahuta nuclear laboratory, the only active or known Pakistani atomic installation in the early-Eighties. While normally a hawk against Pakistan, Indira Gandhi, who was then in power, refused permission. To this day, it is not very clear why she said no.
It may be that the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, she had not condemned it, and, therefore, gotten on the wrong side of the United States, which set up the mujahideen against the Soviets with Pakistan as a âfrontlineâ ally. While Israel was the USâs long-term strategic ally, she may not have wished to take chances with its bombing Kahuta, because America would take it as impeding the war effort against the Soviet Union. Sorting out Israel would come later, if at all, but the US could turn viciously against India, more vicious that in Nixonâs time during the Bangladesh War, as Pakistan would goad it to extreme action.
What that action could be is again unclear, because it couldnât be war. The US couldnât fool around then with a war with India because Israel had bombed Kahuta from an Indian base. Still, contrary to her nature, Mrs Gandhi fought shy, not giving Israel the permission. Maybe she was consolidating herself domestically, after a gap of Janata rule, and some kind of precedent had been set by the Janata government under Morarji Desai. As we know now, Indian intelligence had warned that Pakistan was rapidly weaponising, and both Morarji and his foreign minister, A.B.Vajpayee, were against building a deterrent as counter. That deterrent was finally in place in 1988. Perhaps Mrs Gandhi was not entirely sure how an India-assisted Israeli attack on Kahuta would pan out. Maybe she was convinced that the attack wouldnât stop Pakistan but determine it further to build a deterrent against India, as eventually happened.
What is the relevance of twenty-year-old events now? Because in secret talks with Pakistan over the last three months (Intelligence, âIsrael warns strike against Pak N-assets,â 22 July 2004), Israel has threatened to strike at Pakistanâs nuclear assets, convinced that Pakistan is proliferating apace through A.Q.Khanâs nuclear blackmarket. No one is buying the Pakistani plea that Khan, the so-called âFather of the Pak Bomb,â has been defanged, well and truly locked up, and his blackmarket, at least the Pakistan end of it, smashed. The Japanese, one of Pakistanâs largest donors, and very touchy about proliferation issues, demanded and got Khanâs interrogation report, but seeing parts of it excerpted in the Pakistani press have come to believe it to be faked up.
The Israeli intelligence is surer that Khan and his nuclear network survive on. Diplomats privy to the secret Israeli-Pakistani talks, but refusing to give details, say Israel dreads that Pakistani nuclear materials may move to Iran, whose late Ayatollah Khomeini gave a fatwa for the obliteration of Israel. When moderate civilian governments have been in power in Iran, a hands-off policy towards Israel has been practiced, but in longer rules of hardline clerics, as now, under Ali Khamenei, hostilities have been revisited with the Jewish state. While diplomats wonât say what would provoke Pakistan to arm Iran with its nuclear arsenal, given the instability in their own bilateral relations, Israel has assumed that as fact, and threatened Pakistan with retaliation.
Striking at the heart of Pakistanâs nuclear assets wonât be as easy or successful as it would have been in the early-Eighties, when Pakistan had not weaponised, and Kahuta was its principal nuclear facility. Now, Pakistan is fully weaponised, its nuclear warheads and missiles dispersed to war-ready locations, but Israel wants to send a tough message with a strike, and Pakistan evidently fears enough of it to want to sue for peace. An air strike is not the only option, Pakistan is in dread of Israeli intelligence sabotage.
Either Israel or Pakistan or both approached the United States to deter the other, and while America has played blind to the real truths of the A.Q.Khan network, Israel is not letting it easy. During the US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitageâs visit to Pakistan, General Parvez Musharraf pointedly asked for the loan or sale of US nuclear submarines so that Pakistan could wind up its land-based nuclear forces (Intelligence, Pak asks US for nuclear submarines,â 20 July 2004). Musharraf said a sea-based deterrent was securer, which it is, but since this also implied a security gap in Pakistanâs land-based forces, Armitage asked if these were well secured, and the generalissimo naturally said yes.
But over three days, as Reuters reported the day before, Pakistani and American officials have met in the US to determine the security of Pakistanâs nuclear programme. In the course of Armitageâs Pakistan visit, diplomats also said Pakistan was under pressure to sign a maintainability agreement with the US, whereby Pakistan would give full or partial custody of its nuclear weapons to the US. Since 9/ 11, this denouement has been predicted, with side suggestions that Musharraf has also asked the Chinese to safekeep his weapons in case of a war with India. But this time, there is an edge of desperation, the desperation on Pakistanâs side, because Israel is a nasty enemy to make, although Musharraf is playing for time, as from his suggestion to Armitage â harebrained as it would seem â to give him nuclear submarines.
This magazine cannot say how much India is privy to these desperate and menacing Pakistan-US-Israel parleys. If it is privy, it is certainly playing no role, none that is noticeable, at any rate. This country has practised considerable self-deception about Pakistanâs nuclear programme, right since the time Morarji Desai and Vajpayee said no to weaponising in 1979 (although the cabinet committee on security overruled them), followed by Mrs Gandhiâs nyet to Israel.
When Pakistan went overtly nuclear after the six Chagai tests in May 1998, it was the considered opinion of key Indian defence analysts that Pakistanâs bombs were Americaâs problem, not Indiaâs. Since America and the other four P-5 powers were committed to non-proliferation (barring China, perhaps), it was their problem to contain Pakistan, and that India, by that twisted logic, would ultimately benefits from such containment.
Soon, we knew that Pakistanâs arsenals were a menace to us more than to the P-5, because using the nuclear overhang, Pakistan increased the terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, and made bold to strike in Kargil, less than a year after the Pokhran explosions. Not content, Pakistan turned to nuclear blackmail, saying that if the J and K dispute was not resolved, it could escalate to war and a horrible nuclear confrontation. This scenario came very close to reality in January 2002 and mid-2002 when India mobilised troops completely to the Pakistan border in retaliation for the Pakistani terrorist attack on Houses of Parliament.
In the subsequent cooling off, Pakistan stopped the nuclear blackmail, and India became more studiedly indifferent to its weapons, as though they were in faraway Latin America or in Mars. So indifferent did we choose to be that the worst disclosures of A.Q.Khanâs proliferation elicited not a worthwhile comment from the Indian side. It was as if A.Q.Khanâs proliferation was of no concern to us, although, privately, we were terrified as hell, as evidenced by all the intelligence-sharing with the US on the North-Korean axis of Khanâs nuclear blackmarket.
In a sense, Israel has exploded into the open the dangers of Pakistani proliferation, and it calls for some Indian response. Pakistanâs insecure nuclear programme is not only a nightmare for America, Israel and all non-rouge states but India as well. We cannot turn a blind eye to our neighbourâs misdoing, because it threatens our security most. Since a peace process is on with Pakistan, our response has to be cool but firm, and it makes eminent good sense to secretly engage with the US and Israel on this. Without risking its nuclear deterrent, which is primarily aimed at China (Commentary, âDealing with China,â 21 July 2004), India should contribute to the US-Israeli effort to denuke Pakistan. As an MNNA ally of the US, Pakistan has nothing to fear from India anymore. Its nuclear weapons are redundant for its security. On the other hand, its arsenals have become a nightmare for the world.
Nuclear nightmare -- Israel has threatened attack if Pakistan does not denuke, and we cannot remain silent any longer
23 July 2004: Soon after Israel bombed Iraqâs Osirak reactor, it asked India for landing permission or refueling facility for its warplanes to blow up Pakistanâs Kahuta nuclear laboratory, the only active or known Pakistani atomic installation in the early-Eighties. While normally a hawk against Pakistan, Indira Gandhi, who was then in power, refused permission. To this day, it is not very clear why she said no.
It may be that the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan, she had not condemned it, and, therefore, gotten on the wrong side of the United States, which set up the mujahideen against the Soviets with Pakistan as a âfrontlineâ ally. While Israel was the USâs long-term strategic ally, she may not have wished to take chances with its bombing Kahuta, because America would take it as impeding the war effort against the Soviet Union. Sorting out Israel would come later, if at all, but the US could turn viciously against India, more vicious that in Nixonâs time during the Bangladesh War, as Pakistan would goad it to extreme action.
What that action could be is again unclear, because it couldnât be war. The US couldnât fool around then with a war with India because Israel had bombed Kahuta from an Indian base. Still, contrary to her nature, Mrs Gandhi fought shy, not giving Israel the permission. Maybe she was consolidating herself domestically, after a gap of Janata rule, and some kind of precedent had been set by the Janata government under Morarji Desai. As we know now, Indian intelligence had warned that Pakistan was rapidly weaponising, and both Morarji and his foreign minister, A.B.Vajpayee, were against building a deterrent as counter. That deterrent was finally in place in 1988. Perhaps Mrs Gandhi was not entirely sure how an India-assisted Israeli attack on Kahuta would pan out. Maybe she was convinced that the attack wouldnât stop Pakistan but determine it further to build a deterrent against India, as eventually happened.
What is the relevance of twenty-year-old events now? Because in secret talks with Pakistan over the last three months (Intelligence, âIsrael warns strike against Pak N-assets,â 22 July 2004), Israel has threatened to strike at Pakistanâs nuclear assets, convinced that Pakistan is proliferating apace through A.Q.Khanâs nuclear blackmarket. No one is buying the Pakistani plea that Khan, the so-called âFather of the Pak Bomb,â has been defanged, well and truly locked up, and his blackmarket, at least the Pakistan end of it, smashed. The Japanese, one of Pakistanâs largest donors, and very touchy about proliferation issues, demanded and got Khanâs interrogation report, but seeing parts of it excerpted in the Pakistani press have come to believe it to be faked up.
The Israeli intelligence is surer that Khan and his nuclear network survive on. Diplomats privy to the secret Israeli-Pakistani talks, but refusing to give details, say Israel dreads that Pakistani nuclear materials may move to Iran, whose late Ayatollah Khomeini gave a fatwa for the obliteration of Israel. When moderate civilian governments have been in power in Iran, a hands-off policy towards Israel has been practiced, but in longer rules of hardline clerics, as now, under Ali Khamenei, hostilities have been revisited with the Jewish state. While diplomats wonât say what would provoke Pakistan to arm Iran with its nuclear arsenal, given the instability in their own bilateral relations, Israel has assumed that as fact, and threatened Pakistan with retaliation.
Striking at the heart of Pakistanâs nuclear assets wonât be as easy or successful as it would have been in the early-Eighties, when Pakistan had not weaponised, and Kahuta was its principal nuclear facility. Now, Pakistan is fully weaponised, its nuclear warheads and missiles dispersed to war-ready locations, but Israel wants to send a tough message with a strike, and Pakistan evidently fears enough of it to want to sue for peace. An air strike is not the only option, Pakistan is in dread of Israeli intelligence sabotage.
Either Israel or Pakistan or both approached the United States to deter the other, and while America has played blind to the real truths of the A.Q.Khan network, Israel is not letting it easy. During the US deputy secretary of state, Richard Armitageâs visit to Pakistan, General Parvez Musharraf pointedly asked for the loan or sale of US nuclear submarines so that Pakistan could wind up its land-based nuclear forces (Intelligence, Pak asks US for nuclear submarines,â 20 July 2004). Musharraf said a sea-based deterrent was securer, which it is, but since this also implied a security gap in Pakistanâs land-based forces, Armitage asked if these were well secured, and the generalissimo naturally said yes.
But over three days, as Reuters reported the day before, Pakistani and American officials have met in the US to determine the security of Pakistanâs nuclear programme. In the course of Armitageâs Pakistan visit, diplomats also said Pakistan was under pressure to sign a maintainability agreement with the US, whereby Pakistan would give full or partial custody of its nuclear weapons to the US. Since 9/ 11, this denouement has been predicted, with side suggestions that Musharraf has also asked the Chinese to safekeep his weapons in case of a war with India. But this time, there is an edge of desperation, the desperation on Pakistanâs side, because Israel is a nasty enemy to make, although Musharraf is playing for time, as from his suggestion to Armitage â harebrained as it would seem â to give him nuclear submarines.
This magazine cannot say how much India is privy to these desperate and menacing Pakistan-US-Israel parleys. If it is privy, it is certainly playing no role, none that is noticeable, at any rate. This country has practised considerable self-deception about Pakistanâs nuclear programme, right since the time Morarji Desai and Vajpayee said no to weaponising in 1979 (although the cabinet committee on security overruled them), followed by Mrs Gandhiâs nyet to Israel.
When Pakistan went overtly nuclear after the six Chagai tests in May 1998, it was the considered opinion of key Indian defence analysts that Pakistanâs bombs were Americaâs problem, not Indiaâs. Since America and the other four P-5 powers were committed to non-proliferation (barring China, perhaps), it was their problem to contain Pakistan, and that India, by that twisted logic, would ultimately benefits from such containment.
Soon, we knew that Pakistanâs arsenals were a menace to us more than to the P-5, because using the nuclear overhang, Pakistan increased the terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, and made bold to strike in Kargil, less than a year after the Pokhran explosions. Not content, Pakistan turned to nuclear blackmail, saying that if the J and K dispute was not resolved, it could escalate to war and a horrible nuclear confrontation. This scenario came very close to reality in January 2002 and mid-2002 when India mobilised troops completely to the Pakistan border in retaliation for the Pakistani terrorist attack on Houses of Parliament.
In the subsequent cooling off, Pakistan stopped the nuclear blackmail, and India became more studiedly indifferent to its weapons, as though they were in faraway Latin America or in Mars. So indifferent did we choose to be that the worst disclosures of A.Q.Khanâs proliferation elicited not a worthwhile comment from the Indian side. It was as if A.Q.Khanâs proliferation was of no concern to us, although, privately, we were terrified as hell, as evidenced by all the intelligence-sharing with the US on the North-Korean axis of Khanâs nuclear blackmarket.
In a sense, Israel has exploded into the open the dangers of Pakistani proliferation, and it calls for some Indian response. Pakistanâs insecure nuclear programme is not only a nightmare for America, Israel and all non-rouge states but India as well. We cannot turn a blind eye to our neighbourâs misdoing, because it threatens our security most. Since a peace process is on with Pakistan, our response has to be cool but firm, and it makes eminent good sense to secretly engage with the US and Israel on this. Without risking its nuclear deterrent, which is primarily aimed at China (Commentary, âDealing with China,â 21 July 2004), India should contribute to the US-Israeli effort to denuke Pakistan. As an MNNA ally of the US, Pakistan has nothing to fear from India anymore. Its nuclear weapons are redundant for its security. On the other hand, its arsenals have become a nightmare for the world.