Why Was There No Tranfer Of Population?

[G.Subramaniam]

The basis of their talks was the offer made by Mr. Rajagopalachariar to Mr. Jinnah in April 1944
which, according to the somewhat incredible 20[f.20] story told by Mr. Rajagopalachariar, was
discussed by him with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 when he (Mr. Gandhi) was fasting in gaol and to
which Mr. Gandhi had given his full approval. The following is the text of Mr. Rajagopalachariar's
formula popularly spoken of as the C. R. Formula:—
(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim
League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period.
(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous
districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority.
In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage
or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the
majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision
shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join
either State.
(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.
(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence,
and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.
(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.
(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility
for the governance of India.
The talks which began on the 9th September were carried on over a period of 18 days till 27th
September when it was announced that the talks had failed. The failure of the talks produced
different reactions in the minds of different people. Some were glad, others were sorry. But as both
had been, just previous to the talks, worsted by their opponents in their struggle for supremacy,
Gandhi by the British and Jinnah by the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and had lost a good deal of
their credit the majority of people expected that they would put forth some constructive effort to
bring about a solution. The failure may have been due to the defects of personalities. But it must
however be said that failure was inevitable having regard to certain fundamental faults in the C. R.
Formula. In the first place, it tied up the communal question with the political question in an
indissoluble knot. No political settlement, no communal settlement, is the strategy on which the
formula proceeds. The formula did not offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah to enter into a deal. It
was a bargain—" If you help us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider your proposal
for Pakistan. " I don't know from where Mr. Rajagopalachariar got the idea that this was the best
means of getting independence. It is possible that he borrowed it from the old Hindu kings of India
who built up alliance for protecting their independence against foreign enemies by giving their
daughters to neighbouring princes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar forgot that such alliances brought neither
a good husband nor a permanent ally. To make communal settlement depend upon help rendered in
winning freedom is a very unwise way of proceeding in a matter of this kind. It is a way of one
party drawing another party into its net by offering communal privileges as a bait. The C. R.
Formula made communal settlement an article for sale.
The second fault in the C. R. Formula relates to the machinery for giving effect to any agreement
that may be arrived at. The agency suggested in the C. R. Formula is the Provisional Government.
In suggesting this Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously overlooked two difficulties. The first thing he
overlooked is that once the Provisional Government was established, the promises of the
contracting parties, to use legal phraseology, did not remain concurrent promises. The case became
one of the executed promise against an executory promise. By consenting to the establishment of a
Provisional Government, the League would have executed its promise to help the Congress to win
independence. But the promise of the Congress to bring about Pakistan would remain executory.
Mr. Jinnah who insists, and quite rightly, that the promises should be concurrent could never be
expected to agree to place himself in such a position. The second difficulty which Mr.
Rajagopalachariar has overlooked is what would happen if the Provisional Government failed to
give effect to the Congress part of the agreement. Who is to enforce it ? The Provisional
Government is to be a sovereign government, not subject to superior authority. If it was unwilling
to give effect to the agreement, the only sanction open to the Muslims would be rebellion. To make
the Provisional Government the agency for forging a new Constitution, for bringing about Pakistan,
nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution.
The only way of bringing about the constitutional changes will be through an Act of Parliament
embodying provisions agreed upon by the important elements in the national life of British India.
There is no other way.
There is a third fault in the C. R. Formula. It relates to the provision for a treaty between Pakistan
and Hindustan to safeguard what are called matters of common interests such as Defence, Foreign
Affairs, Customs, etc. Here again Mr. Rajagopalachariar does not seem to be aware of obvious
difficulties. How are matters of common interest to be safeguarded? I see only two ways. One is to
have a Central Government vested with Executive and Legislative authority in respect of these
matters. This means Pakistan and Hindustan will not be sovereign States. Will Mr. Jinnah agree to
this ? Obviously he does not. The other way is to make Pakistan and Hindustan sovereign States
and to bind them by a treaty relating to matters of common interests. But what is there to ensure
that the terms of the treaty will be observed ? As a sovereign State Pakistan can always repudiate it
even if it was a Dominion. Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously drew his inspiration in drafting this
clause from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. But he forgot the fact that the treaty lasted so long as
Ireland was not a Dominion and that as soon as it became a Dominion it repudiated the treaty and
the British Parliament stood silent and grinned, for it knew that it could do nothing.
One does not mind very much that the talks failed. What one feels sorry for is that the talks failed
giving us a clear idea of some of the questions about which Mr. Jinnah has been observing discreet
silence in his public utterances, though he has been quite outspoken about them in his private talks.
These questions are— (1) Is Pakistan to be conceded because of the Resolution of the Muslim
League ? (2) Are the Muslims, as distinguished from the Muslim League, to have no say in the
matter ? (3) What will be the boundaries of Pakistan ? Whether the boundaries will be the present
administrative boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal or whether the boundaries of Pakistan will be
ethnological boundaries ? (4) What do the words " subject to such territorial adjustments as may be
necessary " which occur in the Lahore Resolution mean ? What were the territorial adjustments the
League had in mind ? (5) What does the word " finally " which occurs in the last part of the Lahore
Resolution mean ? Did the League contemplate a transition period in which Pakistan will not be an
independent and sovereign State ? (6) If Mr. Jinnah's proposal that the boundaries of Eastern and
Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries, will he allow the Scheduled
Castes, or, if I may say so, the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal to determine by a plebiscite
whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan and whether Mr. Jinnah would be
prepared to abide by the results of the plebiscite of the non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and
Bengal ?
(7) Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through U. P. and Bihar to connect up Eastern
Pakistan to Western Pakistan ? It would have been a great gain if straight questions had been put to
Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained. But instead of coming to grips with Mr. Jinnah on
these questions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R. Formula is substantially the
same as the League's Lahore Resolution—which was ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby lost
the best opportunity he had of having these questions clarified.
After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket
match do after their game is over, as though there is nothing further to be done. There is no
indication whether they will meet again and if so when. What next ? is not a question which seems
to worry them. Yet it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution
of the question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions about
which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to be found. How ? It
must be by agreement or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it must be the result of
negotiations—of give and take and not of surrender by one side to the other. That is not agreement.
It is dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail and parties may come to an agreement. But
agreement may turn out to be a very dilatory way. It may take long before good sense prevails.
How long one cannot say. The political freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be
postponed and yet without a solution of the communal problem it cannot be hastened. To make it
dependent on agreement is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expeditious method must
be found. It seems to me that arbitration by an International Board is the best way out. The disputed
points in the minorities problem including that of Pakistan should be remitted to such a Board. The
Board should be constituted of persons drawn from countries outside the British Empire. Each
statutory minority in India—Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Indian Christians—should be
asked to select its nominee to this Board of Arbitration. These minorities as also the Hindus should
appear before the Board in support of their demands and should agree to abide by the decision
given by the Board. The British should give the following undertakings :—
(1) That they will have nothing to do with the communal settlement. It will be left to agreement or
to a Board of Arbitration.
(2) They will implement the decision of the Board of Arbitration on the communal question by
embodying it in the Government of India Act.
(3) That the award of the International Board of Arbitration would be regarded by them as a
sufficient discharge of their obligations to the minorities in India and would agree to give India
Dominion Status.
The procedure has many advantages. It eliminates the fear of British interference in the communal
settlement which has been offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able to settle the
communal problem. It is alleged that, as there is always the possibility of the minorities getting
from the British something more than what the Congress thinks it proper to give, the minorities do
not wish to come to terms with the Congress. The proposal has a second advantage. It removes the
objection of the Congress that by making the constitution subject to the consent of the minorities,
the British Government has placed a veto in the hands, of the minorities over the constitutional
progress of India. It is complained that the minorities can unreasonably withhold their consent or
they can be prevailed upon by the British Government to withhold their consent as the minorities
are suspected by the Congress to be mere tools in the hands of the British Government.
International arbitration removes completely every ground of complaint on this account. There
should be no objection on the part of the minorities. If their demands are fair and just no minority
need have any fear from a Board of International Arbitration. There is nothing unfair in the
requirement of a submission to arbitration. It follows the well known rule of law, namely, that no
man should be allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is no reason to make any exception in
the case of a minority. Like an individual it cannot claim to sit in judgement over its own case.
What about the British Government ? I cannot see any reason why the British Government should
object to any part of this scheme. The Communal Award has brought great odium on the British. It
has been a thankless task and the British should be glad to be relieved of it. On the question of the
discharge of their responsibilities for making adequate provision for the safety and security of
certain communities in respect of which they have regarded themselves as trustees before they
relinquish their sovereignty what more can such communities ask than the implantation in the
constitution of safeguards in terms of the award of an International Board of Arbitration ? There is
only one contingency which may appear to create some difficulty for the British Government in the
matter of enforcing the award of the Board of Arbitration. Such a contingency can arise if any one
of the parties to the dispute is not prepared to submit its case to arbitration.
In that case the question will be: will the British Government be justified in enforcing the award
against such a party ? I see no difficulty in saying that the British Government can with perfect
justice proceed to enforce the award against such a party. After all what is the status of a party
which refuses to submit its case to arbitration ? The answer is that such a party is an aggressor.
How is an aggressor dealt with ? By subjecting him to sanctions. Implementing the award of the
Board of Arbitration in a constitution against a party which refuses to go to arbitration is simply
another name for the process of applying sanctions against an aggressor. The British Government
need not feel embarrassed in following this process if the contingency should arise. For it is a well
recognized process of dealing with such cases and has the imprimatur of the League of Nations
which evolved this formula when Mussolini refused to submit to arbitration his dispute with
Abyssinia. What I have proposed may not be the answer to the question : What next ? I don't know
what else can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without an answer. It must be
decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties concerned.