04-10-2004, 03:18 PM
IV
I do not claim any originality for the solution I have proposed. The ideas which underlie it are
drawn from three sources, from the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket presided, from
the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It
will be seen that my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of pooled wisdom. Will it be
accepted ? There are four ways of resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of
Pakistan. First is that the British Government should act as the deciding authority. Second is that
the Hindus and the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an International Board of
Arbitration and the fourth is to fight it out by a Civil War.
Although India today is a political mad-house there are I hope enough sane people in the country
who would not allow matters to reach the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect of an agreement
between political leaders in the near future. The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a
meeting in Allahabad held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat Narayan Lal resolved 16
[f16] not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan. Two other ways are left to have the problem solved.
One is by the people concerned ; the other is by international arbitration. This is the way I have
suggested. I prefer the former. For various reasons this seems to me the only right course. The
leaders having failed to resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the people for decision. Indeed,
it is inconceivable how an issue like that of partition of territory and transference of peoples'
allegiance from one government to another can be decided by political leaders. Such things are no
doubt done by conquerors to whom victory in war is sufficient authority to do what they like with
the conquered people. But we are not working under such a lawless condition. In normal times
when constitutional procedure is not in abeyance the views of political leaders cannot have the
effect which the fiats of dictators have. That would be contrary to the rule of democracy. The
highest value that can be put upon the views of leaders is to regard them as worthy to be placed on
the agenda. They cannot replace or obviate the necessity of having the matter decided by the
people. This is the position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand taken by the Muslim
League was, let there be Pakistan because the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position
has been negatived by the Cripps proposals and quite rightly. The Muslim League is recognized by
the Cripps proposals only to the extent of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a proposition be
considered. It has not been given the right to decide. Again it does not seem to have been realized
that the decision of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry with it the active
consent of the majority of the people, immediately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry
the matter to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Rajagopalachariar agreeing or the
All-India Congress Committee resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was opposed by the Hindus of
the Punjab, or Bengal. Really speaking it is not the business of the people of Bombay or Madras to
say, ' let there be Pakistan ' It must be left to be decided by the people who are living in those areas
and who will have to bear the consequences of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a
change in the political and economic system with which their lives and fortunes have been closely
bound up for so many years. A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the
safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan.
But I fear that solving the question of Pakistan by a referendum of the people howsoever attractive
may not find much favour with those who count. Even the Muslim League may not be very
enthusiastic about it. This is not because the proposal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is
that there is another solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon the British Government to
establish Pakistan by the exercise of its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be
preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that it is simple and involves no such
elaborate procedure as that of a referendum to the people and has none of the uncertainties involved
in a referendum. But there is another ground why it is preferred, namely, that there is a precedent
for it. The precedent is the Irish precedent and the argument is that if the British Government by
virtue of its sovereign authority divided Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British
Government divide India and create Pakistan ?
The British Parliament is the most sovereign legislative body in the world. De L'home, a French
writer on English Constitution, observed that there is nothing the British Parliament cannot do
except make man a woman and woman a man. And although the sovereignty of the British
Parliament over the affairs of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster it is still
unlimited so far as India is concerned. There is nothing in law to prevent the British Parliament
from proceeding to divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but will it do it? The
question is not one of power but of will.
Those who urge the British Government to follow the precedent in Ireland should ask what led the
British Government to partition Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British Government which led
them to sanction the course they took or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they
had to yield ? A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will have to admit that the partition of
Ireland was not sanctioned by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not often clearly
realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition of Ireland. Not even Carson, the Leader
of Ulster. Carson was opposed to Home Rule but he was not in favour of partition. His primary
position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second
line of defence against the imposition of Home Rule that he insisted on partition. This will be quite
clear from his speeches both inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith's Government on
the other side was equally opposed to partition. This may be seen from the proceedings in the
House of Commons over the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for the
exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in the Committee stage by Mr.
Agar-Roberts and again on the third reading by Carson himself. Both the times the Government
opposed and the amendments were lost.
Permanent partition of Ireland was effected in 1920 by Mr. Lloyd George in his Government of
Ireland Act. Many people think that this was the first time that partition of Ireland was thought of
and that it was due to the dictation of the ConservativeâUnionists in the Coalition Government of
which Mr. Lloyd George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd George succumbed
to the influence of the predominant party in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was
thought of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party had not undergone a change
and shown its readiness to favour partition as a possible solution. As a matter of fact partition as a
solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George's Act when the Asquith Government, a
purely Liberal Government, was in office. The real cause which led to the partition of Ireland can
be understood only by examining the factors which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith
change its mind. I feel certain that the factor which brought about this change in the viewpoint of
the Liberal Government was the Military crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is
generally referred to as the " Curragh Incident". A few facts will be sufficient to explain what the "
Curragh Incident " was and how decisive it was in bringing about a change in the policy of the
Asquith Government.
To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home Rule Bill had gone through all its stages by the end
of 1913. Mr. Asquith who had been challenged that he was proceeding without a mandate from the
electorate had however given an undertaking that the Act would not be given effect to until another
general election had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a general election in
1915 if the War had not supervened. But the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a
general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home Rule. They were not always very
scrupulous in choosing their means and their methods and under the seductive pose that they were
fighting against the Government which was preventing them from remaining loyal subjects of the
King they resorted to means which nobody would hesitate to call shameless and nefarious. There
was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen always depended for defeating Home Rule. That
was the House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911 the House of Lords had become a
Wailing Wall neither strong nor high. It had ceased to be a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing
that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its rejection by the House of Lords, feeling that in the next
election Asquith might win, the Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching for another
line of defence. They found it in the Army. The plan was twofold. It included the project of getting
the House of Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that there would be no Army in
existence to be used against Ulster. The second project was to spread their propagandaâThat
Home Rule will be Home Ruleâin the Army with a view to preparing the Army to disobey the
Government in case Government decided to use the Army for forcing Home Rule on Ireland. The
first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily in bringing about the second. This became clear
in March 1914 when there occurred the Curragh Incident. The Government had reasons to suspect
that certain Army depots in Ireland were likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March
20th, order-were sent to Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, to take
steps to safeguard these depols. His reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not
prepared to obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared that men would refuse to
move. General Sir Hubert Gough had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example
had been followed by others. The Government realized that the Army had become political,
17[f.17] nay, partisan. It took fright and decided in favour of partition acting on the well-known
maxim that wisdom is the better part of valour. What made Asquith change his position was not
conscience but the fright of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one thereafter felt
bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home Rule without partition.
Can His Majesty's Government be depended upon to repeat in India what it did in Ireland ? I am
unable to answer the question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty's
Government knows full well what have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish
Free State has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits.
The wound caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The
Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally indefensible inasmuch as it was the result not
of the consent of the people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder of Duncan by
Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty's Government are as deep as those on Lady Macbeth
and of which Lady Macbeth said that " All the perfumes of Arabia " had failed to remove the stink.
That His Majesty's Government does not like to be responsible for the execution of another deed of
partition is quite clear from its policy with the Jew-Arab problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel
Commission to investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Palestine. The Government
accepted 18[f.18] it in principle as the most hopeful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the
Government realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and appointed another
Royal Commission called the Woodhead Commission which condemned partition and opened an
easy way to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from a terrible position. The
partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to
be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His Majesty's Government
will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim League.
And why should His Majesty's Government oblige the Muslim League ? In the case of Ulster there
was the tie of blood which made a powerful section of the British politicians take the side of Ulster.
It was this tie of blood which made Lord Curzon say " You are compelling Ulster to divorce her
present husband, to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to marry someone else
who she cordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live." There is no such kinship between
His Majesty's Government and the Muslim League and it would be a vain hope for the League to
expect His Majesty's Government to take her side.
The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to
achieve its object by invoking the authority of His Majesty's Government to bring about the
partition of India. In my judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be
adopted in bringing about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and Hindustan should
continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other.
What is the procedure which is best suited for the realization of this end ? Everyone will agree that
the procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to
the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another
solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people. I
have made my suggestion as to which is the best course. Others also will come forth with theirs. I
cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be unless good sense as well as a
sense of responsibility is brought to bear upon the solution of this question it will remain a festering
sore.
I do not claim any originality for the solution I have proposed. The ideas which underlie it are
drawn from three sources, from the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket presided, from
the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It
will be seen that my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of pooled wisdom. Will it be
accepted ? There are four ways of resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of
Pakistan. First is that the British Government should act as the deciding authority. Second is that
the Hindus and the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an International Board of
Arbitration and the fourth is to fight it out by a Civil War.
Although India today is a political mad-house there are I hope enough sane people in the country
who would not allow matters to reach the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect of an agreement
between political leaders in the near future. The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a
meeting in Allahabad held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat Narayan Lal resolved 16
[f16] not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan. Two other ways are left to have the problem solved.
One is by the people concerned ; the other is by international arbitration. This is the way I have
suggested. I prefer the former. For various reasons this seems to me the only right course. The
leaders having failed to resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the people for decision. Indeed,
it is inconceivable how an issue like that of partition of territory and transference of peoples'
allegiance from one government to another can be decided by political leaders. Such things are no
doubt done by conquerors to whom victory in war is sufficient authority to do what they like with
the conquered people. But we are not working under such a lawless condition. In normal times
when constitutional procedure is not in abeyance the views of political leaders cannot have the
effect which the fiats of dictators have. That would be contrary to the rule of democracy. The
highest value that can be put upon the views of leaders is to regard them as worthy to be placed on
the agenda. They cannot replace or obviate the necessity of having the matter decided by the
people. This is the position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand taken by the Muslim
League was, let there be Pakistan because the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position
has been negatived by the Cripps proposals and quite rightly. The Muslim League is recognized by
the Cripps proposals only to the extent of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a proposition be
considered. It has not been given the right to decide. Again it does not seem to have been realized
that the decision of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry with it the active
consent of the majority of the people, immediately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry
the matter to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Rajagopalachariar agreeing or the
All-India Congress Committee resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was opposed by the Hindus of
the Punjab, or Bengal. Really speaking it is not the business of the people of Bombay or Madras to
say, ' let there be Pakistan ' It must be left to be decided by the people who are living in those areas
and who will have to bear the consequences of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a
change in the political and economic system with which their lives and fortunes have been closely
bound up for so many years. A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the
safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan.
But I fear that solving the question of Pakistan by a referendum of the people howsoever attractive
may not find much favour with those who count. Even the Muslim League may not be very
enthusiastic about it. This is not because the proposal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is
that there is another solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon the British Government to
establish Pakistan by the exercise of its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be
preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that it is simple and involves no such
elaborate procedure as that of a referendum to the people and has none of the uncertainties involved
in a referendum. But there is another ground why it is preferred, namely, that there is a precedent
for it. The precedent is the Irish precedent and the argument is that if the British Government by
virtue of its sovereign authority divided Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British
Government divide India and create Pakistan ?
The British Parliament is the most sovereign legislative body in the world. De L'home, a French
writer on English Constitution, observed that there is nothing the British Parliament cannot do
except make man a woman and woman a man. And although the sovereignty of the British
Parliament over the affairs of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster it is still
unlimited so far as India is concerned. There is nothing in law to prevent the British Parliament
from proceeding to divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but will it do it? The
question is not one of power but of will.
Those who urge the British Government to follow the precedent in Ireland should ask what led the
British Government to partition Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British Government which led
them to sanction the course they took or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they
had to yield ? A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will have to admit that the partition of
Ireland was not sanctioned by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not often clearly
realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition of Ireland. Not even Carson, the Leader
of Ulster. Carson was opposed to Home Rule but he was not in favour of partition. His primary
position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second
line of defence against the imposition of Home Rule that he insisted on partition. This will be quite
clear from his speeches both inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith's Government on
the other side was equally opposed to partition. This may be seen from the proceedings in the
House of Commons over the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for the
exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in the Committee stage by Mr.
Agar-Roberts and again on the third reading by Carson himself. Both the times the Government
opposed and the amendments were lost.
Permanent partition of Ireland was effected in 1920 by Mr. Lloyd George in his Government of
Ireland Act. Many people think that this was the first time that partition of Ireland was thought of
and that it was due to the dictation of the ConservativeâUnionists in the Coalition Government of
which Mr. Lloyd George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd George succumbed
to the influence of the predominant party in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was
thought of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party had not undergone a change
and shown its readiness to favour partition as a possible solution. As a matter of fact partition as a
solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George's Act when the Asquith Government, a
purely Liberal Government, was in office. The real cause which led to the partition of Ireland can
be understood only by examining the factors which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith
change its mind. I feel certain that the factor which brought about this change in the viewpoint of
the Liberal Government was the Military crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is
generally referred to as the " Curragh Incident". A few facts will be sufficient to explain what the "
Curragh Incident " was and how decisive it was in bringing about a change in the policy of the
Asquith Government.
To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home Rule Bill had gone through all its stages by the end
of 1913. Mr. Asquith who had been challenged that he was proceeding without a mandate from the
electorate had however given an undertaking that the Act would not be given effect to until another
general election had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a general election in
1915 if the War had not supervened. But the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a
general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home Rule. They were not always very
scrupulous in choosing their means and their methods and under the seductive pose that they were
fighting against the Government which was preventing them from remaining loyal subjects of the
King they resorted to means which nobody would hesitate to call shameless and nefarious. There
was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen always depended for defeating Home Rule. That
was the House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911 the House of Lords had become a
Wailing Wall neither strong nor high. It had ceased to be a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing
that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its rejection by the House of Lords, feeling that in the next
election Asquith might win, the Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching for another
line of defence. They found it in the Army. The plan was twofold. It included the project of getting
the House of Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that there would be no Army in
existence to be used against Ulster. The second project was to spread their propagandaâThat
Home Rule will be Home Ruleâin the Army with a view to preparing the Army to disobey the
Government in case Government decided to use the Army for forcing Home Rule on Ireland. The
first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily in bringing about the second. This became clear
in March 1914 when there occurred the Curragh Incident. The Government had reasons to suspect
that certain Army depots in Ireland were likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March
20th, order-were sent to Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, to take
steps to safeguard these depols. His reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not
prepared to obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared that men would refuse to
move. General Sir Hubert Gough had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example
had been followed by others. The Government realized that the Army had become political,
17[f.17] nay, partisan. It took fright and decided in favour of partition acting on the well-known
maxim that wisdom is the better part of valour. What made Asquith change his position was not
conscience but the fright of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one thereafter felt
bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home Rule without partition.
Can His Majesty's Government be depended upon to repeat in India what it did in Ireland ? I am
unable to answer the question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty's
Government knows full well what have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish
Free State has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits.
The wound caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The
Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally indefensible inasmuch as it was the result not
of the consent of the people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder of Duncan by
Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty's Government are as deep as those on Lady Macbeth
and of which Lady Macbeth said that " All the perfumes of Arabia " had failed to remove the stink.
That His Majesty's Government does not like to be responsible for the execution of another deed of
partition is quite clear from its policy with the Jew-Arab problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel
Commission to investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Palestine. The Government
accepted 18[f.18] it in principle as the most hopeful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the
Government realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and appointed another
Royal Commission called the Woodhead Commission which condemned partition and opened an
easy way to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from a terrible position. The
partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to
be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His Majesty's Government
will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim League.
And why should His Majesty's Government oblige the Muslim League ? In the case of Ulster there
was the tie of blood which made a powerful section of the British politicians take the side of Ulster.
It was this tie of blood which made Lord Curzon say " You are compelling Ulster to divorce her
present husband, to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to marry someone else
who she cordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live." There is no such kinship between
His Majesty's Government and the Muslim League and it would be a vain hope for the League to
expect His Majesty's Government to take her side.
The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to
achieve its object by invoking the authority of His Majesty's Government to bring about the
partition of India. In my judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be
adopted in bringing about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and Hindustan should
continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other.
What is the procedure which is best suited for the realization of this end ? Everyone will agree that
the procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to
the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another
solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people. I
have made my suggestion as to which is the best course. Others also will come forth with theirs. I
cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be unless good sense as well as a
sense of responsibility is brought to bear upon the solution of this question it will remain a festering
sore.