Islamic Nuke

[Guest]

From FT
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Through the nuclear prism </b>
Moeed Yusuf
Just like the Indian disapora, the huge number of Pakistani expatriates in the West could play a major role in rectifying misperceptions about the country's nuclear ambitions 
   
Three weeks ago, I discussed Pakistan’s proliferation scandal in light of the recent meeting of the US Congress sub-committee on terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation. In that article (“Exorcising AQ Khan,” TFT, June 16-22, 2006 ) I had stated: “…it [Pakistan] should share as much information on the measures taken and implemented on the ground [to check proliferation] as to avoid any possibility of a relapse of the problem.” Reports suggest the establishment may be taking a different approach.

The current official approach solely focuses on targeting governments in the West. Admittedly, there is an urgent requirement to do so since these governments are entities Pakistan has to face in the immediate future. However, a failure to expand the target audience could seriously limit the probability of success in attaining the ultimate objective in the long run. It is essential to extend the “convince-them” campaign to other actors.

With the current thrust, Islamabad has ended up basing the authenticity of its case on its success in convincing Washington of its non-involvement in the proliferation scandal and the robustness of its revamped counter-proliferation framework. The premise is that if the Bush administration had any reservations about Pakistan’s official position (after having been briefed on the entire affair by Islamabad), it would never have lifted diplomatic pressure on Islamabad to provide access to further information (which reportedly has now eased off considerably). The official version implies that Washington’s move to withdraw pressure means it (US) is convinced that the Pakistani state was not involved in the proliferation scandal.

The problem with building a case on the reaction of a single exogenous actor (in this case the Bush administration) should be obvious: what happens if the exogenous factor decides to reveal facts or perceptions contrary to the state’s stance any time in the future? Consider the fact that the Bush administration has agreed to keep a lid on the issue only because of its current strategic alignment with Pakistan. Individual members of the Bush administration remain extremely wary of Pakistani explanations and are liable to join the opposition camp should Pakistan-US interests diverge or if political interests of the current administration members dictate such a switch in the future. Were this realistic scenario to materialise, it will end up reinforcing already persistent calls for stringent checks on Pakistan’s nuclear activities and coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Ideally, Islamabad’s strategy should have been designed for two distinct phases, the immediate future and the longer run. The first phase, which ought to have been a campaign targeting current administrations, has been satisfied. In the second leg the focus ought to have shifted to those currently in the ‘anti-Pakistan’ camp but likely to be in positions of power in their respective countries in the future, or institutions that have an overbearing influence on public perception, i.e., the media. If the current limited strategy to cope with this issue remains unaltered, one ought not to expect the present lull in coercive diplomacy to last, especially if the ultra-critics come to power in Washington.

Admittedly, broadening the campaign to the second set of actors is a much greater challenge both in terms of identifying the particular individuals or groups to target and in devising a strategy to convince actors, most of whom are inherently biased against Pakistan, given their political interests and the misperceptions that exist about Pakistan in the West. However, Islamabad has little choice but to pursue this elaborate strategy.

To begin with, the authorities should identify the key actors who are critical of Pakistan’s role and those who are likely to be in office in case of an administration shift in Washington. In addition, kingpins in the media networks should be targeted (although interaction with the Western media takes place, to my knowledge no systematic briefings and targeted meetings have been undertaken on the proliferation issue).

Simultaneously, devising a specific plan for the kind of ‘defence’ to be put forth by the state is necessary. Pakistan’s nuclear establishment would have to analyse and determine the maximum amount of scandal-related information that can be shared with the targeted audience to convince them of the authenticity of the official position. Given that much of what are conventionally considered ‘classified’ facts are already public knowledge – due to revelations about the activities of the underground network – one can expect substantial amount of sharable information.

A step-by-step account of how AQ Khan could have managed such a feat must be provided, perhaps through hypothetical simulation (to avoid classified information from being provided). At the same time, it is imperative to prove that the revamped counter-proliferation structure ensures the episode does not recur. For example, to counter allegations of an intelligence failure in the proliferation scandal, it is not enough to highlight the macro-level steps undertaken by the establishment. Simply the establishment of new functionaries dedicated to nuclear programme-related intelligence gathering would not satisfy Western critics. As much as possible, proof of the robustness of the mechanism and the assurance of its functioning should be detailed.

It is difficult to predict the best way of defending the allegation of state involvement in nuclear hardware transfer since there is no information in the public domain of Pakistan’s current stance on the issue. However, presuming that informed authorities have proof to signal the state’s non-involvement in this regard, such evidence should be made part of the information to be presented to select Western actors.

Finally, the entire exercise to acquit Pakistan of the wrongdoing is relevant to the broader objective of improving Pakistan’s image in the Western world. While a campaign run by the establishment is recommended, to complement this there is a need for a comprehensive nuclear public policy both within and outside Pakistan. It is imperative for the nuclear establishment to ensure systematic information-sharing with Pakistani strategic experts (while the nuclear establishment has shown remarkable willingness to open up to strategic analysts, the interaction still remains sporadic) and provide incentives for them to seek placements in Western research and policy institutes.

The need for an internal nuclear public policy is premised on the oft-understated impact the diaspora tends to have on image perception of their native countries. Just like the Indian disapora, the huge number of Pakistani expatriates in the West could play a major role in rectifying the misperceptions about the country’s nuclear ambitions.

Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad

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<b>
ElBaradei upsets the nuclear applecart </b>
Ahmer Bilal Soofi
The implication of ElBaradei's article is that Pakistan should no longer worry about the legitimacy of its status since the NPT has not bestowed legitimacy on any state 

The June 14 op-ed in the Washington Post by Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, carries a very significant comment: “…under the NPT, there is no such thing as a ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ nuclear weapons state. The fact that five states are recognised in the treaty as holders of nuclear weapons was regarded as a matter of transition; the treaty does not in any sense confer permanent status on those states as weapons holders”.

Two weeks ago, in his TFT article (“The bell-wether of national security strategy”; June 23-29, 2006), Ejaz Haider argued that “ElBaradei dismisses the contention that the NPT bestowed legitimacy on any state’s nuclear-weapon capability…but then uses this as the basis for his argument in favour of the US-India nuclear deal. This complicates matters and undermines the importance of ElBaradei’s interpretation of ‘legitimacy’.”

I would slightly differ from Haider on this point. My contention is that by writing what he has, ElBaradei has clarified the legal position on this score and thus made the debate over the legitimacy issue – some can have the weapons while others can’t – irrelevant. By extension, this also renders irrelevant Pakistan’s quest to seek the status of a legitimate nuclear weapons state (NWS). Consider.

Winning legitimacy for the nuclear programme has been a major foreign policy objective for Pakistan, who, along with India, was painted as an illegal NWS worldwide. Pakistan had toiled hard to convince the world that it had the right to go nuclear, not only in self-defence but also because it had refused to ratify the NPT.

It has also been a popular, though flawed belief that to be recognised as legitimate NWSs, Pakistan and India should persuade the international community to amend the NPT and include them in the text of the treaty so they could get legitimacy for their de facto status. This was not possible given the very architecture of the treaty.

ElBaradei’s take on the issue has suddenly upset the entire debate on the ‘legitimacy’ issue under the NPT, making it irrelevant.

From a purely legal standpoint, ElBaradei is right. Not only because he enjoys respect as a qualified international lawyer and an expert in public international law but also because he has been an astute chief executive of the IAEA and understands well the interplay of law and diplomacy. He is legally correct in stating that the issue of recognising five states as possessors of nuclear weapons was an interim measure and “the treaty does not in any sense confer permanent status on those states as weapons holders”.

Another interesting question is whether ElBaradei has contradicted the UNSC resolution 1172 that condemned Pakistan and India for going nuclear, especially para 11 of the said UN Resolution which states that the UNSC “… recalls that in accordance with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapons state….”?

It was this paragraph which induced some analysts to mistakenly believe that Pakistan had been denied legitimacy as a nuclear weapons state on the whole. Para 11 of the UNSC Resolution, however, specifically referred to the issue “in accordance with the NPT…”

ElBaradei’s article should correct this perception in Pakistan.

It should be recalled that apart from the NPT, there is no other international legal text that determines states as lawful or unlawful nuclear states. There is no other global forum that confers legitimacy or illegitimacy on a state in respect of its nuclear programme. NPT is the only treaty that, by implication, refers to five states as nuclear weapons states. Pakistan, in any case, lay outside the legal regime of NPT. The only attraction for Pakistan to consider ratification of the NPT was to acquire legitimacy in respect of its nuclear programme. To that, ElBaradei’s comment has put paid.

The implication of ElBaradei’s article is that Pakistan should no longer worry about the legitimacy of its status since the NPT has not bestowed legitimacy on any state, not even those recognised by it as holders of such weapons.

This has also been the official Pakistani view. But there is no further reason to expend our diplomatic energies on this count.

<i>Ahmer Bilal Soofi is a practicing lawyer and President of Research Society of International Law</i>
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