01-26-2004, 05:33 PM
<b>Pakistan's twisted trail of nuclear knowledge</b>
By Peter R. Lavoy and Feroz Hassan Khan
When Pakistan set out to become a nuclear power in the 1970s, it found itself squarely at odds with much of the rest of the world, which was focused instead on stopping proliferation. With legitimate routes of acquiring nuclear technology blocked, Pakistan turned to clandestine means -- cooperating with shady middlemen, financiers and front companies overseas.
By the mid-1980s it had secretly built its first nuclear bomb.
That experience, it turns out, was just the beginning of the international intrigue surrounding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In recent weeks, each day has produced yet another dramatic twist as Pakistan responds to allegations that it, in turn, secretly shared its nuclear expertise with other nations, specifically North Korea, Iran and Libya.
The unfolding drama involves, among other things, an intercepted ship, top-secret investigative missions and, as of last week, word that Pakistan had detained more of its leading -- and most popular -- nuclear scientists, apparently to probe allegations that the men illicitly spread their knowledge. The interrogation comes after evidence provided last year by the International Atomic Energy Agency forced Pakistan to acknowledge the possibility of past misdeeds.
On Friday, President Pervez Musharraf went so far as to say, in an interview with CNN, that it appeared some scientists had shared nuclear designs. When asked if the government had authorized nuclear transfers to Iran, Musharraf said the scientists probably had acted for their own financial gain, and he discounted any government involvement. Western officials, however, remain skeptical that such transfers could have occurred without the express consent -- much less knowledge -- of government officials.
If the investigation ultimately concludes nuclear technology was transferred to other nations, the challenge for Pakistan, as well as the United States and other Western powers, will be to determine how to help Pakistan become a more responsible nuclear power, rather than a rogue.
Even though opposition groups within Pakistan claim that the inquiry is being staged to appease the United States, Musharraf told a joint session of parliament a week ago that Pakistan cannot achieve its national objectives of boosting its economy and strengthening its might against India if it becomes isolated from the world. Musharraf also said Friday that Pakistan will ``move against violators because they are enemies of the state.''
Allegations of misdeeds
Pakistan's nuclear conduct has long been controversial. When the South Asian country tested nuclear explosives and declared itself a nuclear weapon state in May 1998, the world viewed this as an unavoidable reaction to India's earlier nuclear tests. However, three years later, when it became known that two retired scientists previously associated with Pakistani nuclear research institutions had met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, new and deeper concerns arose over Pakistan's nuclear stewardship.
Pakistan came under fire again in 2002 when the media reported that U.S. intelligence services discovered that North Korea, which already had enough plutonium for a few nuclear bombs, had received substantial foreign assistance for a uranium enrichment plant, which when operational could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for another two or more nuclear bombs per year.
Western analysts suspect that North Korea gave Pakistan ballistic missile technology -- which Pakistan could not obtain from Western sources -- in exchange for Pakistan's help with uranium enrichment. While acknowledging missile aid, Musharraf denies that any nuclear exports to North Korea took place since he took office in October 1999.
Other reports tie Pakistan to the uranium enrichment efforts of Iran and Libya. Washington learned from an Iranian opposition group in August 2002 that Iran was secretly building a large uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, and Iranian officials told the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency last year that Pakistan had provided support. Centrifuges are the most common device used for producing bomb-grade uranium from naturally occurring uranium.
That charge sparked a dramatic change in the position of Pakistan's leadership, from denial to investigation. After a ship carrying centrifuge parts to Libya was interdicted last October, Libyan officials told Western authorities that Pakistani scientists also were the source of some of their centrifuge designs.
`Father' of the bomb
Pakistan's probe becomes more intriguing each day. More than two dozen officials, including two retired army brigadiers, have been detained over the past several weeks. At the home of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the popular ``father'' of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, his former military assistant was arrested as he dined with his old boss. The government decided to question the top scientists after it sent secret teams to Iran and Libya to investigate allegations that the men had sought payment for nuclear secrets.
Khan reportedly has pointed fingers, alleging that Pakistan's army chief from 1988 to 1991, Gen. Aslam Beg, approved sharing nuclear technology with Iran. Although Beg rejects this, his well-known vision of a Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan partnership and its ``strategic defiance'' of the West makes Khan's claim plausible.
Alternatively, Khan could be attempting to cover up his own personal gains -- or those of his deputies -- by claiming state approval of his actions. Either way -- whether the government was responsible for the alleged nuclear exports or whether it was unable to control the people with nuclear know-how -- the country's shrewd path to the nuclear club provides clues to how it could be a recipient as well as a provider of nuclear secrets.
Pakistan's nuclear program was established in the 1970s with two competing laboratories, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the other under Khan. With two organizations to police, governmental oversight was weak. And there were few scruples in the fierce contest.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's effort to produce bomb-grade plutonium was blocked in 1978 when Washington pressured France to cancel its sale of a plutonium reprocessing facility. This opened the door for Khan to obtain unprecedented latitude and state resources in his bid to acquire foreign technology.
By the early 1980s, Khan had mastered not only the production of highly enriched uranium, but also the art of acquiring dual-use technology, sensitive materials and critical equipment through a web of seedy black-market ties. The international contacts and procurement techniques Khan acquired during this period would later become worth their weight in gold to other nuclear aspirants.
Growing ambition
Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War intensified Pakistan's strategic ambitions. Islamabad's military significance to the West plummeted with the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the thaw in relations between Washington and Moscow. In 1990, the United States canceled F-16 aircraft sales to Pakistan. Without these jets, Pakistan looked elsewhere for missiles that could carry nuclear weapons.
This period also saw Pakistan return to democracy. From 1988 to 1997, power was shared among a troika: the president, the prime minister and the army chief. The diffusion of authority enabled national security organizations to manipulate the system and become nearly autonomous.
In this environment, Khan would have needed to convince only one of the power centers that sharing nuclear technology with foreign entities would be in Pakistan's interest. He could have argued that parting with nuclear know-how was needed to obtain additional funding or access to new clandestine networks for procuring still-elusive materials and technology. The current inquiry is asking whether Khan and his associates sold such precious information or other nuclear technology for personal gain.
As long as Khan's group delivered the goods, no state authority questioned its tactics. But the 1998 nuclear tests put the spotlight squarely on Pakistan's nuclear conduct; it now was expected to prove itself as a responsible nuclear power.
The United States played a critical role in changing Pakistan's nuclear practices. After the 1998 nuclear tests, Washington applied intense pressure on Islamabad to restrain nuclear exports, including the sharing of know-how. In February 2000, Pakistan revealed a new nuclear command and control structure to show it was operationally prepared to face India's growing military threat and to prove that it could be a responsible custodian of nuclear weapons.
As the government tightened its control over all nuclear and missile-related organizations, Khan's laboratory resisted. This prompted the Musharraf government to replace the top officials of Khan's lab in 2001 and to appoint Khan to a ceremonial post.
Keep ties to West
In addition, the government established rigorous accounting and auditing practices and announced its intent to create a program to test the reliability of all soldiers and civilians with access to nuclear technology and weapons. Since then, especially after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Pakistan has tightened security over its nuclear establishment, and it must continue to implement long-overdue reforms.
It is in America's interest not to let Pakistan and Musharraf falter. <b>If Pakistan lost all meaningful contact with the West, radical internal forces could prevail and the country could become a haven for terrorists and a colossal exporter of weapons of mass destruction.</b>
<!--emo&:mad--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo-->
PETER LAVOY is director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey (www.ccc.nps.navy.mil) and directed the Pentagon's counterproliferation policy office from 1998 to 2000. BRIG. GEN. FEROZ HASSAN KHAN is a research fellow at the Center for Contemporary Conflict and recently retired from the Pakistani army, where he was director of arms control and disarmament affairs. They wrote this article, which expresses their own views, for Perspective.
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews...ial/7793106.htm
By Peter R. Lavoy and Feroz Hassan Khan
When Pakistan set out to become a nuclear power in the 1970s, it found itself squarely at odds with much of the rest of the world, which was focused instead on stopping proliferation. With legitimate routes of acquiring nuclear technology blocked, Pakistan turned to clandestine means -- cooperating with shady middlemen, financiers and front companies overseas.
By the mid-1980s it had secretly built its first nuclear bomb.
That experience, it turns out, was just the beginning of the international intrigue surrounding Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In recent weeks, each day has produced yet another dramatic twist as Pakistan responds to allegations that it, in turn, secretly shared its nuclear expertise with other nations, specifically North Korea, Iran and Libya.
The unfolding drama involves, among other things, an intercepted ship, top-secret investigative missions and, as of last week, word that Pakistan had detained more of its leading -- and most popular -- nuclear scientists, apparently to probe allegations that the men illicitly spread their knowledge. The interrogation comes after evidence provided last year by the International Atomic Energy Agency forced Pakistan to acknowledge the possibility of past misdeeds.
On Friday, President Pervez Musharraf went so far as to say, in an interview with CNN, that it appeared some scientists had shared nuclear designs. When asked if the government had authorized nuclear transfers to Iran, Musharraf said the scientists probably had acted for their own financial gain, and he discounted any government involvement. Western officials, however, remain skeptical that such transfers could have occurred without the express consent -- much less knowledge -- of government officials.
If the investigation ultimately concludes nuclear technology was transferred to other nations, the challenge for Pakistan, as well as the United States and other Western powers, will be to determine how to help Pakistan become a more responsible nuclear power, rather than a rogue.
Even though opposition groups within Pakistan claim that the inquiry is being staged to appease the United States, Musharraf told a joint session of parliament a week ago that Pakistan cannot achieve its national objectives of boosting its economy and strengthening its might against India if it becomes isolated from the world. Musharraf also said Friday that Pakistan will ``move against violators because they are enemies of the state.''
Allegations of misdeeds
Pakistan's nuclear conduct has long been controversial. When the South Asian country tested nuclear explosives and declared itself a nuclear weapon state in May 1998, the world viewed this as an unavoidable reaction to India's earlier nuclear tests. However, three years later, when it became known that two retired scientists previously associated with Pakistani nuclear research institutions had met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, new and deeper concerns arose over Pakistan's nuclear stewardship.
Pakistan came under fire again in 2002 when the media reported that U.S. intelligence services discovered that North Korea, which already had enough plutonium for a few nuclear bombs, had received substantial foreign assistance for a uranium enrichment plant, which when operational could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for another two or more nuclear bombs per year.
Western analysts suspect that North Korea gave Pakistan ballistic missile technology -- which Pakistan could not obtain from Western sources -- in exchange for Pakistan's help with uranium enrichment. While acknowledging missile aid, Musharraf denies that any nuclear exports to North Korea took place since he took office in October 1999.
Other reports tie Pakistan to the uranium enrichment efforts of Iran and Libya. Washington learned from an Iranian opposition group in August 2002 that Iran was secretly building a large uranium centrifuge enrichment plant, and Iranian officials told the watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency last year that Pakistan had provided support. Centrifuges are the most common device used for producing bomb-grade uranium from naturally occurring uranium.
That charge sparked a dramatic change in the position of Pakistan's leadership, from denial to investigation. After a ship carrying centrifuge parts to Libya was interdicted last October, Libyan officials told Western authorities that Pakistani scientists also were the source of some of their centrifuge designs.
`Father' of the bomb
Pakistan's probe becomes more intriguing each day. More than two dozen officials, including two retired army brigadiers, have been detained over the past several weeks. At the home of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the popular ``father'' of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, his former military assistant was arrested as he dined with his old boss. The government decided to question the top scientists after it sent secret teams to Iran and Libya to investigate allegations that the men had sought payment for nuclear secrets.
Khan reportedly has pointed fingers, alleging that Pakistan's army chief from 1988 to 1991, Gen. Aslam Beg, approved sharing nuclear technology with Iran. Although Beg rejects this, his well-known vision of a Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan partnership and its ``strategic defiance'' of the West makes Khan's claim plausible.
Alternatively, Khan could be attempting to cover up his own personal gains -- or those of his deputies -- by claiming state approval of his actions. Either way -- whether the government was responsible for the alleged nuclear exports or whether it was unable to control the people with nuclear know-how -- the country's shrewd path to the nuclear club provides clues to how it could be a recipient as well as a provider of nuclear secrets.
Pakistan's nuclear program was established in the 1970s with two competing laboratories, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and the other under Khan. With two organizations to police, governmental oversight was weak. And there were few scruples in the fierce contest.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's effort to produce bomb-grade plutonium was blocked in 1978 when Washington pressured France to cancel its sale of a plutonium reprocessing facility. This opened the door for Khan to obtain unprecedented latitude and state resources in his bid to acquire foreign technology.
By the early 1980s, Khan had mastered not only the production of highly enriched uranium, but also the art of acquiring dual-use technology, sensitive materials and critical equipment through a web of seedy black-market ties. The international contacts and procurement techniques Khan acquired during this period would later become worth their weight in gold to other nuclear aspirants.
Growing ambition
Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War intensified Pakistan's strategic ambitions. Islamabad's military significance to the West plummeted with the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the thaw in relations between Washington and Moscow. In 1990, the United States canceled F-16 aircraft sales to Pakistan. Without these jets, Pakistan looked elsewhere for missiles that could carry nuclear weapons.
This period also saw Pakistan return to democracy. From 1988 to 1997, power was shared among a troika: the president, the prime minister and the army chief. The diffusion of authority enabled national security organizations to manipulate the system and become nearly autonomous.
In this environment, Khan would have needed to convince only one of the power centers that sharing nuclear technology with foreign entities would be in Pakistan's interest. He could have argued that parting with nuclear know-how was needed to obtain additional funding or access to new clandestine networks for procuring still-elusive materials and technology. The current inquiry is asking whether Khan and his associates sold such precious information or other nuclear technology for personal gain.
As long as Khan's group delivered the goods, no state authority questioned its tactics. But the 1998 nuclear tests put the spotlight squarely on Pakistan's nuclear conduct; it now was expected to prove itself as a responsible nuclear power.
The United States played a critical role in changing Pakistan's nuclear practices. After the 1998 nuclear tests, Washington applied intense pressure on Islamabad to restrain nuclear exports, including the sharing of know-how. In February 2000, Pakistan revealed a new nuclear command and control structure to show it was operationally prepared to face India's growing military threat and to prove that it could be a responsible custodian of nuclear weapons.
As the government tightened its control over all nuclear and missile-related organizations, Khan's laboratory resisted. This prompted the Musharraf government to replace the top officials of Khan's lab in 2001 and to appoint Khan to a ceremonial post.
Keep ties to West
In addition, the government established rigorous accounting and auditing practices and announced its intent to create a program to test the reliability of all soldiers and civilians with access to nuclear technology and weapons. Since then, especially after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Pakistan has tightened security over its nuclear establishment, and it must continue to implement long-overdue reforms.
It is in America's interest not to let Pakistan and Musharraf falter. <b>If Pakistan lost all meaningful contact with the West, radical internal forces could prevail and the country could become a haven for terrorists and a colossal exporter of weapons of mass destruction.</b>
<!--emo&:mad--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/mad.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='mad.gif' /><!--endemo-->
PETER LAVOY is director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey (www.ccc.nps.navy.mil) and directed the Pentagon's counterproliferation policy office from 1998 to 2000. BRIG. GEN. FEROZ HASSAN KHAN is a research fellow at the Center for Contemporary Conflict and recently retired from the Pakistani army, where he was director of arms control and disarmament affairs. They wrote this article, which expresses their own views, for Perspective.
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews...ial/7793106.htm