01-27-2006, 02:36 AM
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/IndianCivili...n/message/84824
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Dear Rani,
Difficult question. Currently, we are working on answering it at
different levels.
1. The 'identity politics' in terms of 'religion' certainly is a
result of the workings of the secular state in India. The rise of the
Hindutva movement, for instance, can be traced as an effect of state
policy from the early stages of the colonial state to the latest phase
of Congress rule. In an article to be published later this year, Balu
and I show how the secular state in India provides a ready-made dress
which forces the traditions and communities in society to take a
particular form in order to defend their interests. All traditions
have to re-shape themselves as religious doctrines -- rivals of Islam
and Christianity.
The secular state treats any conflict between different groups as an
instance of religious rivalry; it assumes these conflicts revolve
around a rivalry over religious truth and then sees itself as rising
above that rivalry by taking a neutral position. It systematically
approaches all traditions as variants of the same phenomenon of
religion: e.g. it contrasts between Hindu religious law and Muslim
religious law and argues both should give way to a uniform civil code.
Thus, the secular state has compelled the Hindu traditions to react as
though they constitute one more religion, opposed to Islam and
Christianity.
2. The model of the liberal secular state has been inherited from the
Raj. Early in the nineteenth century, the policy of the colonials gave
rise to the 'religious identity' politics of Hindu movements. In
Bengal, for instance, there was a huge dispute about whether or not
sati was part of 'the Hindu religion and its sacred law'. The point
was that the practice would be tolerated by the colonial state only if
it was part of the Hindu religion. If it were a civil practice, it
would be outlawed. The same stance was taken towards many other
practices. Obviously, the 'orthodox' Hindu groups reacted by arguing
that all these practices were indeed part of the Hindu sacred doctrine
and that, therefore, they should not be touched.
So, in order to maintain their traditional practices, the Hindu
traditions were forced by colonial policies to present themselves as a
religious doctrine with its own orthodoxy and sacred authorities. In
1830, for instance, the Dharma Sabha--arguably the precursor of
today's Hindutva organisations--was established. "An appeal to the
orthodox Hindus on the necessity of establishing the Dhurma Subha" was
published in one of the Calcutta journals: "Through the absence of all
religious authority in this country, religion suffers great detriment.
It has therefore become necessary that the excellent and the noble
should unite and continually devise means for protecting our religion
and our excellent customs and usages...Though we are firmly
united...yet, because we do not meet together, we appear disunited,
and hence those of an opposite faith are constantly seeking to destroy
our religion." This reflects the experience of those who saw the need
to protect their traditions against the rivalry of Christianity and
Islam. The only way to do so, they felt, was by establishing a church
which could unite the Hindus into one religious authority.
3. Apart from 'religion', of course, there is the question of caste
identity politics in today's India. There I do not have much to tell
you, because our group's research on this theme has only started
recently in Karnataka. From what I have seen, caste politics appears
to be a peculiar mix of traditional jati stances, the colonial image
of the caste system and the logic of liberal democracy. But this is
about as good as saying nothing at all.
Yours,
Jakob<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Dear Rani,
Difficult question. Currently, we are working on answering it at
different levels.
1. The 'identity politics' in terms of 'religion' certainly is a
result of the workings of the secular state in India. The rise of the
Hindutva movement, for instance, can be traced as an effect of state
policy from the early stages of the colonial state to the latest phase
of Congress rule. In an article to be published later this year, Balu
and I show how the secular state in India provides a ready-made dress
which forces the traditions and communities in society to take a
particular form in order to defend their interests. All traditions
have to re-shape themselves as religious doctrines -- rivals of Islam
and Christianity.
The secular state treats any conflict between different groups as an
instance of religious rivalry; it assumes these conflicts revolve
around a rivalry over religious truth and then sees itself as rising
above that rivalry by taking a neutral position. It systematically
approaches all traditions as variants of the same phenomenon of
religion: e.g. it contrasts between Hindu religious law and Muslim
religious law and argues both should give way to a uniform civil code.
Thus, the secular state has compelled the Hindu traditions to react as
though they constitute one more religion, opposed to Islam and
Christianity.
2. The model of the liberal secular state has been inherited from the
Raj. Early in the nineteenth century, the policy of the colonials gave
rise to the 'religious identity' politics of Hindu movements. In
Bengal, for instance, there was a huge dispute about whether or not
sati was part of 'the Hindu religion and its sacred law'. The point
was that the practice would be tolerated by the colonial state only if
it was part of the Hindu religion. If it were a civil practice, it
would be outlawed. The same stance was taken towards many other
practices. Obviously, the 'orthodox' Hindu groups reacted by arguing
that all these practices were indeed part of the Hindu sacred doctrine
and that, therefore, they should not be touched.
So, in order to maintain their traditional practices, the Hindu
traditions were forced by colonial policies to present themselves as a
religious doctrine with its own orthodoxy and sacred authorities. In
1830, for instance, the Dharma Sabha--arguably the precursor of
today's Hindutva organisations--was established. "An appeal to the
orthodox Hindus on the necessity of establishing the Dhurma Subha" was
published in one of the Calcutta journals: "Through the absence of all
religious authority in this country, religion suffers great detriment.
It has therefore become necessary that the excellent and the noble
should unite and continually devise means for protecting our religion
and our excellent customs and usages...Though we are firmly
united...yet, because we do not meet together, we appear disunited,
and hence those of an opposite faith are constantly seeking to destroy
our religion." This reflects the experience of those who saw the need
to protect their traditions against the rivalry of Christianity and
Islam. The only way to do so, they felt, was by establishing a church
which could unite the Hindus into one religious authority.
3. Apart from 'religion', of course, there is the question of caste
identity politics in today's India. There I do not have much to tell
you, because our group's research on this theme has only started
recently in Karnataka. From what I have seen, caste politics appears
to be a peculiar mix of traditional jati stances, the colonial image
of the caste system and the logic of liberal democracy. But this is
about as good as saying nothing at all.
Yours,
Jakob<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->