01-19-2006, 11:57 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->(1) You are absolutely right about the observations regarding
spreading awareness and setting strategic goals, and about the way
movements develop. From what little I know of you, which is pretty
little I am afraid, you appear to be a person with enormous
capabilities: apart from the evident intellectual acuity, you seem to
be gifted with strategic insights and abilities, a tremendous
organisational talent and a long-term perspective. Consequently, I can
only applaud you: not from the sidelines though, but from the middle
of the field itself. You are quite clearly someone who can *pull*, if
I may use this metaphor despite its connotations, the *ratha*
(chariot); I am willing to *push* the same from behind. It is,
therefore, an immense personal pleasure for me to respond to your
efforts. As you say, `let the light shine bright and clear'.
(2) A slightly longer comment on what you call `westology', the
reverse of Indology. I will simply pen some thoughts down. We need not
enter into a dialogue about these issues on this thread: it might
*sidetrack* the discussion; besides, you can always write a separate
column on `westology', to which one can respond. Nevertheless, some
observations for you to keep in mind for the column on `westology', if
and when you write it.
2.1. When I started formulating my initial project some 17 years ago,
I too thought along (probably) similar lines. However, as I got my
teeth into the project and started working it out, it became pretty
obvious that it was doomed to *fail*. The inherent logic of such an
enterprise forces one, as it were, to build *alternate* theories to
the existing, `western' theories. Instead of explaining this statement
in the abstract, let me take a concrete example to illustrate what I
mean.
2.2. In the University of Chicago, there is a certain Richard Shweder.
He practices `Cultural Psychology', and is (was?) professor of `Human
Development'. He is rather well-known for his `cross-cultural'
studies: he and his students have published many works comparing
psychological developments across the two cultures that India and
America are. (In fact, he received a medal from the American
Association of the Advancement of Science, if I remember properly, for
one of his articles: `Does the concept of the Person vary
cross-culturally?' This was a study about the concept of `self' in the
USA and Orissa, India.) A few years ago, he published a study on the
nature of *moral development* and the growth of moral awareness
cross-culturally: again, India and the USA were the two compared
cultures.
2.3. To study this, Shweder and his co-workers developed a
questionnaire supposed to test the presence of several moral notions
among their subjects. (This article is called "Culture and Moral
Development', by Richard Shweder, Manamohan Mahapatra and Joan G.
Miller. A convenient reprint is to be found in "Cultural Psychology:
Essays on Comparative Human Development, Eds., James Stigler, Richard
Shweder and Gibert Herdt, Cambridge University Press, 1990,
Pp.130-204. I will cite from this work.) The interviewees are both
children and adults. From the list of the cases that Shweder uses,
here are the first five - in order of *perceived* `seriousness of
breach', as judged by Hindu Brahman eight-to ten-year-olds:
1. The day after his father's death, the eldest son had a haircut and
ate chicken.
2. One of your family members eats beef regularly.
3. One of your family members eats a dog regularly for dinner.
4. A widow in your community eats fish two or three times a week.
5. Six months after the death of her husband, the widow wore jewellery
and bright-colored clothes (Ibid. p.165).
It is important to note that, in India, while there was a consensus
between the children and the adults regarding the first two cases
(p.184), there was a lack of consensus only among children regarding
the last three cases. Keeping in mind that they are ordered in terms
of the `perceived seriousness of the breach', we further come across
(ibid., P.165):
8. After defecation (making a bowel movement) a woman did not change
her clothes before cooking.
13. In a family, a twenty-five-year-old son addresses his father by
his first name.
And, as the fifteenth, "a poor man went to the hospital after being
seriously hurt in an accident. At the hospital they refused to treat
him because he could not afford to pay (ibid)."
2.4. We can, I suppose, grant the truth of these statements. We can
grant too that many Indians (both children and adults) would probably
consider such actions not just as *paap* but as *mahapaap*. If not
`sins', they are at least some kind of `ethical transgressions' and
not mere breaches of social etiquette. As the sequence of questions in
the interview makes it clear, the respondents were asked to motivate
(or clarify) their stance. A fragment from such interviews, applied to
a hypothetical Bra hmin adult should make the point clear.
"1. Is the widow's behavior wrong? (Yes, Widows should not eat fish ¼)
How serious is the violation? (A very serious violation¼)
Is it a sin? (Yes. It's a "great" sin.) ¼ " (p.168)
Let us consider a similar fragment from a hypothetical American adult.
"1. Is the widow's behavior wrong? (No. She can eat fish if she wants
to.)
How serious is the violation? (It's not a violation.)
Is it a sin? (No.)" ¼ (ibid.)
2.5. If Shweder is *right* in identifying our *paap* either as `sin'
or as `immoral', one conclusion is inescapable: we Indians must be
absolute cretins really. I mean, we seem to think that what the widow
eats, what she wears, etc. are *ethically* more important than whether
a poor man gets treated in a hospital or not. *However did our culture
manage to survive for a couple of thousand years, when it is governed
by such idiotic `norms'?*
As though to rub salt in the wound, Shweder assures us that the
situation is r eally not all that pathetic. In fact, he says, one
could actually provide `reasoned defence of family life and social
practice', albeit in the form of an "ideal" argument structure. How
does it look? "The body is a temple with a spirit dwelling in it.
Therefore the sanctity of the temple must be preserved. Therefore
impure things must be kept out of and away from the body (p. 198)." It
is important to note that this `reasoned' defence occurs only to
Shweder's mind: no child `argues' the way Shweder does.
3. During the colonial period, we were described as *immoral* people.
This is one end of the spectrum. At the other end, we have `liberals'
like Shweder, who make us into a bunch of moral *cretins*. So, it
appears, we have two choices: either we are immoral or we are moral
idiots. Not much of a choice, is it?
4. Why does this situation come about? This is not a *translation*
problem (`how should we translate *paap* into English?'), but an
empirical and theoretical problem: *what is it about the western
ethical tradition that makes the Indian culture either immoral or
morally senile?*
5. To answer this question, we *need* to develop a theory of ethics,
which does two things *simultaneously*: (a) show how and why there is
an *ethical domain* in the Indian culture and in what ways it differs
from the Western ethical domain; and (b) what are the *constraints* on
the western ethical tradition that it is *forced* to describe us the
way it has.
6. This means, Rajiv, such a theory of ethics will be a direct
*competitor* to the Western thinking on ethics. That is to say, our
`westology' will not remain a mere `westology' but will be forced to
provide an *alternative* and *competing* way of looking at the ethical
phenomenon itself.
7. This is what I discovered when I started working my project out. My
theory of religion *is* an alternate to the current theories of
religion: it shows not merely that the western intellectuals are
*wrong* but also explains why they had to be *necessarily* wrong. Idem
for my current work in ethics.
8. It is here that one experiences the humiliation of *racism*. It is
almost inconceivable to the western intellectuals, at least this has
been my experience, that an Indian could stand up and *prove* that
three hundred years of western scholarship has been wrong. You are
never forgiven for this insult; I mean, it is simply not on. If you
reproduce the `post-colonial' verbiage, you will be rewarded with a
professorship in Columbia, Chicago or California. But, beware, if you
say, let us compete on *equal terms* scientifically; may the best
theory carry the day; and that happens to be your theory!<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
spreading awareness and setting strategic goals, and about the way
movements develop. From what little I know of you, which is pretty
little I am afraid, you appear to be a person with enormous
capabilities: apart from the evident intellectual acuity, you seem to
be gifted with strategic insights and abilities, a tremendous
organisational talent and a long-term perspective. Consequently, I can
only applaud you: not from the sidelines though, but from the middle
of the field itself. You are quite clearly someone who can *pull*, if
I may use this metaphor despite its connotations, the *ratha*
(chariot); I am willing to *push* the same from behind. It is,
therefore, an immense personal pleasure for me to respond to your
efforts. As you say, `let the light shine bright and clear'.
(2) A slightly longer comment on what you call `westology', the
reverse of Indology. I will simply pen some thoughts down. We need not
enter into a dialogue about these issues on this thread: it might
*sidetrack* the discussion; besides, you can always write a separate
column on `westology', to which one can respond. Nevertheless, some
observations for you to keep in mind for the column on `westology', if
and when you write it.
2.1. When I started formulating my initial project some 17 years ago,
I too thought along (probably) similar lines. However, as I got my
teeth into the project and started working it out, it became pretty
obvious that it was doomed to *fail*. The inherent logic of such an
enterprise forces one, as it were, to build *alternate* theories to
the existing, `western' theories. Instead of explaining this statement
in the abstract, let me take a concrete example to illustrate what I
mean.
2.2. In the University of Chicago, there is a certain Richard Shweder.
He practices `Cultural Psychology', and is (was?) professor of `Human
Development'. He is rather well-known for his `cross-cultural'
studies: he and his students have published many works comparing
psychological developments across the two cultures that India and
America are. (In fact, he received a medal from the American
Association of the Advancement of Science, if I remember properly, for
one of his articles: `Does the concept of the Person vary
cross-culturally?' This was a study about the concept of `self' in the
USA and Orissa, India.) A few years ago, he published a study on the
nature of *moral development* and the growth of moral awareness
cross-culturally: again, India and the USA were the two compared
cultures.
2.3. To study this, Shweder and his co-workers developed a
questionnaire supposed to test the presence of several moral notions
among their subjects. (This article is called "Culture and Moral
Development', by Richard Shweder, Manamohan Mahapatra and Joan G.
Miller. A convenient reprint is to be found in "Cultural Psychology:
Essays on Comparative Human Development, Eds., James Stigler, Richard
Shweder and Gibert Herdt, Cambridge University Press, 1990,
Pp.130-204. I will cite from this work.) The interviewees are both
children and adults. From the list of the cases that Shweder uses,
here are the first five - in order of *perceived* `seriousness of
breach', as judged by Hindu Brahman eight-to ten-year-olds:
1. The day after his father's death, the eldest son had a haircut and
ate chicken.
2. One of your family members eats beef regularly.
3. One of your family members eats a dog regularly for dinner.
4. A widow in your community eats fish two or three times a week.
5. Six months after the death of her husband, the widow wore jewellery
and bright-colored clothes (Ibid. p.165).
It is important to note that, in India, while there was a consensus
between the children and the adults regarding the first two cases
(p.184), there was a lack of consensus only among children regarding
the last three cases. Keeping in mind that they are ordered in terms
of the `perceived seriousness of the breach', we further come across
(ibid., P.165):
8. After defecation (making a bowel movement) a woman did not change
her clothes before cooking.
13. In a family, a twenty-five-year-old son addresses his father by
his first name.
And, as the fifteenth, "a poor man went to the hospital after being
seriously hurt in an accident. At the hospital they refused to treat
him because he could not afford to pay (ibid)."
2.4. We can, I suppose, grant the truth of these statements. We can
grant too that many Indians (both children and adults) would probably
consider such actions not just as *paap* but as *mahapaap*. If not
`sins', they are at least some kind of `ethical transgressions' and
not mere breaches of social etiquette. As the sequence of questions in
the interview makes it clear, the respondents were asked to motivate
(or clarify) their stance. A fragment from such interviews, applied to
a hypothetical Bra hmin adult should make the point clear.
"1. Is the widow's behavior wrong? (Yes, Widows should not eat fish ¼)
How serious is the violation? (A very serious violation¼)
Is it a sin? (Yes. It's a "great" sin.) ¼ " (p.168)
Let us consider a similar fragment from a hypothetical American adult.
"1. Is the widow's behavior wrong? (No. She can eat fish if she wants
to.)
How serious is the violation? (It's not a violation.)
Is it a sin? (No.)" ¼ (ibid.)
2.5. If Shweder is *right* in identifying our *paap* either as `sin'
or as `immoral', one conclusion is inescapable: we Indians must be
absolute cretins really. I mean, we seem to think that what the widow
eats, what she wears, etc. are *ethically* more important than whether
a poor man gets treated in a hospital or not. *However did our culture
manage to survive for a couple of thousand years, when it is governed
by such idiotic `norms'?*
As though to rub salt in the wound, Shweder assures us that the
situation is r eally not all that pathetic. In fact, he says, one
could actually provide `reasoned defence of family life and social
practice', albeit in the form of an "ideal" argument structure. How
does it look? "The body is a temple with a spirit dwelling in it.
Therefore the sanctity of the temple must be preserved. Therefore
impure things must be kept out of and away from the body (p. 198)." It
is important to note that this `reasoned' defence occurs only to
Shweder's mind: no child `argues' the way Shweder does.
3. During the colonial period, we were described as *immoral* people.
This is one end of the spectrum. At the other end, we have `liberals'
like Shweder, who make us into a bunch of moral *cretins*. So, it
appears, we have two choices: either we are immoral or we are moral
idiots. Not much of a choice, is it?
4. Why does this situation come about? This is not a *translation*
problem (`how should we translate *paap* into English?'), but an
empirical and theoretical problem: *what is it about the western
ethical tradition that makes the Indian culture either immoral or
morally senile?*
5. To answer this question, we *need* to develop a theory of ethics,
which does two things *simultaneously*: (a) show how and why there is
an *ethical domain* in the Indian culture and in what ways it differs
from the Western ethical domain; and (b) what are the *constraints* on
the western ethical tradition that it is *forced* to describe us the
way it has.
6. This means, Rajiv, such a theory of ethics will be a direct
*competitor* to the Western thinking on ethics. That is to say, our
`westology' will not remain a mere `westology' but will be forced to
provide an *alternative* and *competing* way of looking at the ethical
phenomenon itself.
7. This is what I discovered when I started working my project out. My
theory of religion *is* an alternate to the current theories of
religion: it shows not merely that the western intellectuals are
*wrong* but also explains why they had to be *necessarily* wrong. Idem
for my current work in ethics.
8. It is here that one experiences the humiliation of *racism*. It is
almost inconceivable to the western intellectuals, at least this has
been my experience, that an Indian could stand up and *prove* that
three hundred years of western scholarship has been wrong. You are
never forgiven for this insult; I mean, it is simply not on. If you
reproduce the `post-colonial' verbiage, you will be rewarded with a
professorship in Columbia, Chicago or California. But, beware, if you
say, let us compete on *equal terms* scientifically; may the best
theory carry the day; and that happens to be your theory!<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->