12-15-2005, 12:10 AM
Parity and Communal veto - what did these terms mean in numbers?
To understand the kind of Congress-League and Hindu-Muslim settlement which was being sought by the Muslim League in demanding parity and the communal veto, it is educative to look closer at some numbers.
Parity in the Interim government discussions
What did Jinnah's demand of Congress-League parity in the interim government in 1946 mean?
The Congress had won all but nine seats of General quota(ie 201 out of 210) in the Constituent Assembly and Muslim League won all but five of the Muslim seats(73 out of 78) in the Constituent Assembly. This was without counting the members from princely states.
So Congress-League parity meant a parity between 201 Congress legislators and 73 League legislators.
In the 1946 parleys for the Interim government, Jinnah would not accept caste Hindu-Muslim parity, a formula offered by some Congress leaders in 1945. One ostensible reason for Jinnah's refusal was that Congress had swept most Scheduled Caste seats in the 1946 elections and Congress could legitimately lay claim to appointing at least one Scheduled Caste appointee. That meant that if caste Hindu-Muslim parity were maintained, Congress could legitmately have at least one seat more than the League in the interim government.
So Jinnah refused caste Hindu -Muslim parity(ref. CMP(10)) and insisted on Congress-League parity so that Congress caste Hindus, Congress Scheduled Castes and any Congress minorities would all be squeezed into parity with the Muslim League.
When that formula was not accepted, Jinnah insisted on the right to be consulted in the appointment of Scheduled Castes and other minority members(in addition to the right to appoint all the Muslims, of course).
Maulana Azad wrote to the Viceroy objecting to this pointing out that with these conditions Jinnah was not only demanding that Congress be denied the right to appoint any Muslim within its own quota but Jinnah was also demanding to exert a veto on whom else the Congress appointed in its quota as well. [From Gwyer and Appadorai].
On the day before Direct Action Day in August 1946, Nehru visited Jinnah at Jinnah's home and offered the League 5 seats out of 14(Congress would have 6). Jinnah refused the offer saying that Muslims would be in a minority and that Congress would be free to appoint a Muslim in its own quota. In the event, Congress finally agreed not to appoint a Congress Muslim from its own quota when the Congress-League interim government finally took office in September 1946.
It is interesting to note that an year earlier during the first Simla Conference in 1945 Jinnah had refused a Congress-League parity offer to Indianize the Executive Council on the excuse that Muslims did not get 50% of total seats on the council.
According to Durga Das in 'India from Nehru to Curzon and after', the formula Jinnah rejected was
Congress 5(2 Hindus + 1 Muslim + 1 Christian + 1 Parsee)+
League 5 Muslims +
2 Viceroy nominated Scheduled Caste +
1 Viceroy nominated Sikh +
1 Viceroy nominated Unionist Muslim,
resulting in 7 Muslims in a Council of 14 and a clear minority of Hindus.
According to Durga Das Jinnah said he refused because of the inclusion of a Congress Muslim. Durga Das writes that Jinnah told him the real reason he refused because he had been secretly offered 'Pakistan on a platter' by some British civil servants for sabotaging the Wavell effort.
According to Viceroy Wavell (The Transfer of Power, ed. Nicholas Mansergh and Moon) the final formula which was rejected in 1945 Simla Conference was actually
4 Congress(all Hindus) +
4 League(all Muslims) +
1 Viceroy nominated Hindu +
1 Viceroy nominated Muslim(Unionist) +
2 Viceroy nominated Scheduled Caste +
1 Viceroy nominated Sikh +
1 Viceroy nominated Christian
resulting in 5 Muslims in a Council of 14
The Viceroy wrote that Jinnah refused this formula because of inclusion of the Unionist Muslim and because Muslims did not have parity with all the rest combined, ie Muslims did not get 50% or 7 berths.
It is to be remembered that during this period, Muslims constituted 25% of the population.
Communal veto in Central legislature
Under para 15(2) of the Cabinet Mission Plan(ref. CMP(3)),
(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all members present and voting.
The Congress supported the provision of such a commmunal veto in the Union Constituent Assembly, but not in any future Union legislature. Jinnah was against the existence of any Union legislature, but wanted such a veto if such a Union legislature existed(CMP(2)).
A communal veto meant that a majority of each community, i.e., a majority of Hindus AND a majority of Muslims had to vote in favor of a measure for that measure to be passed in the legislature.
Here is an example of what separate communal voting in legislature implied in real numbers.
Suppose there were 78 Muslims and 214 General+ Sikh in a hypothetical future Union Legislative Assembly, taking same numbers as constituted the Constituent Assembly without the princely states.
Now suppose some country approached the Pakistan section of the Indian Union and promised it aid, and convinced it of the need to wage jihad in Afghanistan( a not inconceivable possibility). But though a majority of the Union legislature voted against it, 'Pakistani' Muslims, though a minority, went ahead and adopted the jihad policy and the Union of India could not stop them.
How did this happen? Under para 15(2) of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
The way it happened was
a)'Pakistani' Muslims said that the issue of whether to wage jihad in Afghanistan was a major communal issue.
So under para15 (2) separate communal voting had to be held in Union legislature (which decided matters on three subjects only - defence, foreign affairs and communications related to defence).
b)During this vote, 214 General+sikh voted against since they did not favor waging jihad in Afghanistan.
c)Some Muslims also voted against it but 'Pakistani' Muslims who were the majority of the 78 Muslims in Legislature voted FOR waging jihad.
d) Since the measure couldnot be passed unless a majority of both communities voted for it, the measure in favor of jihad did not pass.
e)But Muslims had had 50% weight in voting. Pakistani Muslims who had first brought up the issue said "islam was in danger again, because who the heck are nonMuslims to disallow jihad which is our farz and the Union can not stop us anyway".
Muslim League had already gotten the Indian Army dissolved and reconstituted on two-nation basis as Jinnah had demanded. So Pakistan and the Pakistan Army decided to launch jihad in Afghanistan against the wishes of the majority of India and the Union which could not prevent it.
f)Again, why couldn't the anti-jihad majority prevent it? Because the nonMuslim part of that dissenting majority though holding 214 seats had had only 50% say in the matter and the Muslim part of the dissenting majority was outvoted by the Pakistani Muslims in their section of 78 seats.
The Muslims and nonMuslims who opposed jihad though an overall overwhelming majority combined were forbidden from such combining by para 15(2) rule of Cabinet Mission Plan's insistence on separate communal voting.
Under this rule their votes were to be counted separately - the nonMuslims' no go votes counted for only 50% and the dissenting Muslims no go votes were outvoted by the Pakistani Muslims.
So the majority could not together garner a anti-jihad majority consensus to empower the Union government to prevent the minority Pakistani Muslims/Army from waging jihad in Afghanistan.
What were the numbers?
Under para 15(2), if only a majority of the Muslim members, in other words, 78/2+1 = 40 Muslims out of a total Union legislature of 292 voted in favor of Pakistani Army waging jihad in Afghanistan, no one in United India could stop them under the Cabinet Mission Plan.
Clearly it didn't matter what were the absolute numbers, one more than exactly half of the total Muslim members , whatever their number, were all that were needed.
In other words, the majority could not have the foreign policy it wanted but the minority could pursue the foreign policy it wanted in defiance of the majority and Union government. There is no meaning in such a federation and this situation would lead to an end of the federation.
http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/Parit...to_numbers.html
To understand the kind of Congress-League and Hindu-Muslim settlement which was being sought by the Muslim League in demanding parity and the communal veto, it is educative to look closer at some numbers.
Parity in the Interim government discussions
What did Jinnah's demand of Congress-League parity in the interim government in 1946 mean?
The Congress had won all but nine seats of General quota(ie 201 out of 210) in the Constituent Assembly and Muslim League won all but five of the Muslim seats(73 out of 78) in the Constituent Assembly. This was without counting the members from princely states.
So Congress-League parity meant a parity between 201 Congress legislators and 73 League legislators.
In the 1946 parleys for the Interim government, Jinnah would not accept caste Hindu-Muslim parity, a formula offered by some Congress leaders in 1945. One ostensible reason for Jinnah's refusal was that Congress had swept most Scheduled Caste seats in the 1946 elections and Congress could legitimately lay claim to appointing at least one Scheduled Caste appointee. That meant that if caste Hindu-Muslim parity were maintained, Congress could legitmately have at least one seat more than the League in the interim government.
So Jinnah refused caste Hindu -Muslim parity(ref. CMP(10)) and insisted on Congress-League parity so that Congress caste Hindus, Congress Scheduled Castes and any Congress minorities would all be squeezed into parity with the Muslim League.
When that formula was not accepted, Jinnah insisted on the right to be consulted in the appointment of Scheduled Castes and other minority members(in addition to the right to appoint all the Muslims, of course).
Maulana Azad wrote to the Viceroy objecting to this pointing out that with these conditions Jinnah was not only demanding that Congress be denied the right to appoint any Muslim within its own quota but Jinnah was also demanding to exert a veto on whom else the Congress appointed in its quota as well. [From Gwyer and Appadorai].
On the day before Direct Action Day in August 1946, Nehru visited Jinnah at Jinnah's home and offered the League 5 seats out of 14(Congress would have 6). Jinnah refused the offer saying that Muslims would be in a minority and that Congress would be free to appoint a Muslim in its own quota. In the event, Congress finally agreed not to appoint a Congress Muslim from its own quota when the Congress-League interim government finally took office in September 1946.
It is interesting to note that an year earlier during the first Simla Conference in 1945 Jinnah had refused a Congress-League parity offer to Indianize the Executive Council on the excuse that Muslims did not get 50% of total seats on the council.
According to Durga Das in 'India from Nehru to Curzon and after', the formula Jinnah rejected was
Congress 5(2 Hindus + 1 Muslim + 1 Christian + 1 Parsee)+
League 5 Muslims +
2 Viceroy nominated Scheduled Caste +
1 Viceroy nominated Sikh +
1 Viceroy nominated Unionist Muslim,
resulting in 7 Muslims in a Council of 14 and a clear minority of Hindus.
According to Durga Das Jinnah said he refused because of the inclusion of a Congress Muslim. Durga Das writes that Jinnah told him the real reason he refused because he had been secretly offered 'Pakistan on a platter' by some British civil servants for sabotaging the Wavell effort.
According to Viceroy Wavell (The Transfer of Power, ed. Nicholas Mansergh and Moon) the final formula which was rejected in 1945 Simla Conference was actually
4 Congress(all Hindus) +
4 League(all Muslims) +
1 Viceroy nominated Hindu +
1 Viceroy nominated Muslim(Unionist) +
2 Viceroy nominated Scheduled Caste +
1 Viceroy nominated Sikh +
1 Viceroy nominated Christian
resulting in 5 Muslims in a Council of 14
The Viceroy wrote that Jinnah refused this formula because of inclusion of the Unionist Muslim and because Muslims did not have parity with all the rest combined, ie Muslims did not get 50% or 7 berths.
It is to be remembered that during this period, Muslims constituted 25% of the population.
Communal veto in Central legislature
Under para 15(2) of the Cabinet Mission Plan(ref. CMP(3)),
(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British Indian and States' representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all members present and voting.
The Congress supported the provision of such a commmunal veto in the Union Constituent Assembly, but not in any future Union legislature. Jinnah was against the existence of any Union legislature, but wanted such a veto if such a Union legislature existed(CMP(2)).
A communal veto meant that a majority of each community, i.e., a majority of Hindus AND a majority of Muslims had to vote in favor of a measure for that measure to be passed in the legislature.
Here is an example of what separate communal voting in legislature implied in real numbers.
Suppose there were 78 Muslims and 214 General+ Sikh in a hypothetical future Union Legislative Assembly, taking same numbers as constituted the Constituent Assembly without the princely states.
Now suppose some country approached the Pakistan section of the Indian Union and promised it aid, and convinced it of the need to wage jihad in Afghanistan( a not inconceivable possibility). But though a majority of the Union legislature voted against it, 'Pakistani' Muslims, though a minority, went ahead and adopted the jihad policy and the Union of India could not stop them.
How did this happen? Under para 15(2) of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
The way it happened was
a)'Pakistani' Muslims said that the issue of whether to wage jihad in Afghanistan was a major communal issue.
So under para15 (2) separate communal voting had to be held in Union legislature (which decided matters on three subjects only - defence, foreign affairs and communications related to defence).
b)During this vote, 214 General+sikh voted against since they did not favor waging jihad in Afghanistan.
c)Some Muslims also voted against it but 'Pakistani' Muslims who were the majority of the 78 Muslims in Legislature voted FOR waging jihad.
d) Since the measure couldnot be passed unless a majority of both communities voted for it, the measure in favor of jihad did not pass.
e)But Muslims had had 50% weight in voting. Pakistani Muslims who had first brought up the issue said "islam was in danger again, because who the heck are nonMuslims to disallow jihad which is our farz and the Union can not stop us anyway".
Muslim League had already gotten the Indian Army dissolved and reconstituted on two-nation basis as Jinnah had demanded. So Pakistan and the Pakistan Army decided to launch jihad in Afghanistan against the wishes of the majority of India and the Union which could not prevent it.
f)Again, why couldn't the anti-jihad majority prevent it? Because the nonMuslim part of that dissenting majority though holding 214 seats had had only 50% say in the matter and the Muslim part of the dissenting majority was outvoted by the Pakistani Muslims in their section of 78 seats.
The Muslims and nonMuslims who opposed jihad though an overall overwhelming majority combined were forbidden from such combining by para 15(2) rule of Cabinet Mission Plan's insistence on separate communal voting.
Under this rule their votes were to be counted separately - the nonMuslims' no go votes counted for only 50% and the dissenting Muslims no go votes were outvoted by the Pakistani Muslims.
So the majority could not together garner a anti-jihad majority consensus to empower the Union government to prevent the minority Pakistani Muslims/Army from waging jihad in Afghanistan.
What were the numbers?
Under para 15(2), if only a majority of the Muslim members, in other words, 78/2+1 = 40 Muslims out of a total Union legislature of 292 voted in favor of Pakistani Army waging jihad in Afghanistan, no one in United India could stop them under the Cabinet Mission Plan.
Clearly it didn't matter what were the absolute numbers, one more than exactly half of the total Muslim members , whatever their number, were all that were needed.
In other words, the majority could not have the foreign policy it wanted but the minority could pursue the foreign policy it wanted in defiance of the majority and Union government. There is no meaning in such a federation and this situation would lead to an end of the federation.
http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/Parit...to_numbers.html