06-13-2005, 11:21 PM
Gandhi wanted Jinnah to be India's PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Perhaps the most intriguing speculation about recent Indian history and politics - in the wake of the furore surrounding remarks made in Pakistan by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader LK Advani - is what would have happened if Mohammmad Ali Jinnah had accepted Mahatma Gandhi's offer of being prime minister of undivided India.
Although Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel were averse to the idea when it was put to them by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, there is little doubt that if Gandhi had insisted, they would have had no option but to accept it. Gandhi may not have been an ordinary member of the Congress, his moral stature was so high that no one could have opposed his express wishes.
Nehru and Patel were of course appalled at the suggestion, with the former being "shocked to learn", as historian Stanley Wolpert says in his biography of Jinnah "that the Mahatma was quite ready to replace him as premier with the Quaid-e-Azam". Jinnah, on the other hand, was not unresponsive. Mountbatten noted, "Mr. Gandhi's famous scheme may yet go through on the pure vanity of Mr Jinnah!"
Yet, if it was never seriously considered, it is apparently because of the viceroy's personal animus towards Jinnah, whom he considered to be a "psychopathic case". As Mountbatten said: "Until I met him, I would not have thought it possible that a man with such a complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down so powerful a position."
<b>So, probably, the last chance to save India from partition floundered, first, on Gandhi's failure to insist that his idea be given a fair try. Secondly, because of Nehru's and Patel's objections, presumably because they were keen on the top positions for themselves. As Nehru later said, they were getting on in years and did not want to wait for too long for India's independence. And thirdly, because Mountbatten was unable to interact with the "frigid, haughty and disdainful" Jinnah as freely as he did with Nehru.</b>
There were others, too, who were less open to the idea of the Quaid-e-Azam as the prime minister. George Abell, one of Mountbatten's aides, expressed the fear that there might be a civil war since Jinnah's cabinet would be wholly subordinate to the Congress majority in the central legislature while the civil servant VP Menon said that the move might create political complications since it would "place Jinnah in the position of having to adjust his views to those of the Congress".
Even if Gandhi's suggestion is seen as utopian and "unrealistic", as Nehru had said, it nevertheless shows that on the eve of partition, Jinnah did not have the kind of unflattering image as he would later have in India. That image is the result of the communal riots that accompanied the division of the country and in the aftermath of the call for "direct action" given by the Muslim League in August 1946.
Notwithstanding these negative aspects of Jinnah's politics, no student of Indian history can forget his role as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity", as he was called by Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Sarojini Naidu in the 1920s and 1930s. It is evidently this reputation of being the ambassador to which Gandhi was harking back when he wanted him to be the prime minister.
As is obvious, therefore, Jinnah's career in politics can be divided into two halves. The first half saw him in the secular camp, engaged in the task of bringing Hindus and Muslims together. That his belief in secularism never died is evident from the speech on August 11, 1947, to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly which Advani referred to while in Pakistan.
But the second half of Jinnah's political career undoubtedly saw him abandoning secularism for the sake of communal politics, as when he projected the Muslim League as the only party which could save the Indian Muslims from coming under a Hindu raj ushered in by the Congress after independence.
This stance followed the resounding defeat suffered by the League at the hands of the Congress in the 1937 elections which convinced Jinnah and other Muslim leaders that their party had little chance of defeating the seemingly all-powerful Congress in the foreseeable future. It could only do so by whipping up communal sentiments and identifying the Congress as a party only of the Hindus. In arguing his case against the Congress's claim to represent all the communities in India, Jinnah floated his two-nation theory, which portrayed Hindus and Muslims as belonging to two separate "nations".
Arguably, he did not believe in it as ardently as he claimed, for, otherwise, he would not have accepted the Cabinet Mission's plan for a federal India in which the Muslim-majority states of what is today Pakistan and Bangladesh would have been a part of the Union of India. If this plan fell through, the reason is, as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad says in his book "India Wins Freedom", that Nehru said that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly unfettered by any agreement. Jinnah used this disclaimer to withdraw his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan and call for "direct action".
There were two opportunities, therefore, for avoiding the partition. One was Gandhi's offer to Jinnah to be prime minister. And the other was the Cabinet Mission plan, which had secured the approval of both the Congress and the Muslim League, <b>till Nehru made his fateful observation</b>.
(Ganguli is a political analyst. He can be reached at aganguli@mail.com)
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Perhaps the most intriguing speculation about recent Indian history and politics - in the wake of the furore surrounding remarks made in Pakistan by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader LK Advani - is what would have happened if Mohammmad Ali Jinnah had accepted Mahatma Gandhi's offer of being prime minister of undivided India.
Although Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel were averse to the idea when it was put to them by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, there is little doubt that if Gandhi had insisted, they would have had no option but to accept it. Gandhi may not have been an ordinary member of the Congress, his moral stature was so high that no one could have opposed his express wishes.
Nehru and Patel were of course appalled at the suggestion, with the former being "shocked to learn", as historian Stanley Wolpert says in his biography of Jinnah "that the Mahatma was quite ready to replace him as premier with the Quaid-e-Azam". Jinnah, on the other hand, was not unresponsive. Mountbatten noted, "Mr. Gandhi's famous scheme may yet go through on the pure vanity of Mr Jinnah!"
Yet, if it was never seriously considered, it is apparently because of the viceroy's personal animus towards Jinnah, whom he considered to be a "psychopathic case". As Mountbatten said: "Until I met him, I would not have thought it possible that a man with such a complete lack of administrative knowledge or sense of responsibility could achieve or hold down so powerful a position."
<b>So, probably, the last chance to save India from partition floundered, first, on Gandhi's failure to insist that his idea be given a fair try. Secondly, because of Nehru's and Patel's objections, presumably because they were keen on the top positions for themselves. As Nehru later said, they were getting on in years and did not want to wait for too long for India's independence. And thirdly, because Mountbatten was unable to interact with the "frigid, haughty and disdainful" Jinnah as freely as he did with Nehru.</b>
There were others, too, who were less open to the idea of the Quaid-e-Azam as the prime minister. George Abell, one of Mountbatten's aides, expressed the fear that there might be a civil war since Jinnah's cabinet would be wholly subordinate to the Congress majority in the central legislature while the civil servant VP Menon said that the move might create political complications since it would "place Jinnah in the position of having to adjust his views to those of the Congress".
Even if Gandhi's suggestion is seen as utopian and "unrealistic", as Nehru had said, it nevertheless shows that on the eve of partition, Jinnah did not have the kind of unflattering image as he would later have in India. That image is the result of the communal riots that accompanied the division of the country and in the aftermath of the call for "direct action" given by the Muslim League in August 1946.
Notwithstanding these negative aspects of Jinnah's politics, no student of Indian history can forget his role as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity", as he was called by Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Sarojini Naidu in the 1920s and 1930s. It is evidently this reputation of being the ambassador to which Gandhi was harking back when he wanted him to be the prime minister.
As is obvious, therefore, Jinnah's career in politics can be divided into two halves. The first half saw him in the secular camp, engaged in the task of bringing Hindus and Muslims together. That his belief in secularism never died is evident from the speech on August 11, 1947, to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly which Advani referred to while in Pakistan.
But the second half of Jinnah's political career undoubtedly saw him abandoning secularism for the sake of communal politics, as when he projected the Muslim League as the only party which could save the Indian Muslims from coming under a Hindu raj ushered in by the Congress after independence.
This stance followed the resounding defeat suffered by the League at the hands of the Congress in the 1937 elections which convinced Jinnah and other Muslim leaders that their party had little chance of defeating the seemingly all-powerful Congress in the foreseeable future. It could only do so by whipping up communal sentiments and identifying the Congress as a party only of the Hindus. In arguing his case against the Congress's claim to represent all the communities in India, Jinnah floated his two-nation theory, which portrayed Hindus and Muslims as belonging to two separate "nations".
Arguably, he did not believe in it as ardently as he claimed, for, otherwise, he would not have accepted the Cabinet Mission's plan for a federal India in which the Muslim-majority states of what is today Pakistan and Bangladesh would have been a part of the Union of India. If this plan fell through, the reason is, as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad says in his book "India Wins Freedom", that Nehru said that the Congress would enter the Constituent Assembly unfettered by any agreement. Jinnah used this disclaimer to withdraw his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan and call for "direct action".
There were two opportunities, therefore, for avoiding the partition. One was Gandhi's offer to Jinnah to be prime minister. And the other was the Cabinet Mission plan, which had secured the approval of both the Congress and the Muslim League, <b>till Nehru made his fateful observation</b>.
(Ganguli is a political analyst. He can be reached at aganguli@mail.com)
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