06-01-2005, 05:23 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Don't drop guard in Kargil </b>
Ashok K Mehta
Last week, I revisited Kargil and Leh in Ladakh even as the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan met at Islamabad for the second round of talks on Siachen since the resumption of the composite dialogue in 2004. No breakthrough has been reported.
From Dras, looking at the sheer domination of Tololing, Tiger Hill and Point 5875 (Batra Hill), I marvelled at the stunning feat of our Infantry soldiers who recaptured these hilltops six years ago. I was also struck by the fact that despite four wars, several skirmishes and a year-long military confrontation, we have been unable to undo Pakistani intrusions such as at Dalunang in 1988 and the nibbling over the years in the Dras sector. Our non-action emboldened Pakistan to do a Kargil.
A look at the alignment of NH 1A, the lifeline from Srinagar to Leh across Zojila will show its precarious proximity and parallel alignment to the LoC from Dras to the Kargil town. Yet, nothing was done to remove Pakistan's all-weather domination by observation and fire across several stretches of this road. Nor was any alternative route operationalised (it was conceptualised, though) because Kargil and Leh sectors were not the targets of the proxy war.
Pakistani military analysts admit Kargil was a consummate blunder.<b> But historically India's track record in this sector has not been impressive either. The loss of 516 soldiers and airmen in vacating the aggressors from Kargil could have been minimised with more robust use of IAF as demonstrated during the elimination of Pakistan's Lunda post at Point 3260 (Lunda post) during Operation Parakram. Technology, more than manpower, should have won the war and settled other residual scores.</b>
In the 1947-48 war, for example, we left the famous Point 13620 towering over Kargil town in Pakistani possession. When Pakistan ignited the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, the Army fought and seized Point 13620, a thorn in the side ever since. Unfortunately, it had to be vacated after the British brokered a ceasefire. During the 1965 war that followed, point 13620 was retaken. Tragically, along with Haji Pir, it had to be returned to Pakistan at Tashkent. But Point 13620 was captured a third time in 1971, this time for keeps. Last week it stood out on the Kargil skyline despite its weight of snow.
The anomalies of the LoC in Dras sector-which provide a free view to Pakistan on our side-could have been rectified during Kargil and/or Operation Parakram in 1999 and 2002. But we excel in missing opportunities. Till the November 2003 ceasefire, the Dras and Kargil towns were under daily shelling. Life was completely disrupted, schools dislocated as civilians constructed bunkers worth Rs 8,000 a piece from funds provided by Srinagar. Now they are breathing normally even at those dizzy heights. But peace is temporary as boards reading "you are under or out of enemy observation" or "you are safe now" dot the dozen plus stretches of road seen by Pakistan artillery observers.
Before the 1999 Kargil trauma, one Infantry brigade group of 4 to 5 battalions was responsible for the nearly 180 km LoC from Zojila to Chorbatla. Post Kargil, a Mountain Division took charge. The number of combat troops, logistics force and civilians that support the Siachenised Kargil sector has more than trebled. Of the nearly 250 posts and bases, more than half are cut off in winter for periods from five to seven months. At places, even a helicopter cannot make it. Compared to Siachen, these posts are still unstable and therefore more difficult to sustain.
The Kirloskar or Honda generator at each post is deified and coveted as no other collective valuable on the post. At temperatures of minus 40 degrees centigrade, the connecting rod of the generator frequently snaps and so does life for the platoon of soldiers till it is revived. The EME Major at Dras, whose job it is to keep the machines revving even in 10 to 12 feet of snow told me: "It is so satisfying to repair something that is not working." He reflects the ethos and elan of the several thousand soldiers in the rear who ensure the few hundred on posts are alert, happy and uncomplaining.
But they have reason to complain. Those deployed on the posts in Kargil are not equated with their peers in Siachen inn terms of allowances and perks. These lads do a two-year tenure-two winters-in the wilderness, whereas Siachen time is limited to three months, with another three months for induction and de-induction. There is a strong case for equating certain Kargil sector locations with Siachen. It will provide some cheer to many in the armies across the LoC that Siachen is still considered the test bed of manhood and virility.
The 430-km road from Zojila to Leh is lined with more memorials to soldiers than trees for comfort. Many of these soldiers from the Border Roads Organisation, assisted by thousands of Nepali and Bihari labour with Sherpa dogs, have kept the highway open all these years. Unfortunately, the road is still single-lane and avalanche-prone. The Kargil division is on a big exercise planting trees, which, once having taken root, will make many of the danger signs attributable to the enemy, redundant. The BRO must also be recognised for the hundreds of wise and amusing highway signs for avoiding accidents. "It is better to be Mr Late than Late Mr"; "Drive on engine power, not rum power", etc.
The Dras Saviours Brigade does a presentation on the Kargil war. It is the stuff that must be shown to civilians passing through the area. Including the four epic battles of Tololing, Tiger Hill, Point 4875 and Jubbar Heights, the Army and the Air Force won four PVCs, 6 MVCs and 27 VrCs among numerous lesser awards, making Kargil the highest per capita recipient of gallantry awards ever. The previous record for bravery gongs was held by Bana Post (renamed from Qaid-e-Azam after its capture from Pakistan in 1986). The counter-attack of 1987, which was beaten back, too, earned many medals. The other claimants for distinction in gallantry awards are Point 13620 and OP Hill in Rajauri sector.
You have had it, in the Indian Army, if you fail to observe human rights. I discovered this rule in Kargil where I had gone to attend a workshop on human rights. Justice Shivraj Patil, a member of the National Human Rights Commission, who was the keynote speaker, was extremely impressed with the concern and sensitivity among soldiers for the need to conduct operations within norms of civilised behaviour and the law of the land. Some excellent case studies from the Srinagar valley were discussed. But Kargil and Leh are completely at peace since the ceasefire. There are no terrorists here, so no human rights violations are taking place.
But all that could change this summer. With the fencing on the LoC, north and south of Pir Panjal intact, it is through Dras and Kargil that infiltration may be tried, as in 1993-94. Reports of new terrorist camps in Skardu opposite Kargil indicate this possibility. But unlike in 1999, 8 Mountain Division is ready this time.
The benefits of Operation Sadbhavna-Army schools, women empowerment centres, medical posts-are enormous for the civilians. Except for the elements-the weather and the loneliness-this area is pacified. It is for this reason that the ongoing acts of extended deployment must stop. Neither side can win in Kargil or Siachen or anywhere militarily. Gen Pervez Musharraf has said that Siachen and Sir Creek are solvable problems. The buzz word is 'demilitarisation'.
<b>From India's point of view, there are two issues in Siachen. Demarcation of AGPL and verification of demilitarised zone. Possibly, the third concern of the boundary beyond Point 9842 could be put on the back burner till a final settlement of J&K. Bereft of any strategic and geopolitical value, Siachen followed by Kargil must be selectively demilitarised. Both sides should agree to withdraw to mutually acceptable positions outside the weather-killing zone. Whatever the compulsions, we should not harden our position on Siachen. If Pakistan does not agree to our terms, we should offer to vacate Siachen on the condition that Pakistan deploys a Brigade there permanently. As Rangeen Ali, the owner of the famous Hotel Zojila in Kargil said: "It is senseless making more martyrs out of frostbite." </b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Ashok K Mehta
Last week, I revisited Kargil and Leh in Ladakh even as the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan met at Islamabad for the second round of talks on Siachen since the resumption of the composite dialogue in 2004. No breakthrough has been reported.
From Dras, looking at the sheer domination of Tololing, Tiger Hill and Point 5875 (Batra Hill), I marvelled at the stunning feat of our Infantry soldiers who recaptured these hilltops six years ago. I was also struck by the fact that despite four wars, several skirmishes and a year-long military confrontation, we have been unable to undo Pakistani intrusions such as at Dalunang in 1988 and the nibbling over the years in the Dras sector. Our non-action emboldened Pakistan to do a Kargil.
A look at the alignment of NH 1A, the lifeline from Srinagar to Leh across Zojila will show its precarious proximity and parallel alignment to the LoC from Dras to the Kargil town. Yet, nothing was done to remove Pakistan's all-weather domination by observation and fire across several stretches of this road. Nor was any alternative route operationalised (it was conceptualised, though) because Kargil and Leh sectors were not the targets of the proxy war.
Pakistani military analysts admit Kargil was a consummate blunder.<b> But historically India's track record in this sector has not been impressive either. The loss of 516 soldiers and airmen in vacating the aggressors from Kargil could have been minimised with more robust use of IAF as demonstrated during the elimination of Pakistan's Lunda post at Point 3260 (Lunda post) during Operation Parakram. Technology, more than manpower, should have won the war and settled other residual scores.</b>
In the 1947-48 war, for example, we left the famous Point 13620 towering over Kargil town in Pakistani possession. When Pakistan ignited the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, the Army fought and seized Point 13620, a thorn in the side ever since. Unfortunately, it had to be vacated after the British brokered a ceasefire. During the 1965 war that followed, point 13620 was retaken. Tragically, along with Haji Pir, it had to be returned to Pakistan at Tashkent. But Point 13620 was captured a third time in 1971, this time for keeps. Last week it stood out on the Kargil skyline despite its weight of snow.
The anomalies of the LoC in Dras sector-which provide a free view to Pakistan on our side-could have been rectified during Kargil and/or Operation Parakram in 1999 and 2002. But we excel in missing opportunities. Till the November 2003 ceasefire, the Dras and Kargil towns were under daily shelling. Life was completely disrupted, schools dislocated as civilians constructed bunkers worth Rs 8,000 a piece from funds provided by Srinagar. Now they are breathing normally even at those dizzy heights. But peace is temporary as boards reading "you are under or out of enemy observation" or "you are safe now" dot the dozen plus stretches of road seen by Pakistan artillery observers.
Before the 1999 Kargil trauma, one Infantry brigade group of 4 to 5 battalions was responsible for the nearly 180 km LoC from Zojila to Chorbatla. Post Kargil, a Mountain Division took charge. The number of combat troops, logistics force and civilians that support the Siachenised Kargil sector has more than trebled. Of the nearly 250 posts and bases, more than half are cut off in winter for periods from five to seven months. At places, even a helicopter cannot make it. Compared to Siachen, these posts are still unstable and therefore more difficult to sustain.
The Kirloskar or Honda generator at each post is deified and coveted as no other collective valuable on the post. At temperatures of minus 40 degrees centigrade, the connecting rod of the generator frequently snaps and so does life for the platoon of soldiers till it is revived. The EME Major at Dras, whose job it is to keep the machines revving even in 10 to 12 feet of snow told me: "It is so satisfying to repair something that is not working." He reflects the ethos and elan of the several thousand soldiers in the rear who ensure the few hundred on posts are alert, happy and uncomplaining.
But they have reason to complain. Those deployed on the posts in Kargil are not equated with their peers in Siachen inn terms of allowances and perks. These lads do a two-year tenure-two winters-in the wilderness, whereas Siachen time is limited to three months, with another three months for induction and de-induction. There is a strong case for equating certain Kargil sector locations with Siachen. It will provide some cheer to many in the armies across the LoC that Siachen is still considered the test bed of manhood and virility.
The 430-km road from Zojila to Leh is lined with more memorials to soldiers than trees for comfort. Many of these soldiers from the Border Roads Organisation, assisted by thousands of Nepali and Bihari labour with Sherpa dogs, have kept the highway open all these years. Unfortunately, the road is still single-lane and avalanche-prone. The Kargil division is on a big exercise planting trees, which, once having taken root, will make many of the danger signs attributable to the enemy, redundant. The BRO must also be recognised for the hundreds of wise and amusing highway signs for avoiding accidents. "It is better to be Mr Late than Late Mr"; "Drive on engine power, not rum power", etc.
The Dras Saviours Brigade does a presentation on the Kargil war. It is the stuff that must be shown to civilians passing through the area. Including the four epic battles of Tololing, Tiger Hill, Point 4875 and Jubbar Heights, the Army and the Air Force won four PVCs, 6 MVCs and 27 VrCs among numerous lesser awards, making Kargil the highest per capita recipient of gallantry awards ever. The previous record for bravery gongs was held by Bana Post (renamed from Qaid-e-Azam after its capture from Pakistan in 1986). The counter-attack of 1987, which was beaten back, too, earned many medals. The other claimants for distinction in gallantry awards are Point 13620 and OP Hill in Rajauri sector.
You have had it, in the Indian Army, if you fail to observe human rights. I discovered this rule in Kargil where I had gone to attend a workshop on human rights. Justice Shivraj Patil, a member of the National Human Rights Commission, who was the keynote speaker, was extremely impressed with the concern and sensitivity among soldiers for the need to conduct operations within norms of civilised behaviour and the law of the land. Some excellent case studies from the Srinagar valley were discussed. But Kargil and Leh are completely at peace since the ceasefire. There are no terrorists here, so no human rights violations are taking place.
But all that could change this summer. With the fencing on the LoC, north and south of Pir Panjal intact, it is through Dras and Kargil that infiltration may be tried, as in 1993-94. Reports of new terrorist camps in Skardu opposite Kargil indicate this possibility. But unlike in 1999, 8 Mountain Division is ready this time.
The benefits of Operation Sadbhavna-Army schools, women empowerment centres, medical posts-are enormous for the civilians. Except for the elements-the weather and the loneliness-this area is pacified. It is for this reason that the ongoing acts of extended deployment must stop. Neither side can win in Kargil or Siachen or anywhere militarily. Gen Pervez Musharraf has said that Siachen and Sir Creek are solvable problems. The buzz word is 'demilitarisation'.
<b>From India's point of view, there are two issues in Siachen. Demarcation of AGPL and verification of demilitarised zone. Possibly, the third concern of the boundary beyond Point 9842 could be put on the back burner till a final settlement of J&K. Bereft of any strategic and geopolitical value, Siachen followed by Kargil must be selectively demilitarised. Both sides should agree to withdraw to mutually acceptable positions outside the weather-killing zone. Whatever the compulsions, we should not harden our position on Siachen. If Pakistan does not agree to our terms, we should offer to vacate Siachen on the condition that Pakistan deploys a Brigade there permanently. As Rangeen Ali, the owner of the famous Hotel Zojila in Kargil said: "It is senseless making more martyrs out of frostbite." </b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->